Liberationist Thoughts

of

David Sztybel, Ph.D.

(in ascending order, or from first entry to latest;
for descending order, with the latest entries listed first, click here)

INDEX

(1) Welcome! ~ April 21 / 07

NOTE: "FvP" = "Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism Series," the first series in this blog.

(2) Francione Attacks Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics! ~ April 25 / 07 [FvP Part 1]

(3) Francione on "Unnecessary Suffering" ~ July 28 / 07 [FvP Part 2]

(4) Book Reviews ~ September 5 / 07

(5) Insults and Illusions ~ November 21 / 07 [FvP Part 3]

(6) Wise's "Thunder without Rain" ~ November 26 / 07 [FvP Part 4]

(7) Francione's Futilitarianism ~ December 13 / 07 [FvP Part 5]

(8) Is "Futilitarianism" an Insult? ~ December 16 / 07 [FvP Part 6]

(9) The Brock "Miracle" ~ December 16 / 07

(10) Shifting to Homemade Blog ~ January 1 / 08

(11) Two New Web Publications! ~ January 11 / 08

(12) On the Futilitarian Front We Are Winning, But Have Not Won Enough! ~ January 16 / 08 [FvP Part 7]

(13) The Red Carpet ~ January 17 / 08 [FvP Part 8]

(14) Retraction and Apology ~ January 30 / 08

(15) A Public Service: "Motivating Yourself to Study" ~ February 1 / 08

(16) Update of “Animal Rights Law”—with New Insights ~ February 20 / 08 [FvP Part 9]

(17) New Guide: ANIMAL ACTION! ~ March 26 / 08

(18) One Jury Is Back ~ May 31 / 08 [FvP Part 10]

(19) Francione's Proposals: More "Welfarist" than the "Welfarists" ~ June 1 / 08 [FvP Part 11]

(20) Great Apes Activism: Fending Off Futilitarian Animal Rightists ~ June 10 / 08 [FvP Part 12]

(21) Veganism as a Moral Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses ~ June 13 / 08 [FvP Part 13]

(22) Am I "Obsessed" with Gary Francione? No. ~ June 14 / 08 [FvP Part 14]

(23) Ways in Which Animal Rights Fundamentalism Harms the Animal Rights Movement ~ June 15 / 08 [FvP Part 15]

(24) One of Greatest Animal Rights Pragmatists' Life in Danger: Appeal from Dr. Martin Balluch ~ June 16 / 08

(25) Responding to Martin Balluch's Essay, "Abolitionism versus Reformism" ~ June 17 / 08 [FvP Part 16]

(26) New Site Name, Mission Statement, and Balluch Update ~ June 24 / 08

(27) Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters ~ June 25 / 08 [FvP Part 17]

(28) The "Test Period" ~ June 26 / 08 [FvP Part 18]

(29) Francione's Mighty Boomerang ~ July 15 / 08 [FvP Part 19]

(30) Is Fundamentalism "Purist"? ~ July 17 / 08 [FvP Part 20]

(31) Do-Nothingism Triumphant? ~ July 22 / 08 [FvP Part 21]

(32) Negativism in Francione, and Avoiding Negativism towards Francione ~ July 23 / 08 [FvP Part 22]

NOTE: "AE" = "Animal Ethics Series," the second series in this blog.

(33) New Series on Animal Ethics ~ July 28, 2008 [AE Part 1]

(34) Is It Speciesist To Use the Term "Animal"? ~ August 12, 2008 [AE Part 2]

(35) Is It Objectionable To Use the Term "Vivisection"? ~ August 20, 2008 [AE Part 3]

(36) Martin Balluch and Fellow Prisoners Now Free! ~ September 20, 2008

(37) Crises in (Animal) Ethics ~ September 21, 2008 [AE Part 4]

(38) Crisis #1: The Poverty of Justification in (Animal) Ethics: Intuitionism ~ January 26, 2009 [AE Part 5]

(39) Crisis #2: The Crisis of Inconclusive (Animal) Rights Theories ~ January 27, 2009 [AE Part 6]

(40) Update Regarding Great Apes Activism ~ March 19, 2009

(41) Blog Reformat ~ March 20, 2009

(42) Crisis #3: the Conundrum over Animal Equality ~ May 4, 2009 [AE Part 7]

(43) Crisis #4: Unprotective Anti-Vivisection Theories ~ July 7, 2009 [AE Part 8]

(44) New: "Animal Rights Made Simple" ~ July 29, 2009 [AE Part 9]

(45) Modification to Crisis # 5: Taking Criticisms Seriously ~ August 25, 2009 [AE Part 10]

(46) Crisis # 5a: Taking Criticisms of One's Own View Seriously: Francione's Animal Rights Theory ~ August 26, 2009 [AE Part 11]

(47) Interlude: Thoughtful Debate as “In-Fighting”?" ~ September 9, 2009 [AE Part 12]

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Letters may be posted to sztybeld@post.queensu.ca. Selected letters will be published or responded to in this blog.

Welcome!

Saturday, April 21, 2007

Welcome to my sector of the blogosphere! I hope that fellow animal liberationists will find it to be one more oasis in a world replete with speciesism, and that non-animal-liberationists will find it a place to find some inspiration, a different point of view, and perhaps even an opportunity to think differently.

John Stuart Mill said that to every great movement—and in spite of the voices of its detractors, the animal rights movement I believe has proved its greatness—there are three stages: (1) ridicule, (2) discussion, and (3) adoption. There is some adoption of the animal rights ethic, but it is scattered at best. There is more discussion. A lot more discussion—since animal ethics pioneers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan came on the scene and helped history to unfold in such a way as to see this great movement come to birth. And it is not just any movement, out of “left field” (although in fact a leaning towards taking care of all vulnerable members of society is, I think, a logical implication of any sound animal rights ethic!). The animal rights movement is a further step in traditional anti-oppression—or expressed more positively, pro-liberation—movements such as black liberation and women’s liberation. Indeed, I hold that one cannot fully or successfully justify human rights without nonspeciesist thinking, as I will further explain in my book, and have hinted at, with some reasoning, in "The Rights of Animal Persons" (on my website; originally published in The Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal 4 (1) (2006): 1-37). (I add that Singer does not support animal rights, although he does favor animal liberation; in Ibid. I argue that he would not liberate all animals, that is, from vivisection. It is problematic to say that he is part of the same movement as animal rights people. In truth, it only overlaps to a large extent.)

However, we are not fully over the ridicule phase of the movement. Some people still ask: “What about insects?” Trouble is, although these people are often dismissed like “bugs” themselves, they have a legitimate point. Think about it logically: if animals have rights, even equal rights in some sense, and insects are animals, do not insects have equal rights too? If that does not seem right, and insects are not due benefits or protections as much as humans, does that not refute the animal rights ethic by implication? My forthcoming book will be the first to try systematically to account for such a preference without compromising strong rights for sentient beings, including a careful and respectful consideration of beings such as insects and other invertebrates.

I called the animal rights movement a great movement. Is it great in terms of numbers? In terms of numbers of adherents, yes. Millions of souls are enough to boggle anyone’s mind, although I am not aware of any formal tally. In terms of percentage of the population, it does not yet compare to historically great movements such as biblically based religion. Is it great in terms of its ideals? Yes: it advocates that spectacularly more good be done in the world, and greatly more bad avoided, and that what is truly best be affirmed—at least in my version of animal rights ethics. There is nothing greater, indeed, than what is best. And this is best in a distinctively non-utilitarian sense (see “The Rights of Animal Persons” ).

But this greatness is not just in the abstract: it is great to behold animals in largely idyllic settings of animal sanctuaries, and great to meet fellow animal rights supporters who are really wonderful people. They are the ones in my experience who most embody the things that people most admire: compassion, rationality, morality, doing good and avoiding bad, human excellence, a concern for truth, and non-violence. They embody the Golden Rule, basic to all the great religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, Taoism and Zorastrianism. That rule (in one of its more prominent versions) states: Treat others as you would be treated. I am not “getting religious” here but making a point about human greatness in general. Non-religious people try for the same great ideals I have listed—at least the ones I find most truly inspiring.

I firmly believe that we need to move from discussion towards adoption, but that is a gradual process, and frankly I do not expect non-animal-liberationists automatically to agree with me. They need convincing reasons to agree or disagree. In the process of the twenty-years I have been doing animal rights philosophy, however, I have laboured to provide reasons for agreement not just with animal rights, but whatever seems to me most right and good.

This first entry is a welcome message, and you do indeed come to greater wellness the more you come to animal rights: not just more wellness for yourself because veganism, sensibly practiced, is demonstrably healthier. This is a topic widely discussed in many places since meat-eating leads to more cancer, heart disease, strokes, diabetes, senile dementia, arthritis, kidney and gall stones, impotence obesity, osteoporosis, and many other degenerative diseases. I encourage people to pick up Diet for a New America by John Robbins.

I also know that animal liberation is associated with greater wellness because animal agriculture is perhaps the greatest environmental disaster of our time. Animal agriculture is the number one contributor—even considerably greater than cars—of greenhouse gases, believe it or not, due to farm animals farting and thus emitting carbon dioxide; the factory farms have large pools of excrement that contaminate delicate water tables and local rivers, streams and lakes; such practices use enormous amounts of water and raw materials; more than half of North America’s antibiotics to unbelievably stressed-out and ill intensively “farmed” animals; and eating animals creates ever-more pesticides directly by raining them down on animal feed crops, and indirectly when we absorb pesticides stored in the fatty cells of dead animals. Indeed, most crops go to feed animals rather than, say starving people, e.g., about 90% of soybeans are grown for animal feed, thus depleting our topsoil…and so the list goes on.

It is well to come to the place of animal liberation for these reasons, but also because, not least of all, it goes well or at least better for animals if one does. People who practice traditional “kindness” towards animals say they practice “animal welfare,” and that sounds well enough, does it not? However, in “The Rights of Animal Persons” I argue that in nonspeciesist terms (and speciesisim is a lot like racism and sexism in its morally arbitrary and harmful discrimination) killing animals for food, experiments, hunting, clothing, and exploiting them for entertainment is more like an ill fate for these animals rather than ensuring their “wellness” or good as “animal welfare” above all seems to imply. At least we would not say humans were treated “well” if they were exploited in these ways. “Animal welfare” truly practiced would indeed try to do good and avoid bad whenever possible, for all beings to whom good and bad are significant: sentient beings. Speciesist animal welfare issues something of a false welcome to its adherents in the sense I am developing here, since as indicated above traditional animal usage undermines both human and especially nonhuman animal wellness. If I am right that animal rights is a great movement then my welcome is even more in earnest, as something great is even better than what is merely “well,” or is exemplary in its goodness.

Peace be with you and hope to be in communication with you next week!

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Gary Francione Attacks the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics!

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

I was quite surprised that Gary Francione personally referred me to his latest blog entry which slams the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics (OCAE), newly established last year. I was appointed as a Fellow to the Centre recently, and I think this may have prompted him to forward his mini-essay.

The OCAE is an animal-rights-friendly organization whose Director is a known animal rights philosopher and theologian: the Reverend Doctor Andrew Linzey. Linzey is also the world’s first appointed Animal Ethics Professor as of last year, which is quite a leap forward for the discipline as a whole. The Centre will host international conferences, a journal, a resource centre, an on-line resource, and among other things, facilitate courses and contact among animal ethics people. All of this is great for animal rights, and the Centre’s members more than its “Oxford” name will lend ever greater prestige to animal ethics as an area of serious study and concern.

However, there are some animal rights proponents who attack other animal rights proponents. The #1 such attacker, to my reckoning , is Gary L. Francione, a Professor of Law at Rutgers University who is known to slam PETA, laws that make animals suffer less but that are not “abolitionist” in his sense, and more recently, he has attacked supporters of the Great Ape Project. Now he is attacking a Centre that is promising to further animal ethics scholarship exponentially.

First, let us carefully consider all of the charges that Francione lays against the Centre.

1. He calls it the “Oxford” Centre for Animal Welfare, with the Oxford part in quotation marks, as if it has no legitimate claim to be so-called. Yet the Director of OCAE lives in the town of Oxford, teaches at Oxford University, is hosting the series of international conferences at Oxford University with the institution’s knowledge and permission, and Dr. Linzey is also forthright that the new think tank is not an official part of Oxford University. Francione did not need to consult the “Assistant to the Director of Public Affairs at Oxford University,” as he puts it, to learn this fact. He need only explore the website or ask the Director personally. It is no secret. It is an advantage that the Centre is not an arm of the University since then its animal rights component would be less likely to encounter flack, such as from the vivisectors on campus. That the University hosts OCAE’s conferences implies that the older institution does not resent but actively supports the newer one.

2. Francione calls it the “Oxford” Centre for Animal Welfare in his blog headline, although it is the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. This is a deliberate additional insult, since the Centre considers animal rights most favorably, more so than mere animal "welfarism" judging by its affiliates who tend to promote animal liberation. This sort of insult is not new for Francione since historically he has tried, in futility and rancor, to reserve the term “animal rights supporter” or “abolitionist” only for those who agree with his particular views.

3. Most significantly, Francione charges that the Centre’s conference on the link between violence to animals and violence to humans is a throwback to pre-19th-century views of animals as mere things that are at best of instrumental value, wherein harm to animals is only considered insofar as it might affect human beings. He cites correctly Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and John Locke who held this view. But he is in dreamland when he characterizes the whole Centre this way. As said, its affiliates are primarily animal liberationists. Do they view animals merely in terms of how humans are affected? Not at all. Does the Centre or the conference promote such a view? Not at all, and again the opposite view is urged by friends of the Centre. Is it not odd to try to tar and feather an organization with a view it never states and that it implicitly opposes? Absolutely. This is pure mud-slinging unworthy of any scholar or activist.

4. He suggests the conference says nothing about animals beyond their being useful to detect harm for human beings. First, if there are signs that animals are being abused, does Professor Francione suggest that we should ignore this as a sign that humans are also being abused when this was not suspected otherwise? No one with any concern for humans would object to such an inference. Second, is there any suggestion that the animals themselves are not of concern as well? Indeed, warning signs work two ways: establishing the link in question does a number of things for animals: it emphasizes the intrinsic similarities between harming humans and other animals, and we can at a more practical level use warning signs such as people harming humans as an indication that sociopaths should also be banned for life from owning or closely interacting with animals. Nothing in what the Centre says or does suggests that animals are mere objects or instruments as Francione states. Francione commits the fallacy of the straw man argument: falsely ascribing a view to someone and then criticizing that someone for holding that view!

5. Not least bizarrely, Francione accuses the Centre and the conference of perpetuating the idea that there is a difference between people who eat meat, dairy or eggs and extreme sadists, since, as he argues in his Introduction to Animal Rights, there is no such difference. Actually, the difference stares us in the face. Sadists wish to harm animals and enjoy the harm. He is correct that eating animal products is primarily motivated by pleasure, but it is not pleasure at hurting animals. Sadists are a menace because they will harm for its own sake. Meat-eaters are a menace to animals too, and may harm animals just as much, but the mind-set is different. Most meat-eaters probably do not even know that animals suffer so much for the sake of making food. That explains why when many people are educated about the suffering in, say, factory farming, they want to have nothing to do with it. If they were sadists, they would not care or perhaps would even enjoy the idea! But they are not sadists, and that is why people are being won over to animal rights more and more every year. However, it is not a very winning approach to go around accusing ordinary people of being like Jeffrey Dahmer or sadistic, as Francione openly argues in his book and blog site.

6. He says the conference promotes the idea that violence is something done by other people: presumably psychopaths and killers of humans. However again all of the Centre’s friends tend to be animal liberationist and to oppose violence to animals.

That is all there is to his charges, nothing more or less so far as I can tell. This is such a bizarre attack there is some issue as to whether it be given serious attention, but unfortunately, Francione is highly influential, mostly due to arguments that are much more plausible than his latest rant on his blog. I deal with these more credible arguments in my forthcoming paper in the Journal for Critical Animal Studies, called “Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism.”

It could be said that this is just a matter of conflicting opinions, but (1) falsely ascribing views to people (stating the OCAE is only concerned with animal "welfare" rather than liberation and only has an instrumentalist/objectifying view of animals, and that the OCAE conference's very existence somehow implies that violence to animals is only done by psychopaths) and elementary errors of logic such as (2) jumping to conclusions (assuming the OCAE must be an official arm of Oxford University to legitimately use the word "Oxford"), (3) excluding the positive (that links between human/animal abuse can dignify and help ensure the safety of animals), and (4) confusing different cases (animal exploiters and sadists) are not merely matters of opinion. Logic is rightly an esteemed part of science. The Centre stands tall in the end despite Francione's feeble efforts to discredit it.

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Francione on "Unnecessary Suffering": Not Necessarily So!

Saturday, July 28, 2007

(A side-note: I will be up-front. This blog was started directly in response to Gary Francione's blog and its attack on the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. Coincidentally, I have recently been writing a critique of Francione's anti-"welfarist" stance which has just been published in the Journal for Critical Animal Studies online, so my blog dwells a lot on Francione's work...for now.)

Traditional animal welfare has subscribed to the idea that in order to be humane, we should avoid “unnecessary suffering.” This sounds like a noble ideal—why not negate something that seems intrinsically bad?

Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law at Rutgers University, claims to offer a “simplified” account of animal rights on his website. (retrieved in April 2007) This reminds us of his statement in his Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), p. xxxiv: “I argue that the basic right not to be treated as property may be derived directly from the principle of equal consideration and does not require the complicated rights theory upon which Regan relies.” Francione points out that we do not “need” to make animals suffer when we use them for food, clothing, or entertainment. These are merely for amusement and Professor Francione cannot see how any such pleasure-seeking is “necessary.” He notes that some insist that medical research on animals is “necessary,” but correctly points out that it is difficult to extrapolate predictions for human health treatment based on results for animals of different species. I will not digress about such experimentation here, since I address this issue elsewhere. (See, for example, “The Rights of Animal Persons”).

What I wish to focus on presently is one of Francione’s “simplified” arguments for animal rights as I paraphrase it in standard form here:

1. Most people in society are animal welfarists who reject “unnecessary suffering.”
2. Standard animal usage involves unnecessary suffering.
3. Therefore animal welfarists should reject standard animal usage.

Of course, rejecting standard animal usage is in keeping with animal rights. He seeks to reinforce this argument by baldly declaring: "most of the suffering that we impose on animals is completely unnecessary however we interpret that notion," (see Introduction to Animal Rights p. xxiv) and by "that notion," he plainly means "unnecessary."

Francione’s argument is very like that of philosopher Mark Bernstein, in his book, Without a Tear: Our Tragic Relationship with Animals (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004). Let us critically appraise this argument. It is indeed worth realizing that we have a choice about whether to use animals, and that it is not necessary to use them in that sense, and also that many people interfere with animals’ needs often merely for human pleasure. However, I argue that our thoughts cannot rest content with such insights. We cannot rely on Francione’s argument as a way of justifying one’s own animal rights beliefs or as a means of convincing those who disagree with animal rights.

To simplify matters, the two opposing views here are traditional animal “welfare” (“humane” animal usage) and animal rights (again oversimplifying: not exploiting animals at all). Francione again claims that animal welfarists cannot say using animals for pleasure is necessary in any sense. This argument can be refuted if welfarists can show that using animals for pleasure does involve “necessary suffering” in some sense that is consistent with their position. I believe there is such a sense or indeed more than one sense.

In general, what is “necessary” can mean very different things:

1. What we are compelled to do or we have no choice about.
2. What we have a choice about but is concerned with needs such as health needs, legal requirements, etc., as opposed to things that are not required for our needs, such as frivolities or amusements.
3. What is necessary as a means to an end, e.g., water is needed to grow melons.

Recall that Francione claims that standard animal usages are not “necessary” in any sense. This is false. An animal welfarist will say that a certain amount of animal suffering is unavoidable (sense 1.) as a part of eating animals, and also that using animals is necessary as a means to human ends such as meat-eating. (sense 3.) Actually, it is primarily sense 3. that is at issue since the suffering is unavoidable only as part of a means to an end. The end itself is avoidable, but that does not affect sense 3. of what is necessarily part of a certain means to an end. We should not confuse the different senses together. It is not unavoidable to grow melons, but it is still “necessary” to use water if we do so. These are what Kant called “hypothetical imperatives,” that is, if, hypothetically you want a certain end, it may be imperative to do X. E.g., If you want to be well liked, you will have to treat people decently that you wish to like you.

Ironically, Francione claims there is no sense in which necessary suffering is involved in animal welfare, but in fact there are two. He is quite right that none of it is necessary in sense 2., but that is not the only sense.

Part of the animal welfare view is that animals have no rights, including no right not to be used, even harmfully, by humans. This yields:

1. Humans alone have rights, and two of the key ends for human life are freedom and happiness.
2. Animals do not have rights, so we are not restricted against using them.
3. Humans are entitled in their freedom and pursuit of happiness to eat meat, since animals do not have a right not to be used.
4. Therefore humans have a right to cause animals any suffering that is necessary (unavoidably as part of the means involved) as a part of meat-eating.

This yields the sense of “(un)necessary suffering” that the welfarist means. Is the welfarist right that animals have no rights? I do not think so, but we cannot settle that animals do have rights by trying to play on the logical implications of “unnecessary suffering.” To try this begs the question, and also commits the fallacy of equivocation, or confusing together different senses of a key term (in this case “necessary”) in order illicitly to argue in favour of a conclusion.

I do indeed argue elsewhere that animal usage is contrary to moral necessity, as reflected in moral rights and duties, but we need better arguments than this one used by Francione. We cannot make animal rights true by stipulating one meaning of “unnecessary suffering” and then dogmatically (and mistakenly) denying that there is any other sense.

It will be objected that this analysis assumes that the rejection of animal rights is part of animal welfare, and we cannot assume that animal rights is to be ruled out. This objection though confuses the analysis of animal welfare (the rejection of animal rights is indeed a part of that) with the justification of animal welfare (I agree that animal exploitation cannot ultimately be justified). Francione claims that standard practice does not conform with an analysis of animal welfare, which includes avoiding unnecessary suffering, but I have shown this inference is a simple case of jumping to conclusions based on an incomplete analysis. He is trying to employ a “reductio,” or a case that the position that welfarists already embrace logically leads to animal rights. This is not the case.

I am not operating in philosophical dreamland here. It is rather Francione who is in the clouds with his "sole" sense of "necessity." In the real world, many legal experts would be able to see through Francione's argument in less than a second, because it would be immediately contrary to how they already use the concept of necessity. Take, for example, a case in which the Pacific Meat Company was charged for inflicting "unnecessary pain." In the case in question, pigs in a slaughterhouse were shackled by the hind leg, swung against a metal wall "with some force," and then a knife was thrust into their throats whether they were conscious or not. Such cruel treatment of conscious beings is surely unconscionable. Yet in the case the judge ruled as follows:

Hogs fulfil a purpose of providing food for human beings. Before the hog can be eaten by mankind they must of necessity be killed, so that the fatal injury that is administered to each hog by the 'sticker' is a necessity and therefore not 'unnecessary'.

This is cited from Regina v. Pacific Meat Company, 1957, BC County Court, which I found in "Anything Goes: An Overview of Canada's Legal Approach to Animals on Factory Farms" by Lesli Bisgould et al, available on the web site of Animal Alliance of Canada. The judge is using necessity in sense 3., above, or what is necessary as a means to an end. Now the judge erred. It is by no means necessary to treat hogs so callously as a part of the practice of meat-eating. However, animal "welfarists" can argue that many indignities of the slaughterhouse, such as being forced through and being killed, are necessary as a means to the end of meat-eating.

Francione does not rely on this illusory "necessity" argument alone. For example he claims that the right not to be considered property follows from the principle of equal consideration alone. But in both his Introduction to Animal Rights and his website he does rely on the “unnecessary suffering” argument, claiming to “simplify” making a case for animal rights.

Simplicity of formulation is a worthy goal in thinking, embodied in the principle of parsimony. So what approach to simplicity should we take? Should we strive for simplicity at any cost? I recommend we aim for the Golden Mean, which is a standard articulated by Aristotle, an ancient Greek philosopher. The Golden Mean just means: avoiding the dual extremes of excess and deficiency. In the case of simplicity, we wish to avoid the extremes of :

(i) Excess: oversimplification (leads to neglecting important considerations, confusion, overgeneralizations, jumping to conclusions, superficiality, a lack of sophistication and a credibility gap, etc.); and

(ii) Deficiency: overcomplication (leads to confusion, uncertainty, lack of clarity, difficulty in communication, having a harder time interesting people, getting bogged down in irrelevancy or repetition, etc.)

Now addressing different senses of “necessary” is not an overcomplicated model but is the only coherent way of assessing Francione’s claim that animal usage is not necessary in any sense. By contrast, his reliance on avoiding “unnecessary suffering” is a clear-cut case of oversimplification. The animal rightist’s sense of unnecessary suffering may one day triumph over the animal welfarist sense of that phrase. So how can animal rights be justified and animal welfare overturned? Only by systematically justifying animal rights and refuting the many views in philosophy that permit animal usage. I seek to provide such arguments in my forthcoming book, since Francione and others, I find, fail to provide crucially needed, convincing arguments.

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A New Offering: Book Reviews

Wednesday, September 5, 2007

My website features a number of scholarly and public-oriented materials, and now for the first time I am going to offer book reviews. Many of my publications are fairly wide-ranging and forbid, for reasons of length, a detailed discussion of many philosophical views. Book reviews afford an ideal chance for such a discussion. My first book review is of David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989). Warning: it is academic, and especially likely to be clear to those who have completed advanced studies in ethical theory, metaethics in particular. That said, clarity is still my first rule of style, and a determined lay person could conceivably make sense of it. This particular review focuses on one of the key questions of ethics: which is correct, moral realism or moral anti-realism? Anti-realism is the view that nothing is really right or wrong, good or bad, and the like. Realism is just the opposite. As well, the review examines one of the finest articulations of "indirect utilitarianism," any theory that claims it maximizes utility for people not to deliberate in a utilitarian manner. This claim sounds paradoxical on the surface, and in fact I find reason to claim that the direct approach of my own theory, best caring ethics, is preferable (see best caring ethics as an ethical theory sketched in my article, featured on this website, "The Rights of Animal Persons"). I look forward to doing future book reviews on books that I regard to be particularly significant and substantive.

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Insults and Illusions: the Case of Francione and His Followers

Wednesday, November 21, 2007

I would like to report on having participated in an on-line discussion forum, called Animal Rights Community On-line (ARCO). Overall, it was a mixed experience. I made a few friends, and got some great feedback on my work. But I did not make friends amongst the supports of Francione’s anti-welfarism ideology who clearly dominated the forum! Not all of them were vicious, but frankly, most of them were, stooping to outright ad hominem attacks. These culprits made the title of the forum doubly ironic since they refer to people such as myself as not being real defenders of “animal rights,” and also they undermine any useful conception of community. They called me “ignorant,” “a fool,” demonstrating “a depressingly low level of intellect” or showing “sheer intellectual deficiency,” “paranoid,” “nefarious,” “hypocritical,” “arrogant,” and as I will illustrate below, one even called a piece of writing I posted “creepy.” None of it of course was rationally defended, but then, people who use insults like this do so as a substitute for reasoning in the first place. In what follows I will show how the “creepy” charge by David Langlois is completely without objective basis. Now animal rightists are supposed to defend animals against bullies, but these animal rightists are the opposite: they try to bully other animals who happen to be human.

The term “Francionist” is regularly used on these lists by people who disagree with Francione. I’m tempted to do likewise, myself, but what holds me back is that I organized a debate on the Toronto Animal Rights Society list-serve on the prominent issue in animal law: is it ethical or efficacious ever to support so-called “welfarist” legislation? Francione himself responded to my invitation and joined that discussion briefly, and he made it plain he did not like the term “Francionist,” thinking it makes him seem like a cult leader, or that people are more concerned with him as a person rather than the ideas. I deferred to his preference, out of respect, but made it clear that the way I used the term had no such overtones: it was like using the term “Marxist.” I originally used “Francionism” purely descriptively, referring to the unique body of ideas that Francione has authored. Although others will continue to use the term "Francionism" I will not do so out of respect. Instead the term “animal rights fundamentalist,” which I have adapted in my paper, “Animal Rights Law,” will do instead.

It is ironic though that Francione should specially plead for sensitivity to him about terms used (especially when the term in question need not be read as offensive in the slightest). Not only do his supporters resort to extensive name-calling, but Francione himself launches very powerful and unmistakable ad hominem attacks not only against individuals, but whole sweeping classes of people who adhere to certain ideas, by his use of offensive terms. He calls people such as myself "new welfarists." First consider the “new” part of “new welfarism.” Animal rights pragmatism, which tolerates animal welfare legislation as the lesser of evils in the short-term, is not “new welfarist” in any coherent sense of “new.” Consider the forerunner of modern animal rights writing, Henry S. Salt, who influenced Mohandas Gandhi to become an ethical vegetarian when the latter was studying to become a lawyer in England, in late Victorian times. Salt advocated so-called “welfarist” reforms as well as animal rights just as others do today. So it is not “new” unless Francione and his defenders want to start insisting that the Victorian times are somehow “new.” Now consider the “welfarist” label that Francione wishes to wrap around the pragmatists. He calls animal rights pragmatists “new welfarists,” even though such people ultimately seek anti-speciesism, animal liberation, or the abolition of animal exploitation, and to eventually abolish all "welfarist" laws in favor of animal rights laws. How can one essentially be a “welfarist” if one seeks ultimately to destroy all mere "welfarism" (in the speciesist sense of the term)? In sum, neither "new" nor "welfarist" is truly applicable in this context. This is merely insulting, and Francione’s 5 supposed characteristics of new welfarists do not even apply to clear-thinking animal rights pragmatists, as I show in “Animal Rights Law.”

Francione and his followers reserve the term “abolitionist” for themselves and refuse to call animal rights pragmatists “abolitionists.” This the fundamentalists do even though they are confusing the grammar of the situation. Any “-ist” as a suffix in this sort of context indicates advocacy, and animal rights pragmatists not only are in favor of abolition, but believe they have a better way of getting there than the fundamentalists. So another insult is clearly to imply that the pragmatists are “nonabolitionists.” It is purely an insult, and does not communicate truth, avoid confusion, use conventional language, promote the animal rights movement as a whole, or avoid arousing ill feeling in these debates. Pure insult.

But Francione does not rest there. The two major sectors of his adversaries are the animal rights pragmatists, on the one hand, but also the speciesists, on the other hand. These last he also insults by saying that since most animal suffering is caused for passing human amusement or pleasure (e.g., meat-eating, wearing leather, etc.—true enough), and since sadists get pleasure or amusement out of processes that involve suffering, Francione asserts (see his Introduction to Animal Rights) that most people are no different from psychopathic Simon the Sadist, who blow-torches dogs for fun. In a previous blog entry I showed that ordinary people are not psychopathic and violent sadists: they do not enjoy suffering but are often ignorant of it, or tolerate it as a side-effect of getting what they really want: meat, clothng, etc. That is why people often change when confronted with animal cruelty. Again, the inappropriate equation with sadists does not communicate truth, avoid confusion, use conventional language, promote the animal rights movement as a whole, or avoid arousing ill feeling in these debates. Pure insult. So I am not surprised that those whom some call “Francionists” use extensive insults of other kinds on these public discussion boards. They feel victorious, I suppose, but only succeed in unwittingly embarrassing themselves in an international forum.

I have already explored how Francione insulted the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics by calling it the “Oxford” Centre for Animal Welfare (see my blog entry on this topic). Francione himself alerted me to his blog-based tirade against the Centre. I replied, pointing out he was resorting to insults. But his reply did not comment on this point, instead making other points, indicating to me that he knows very well that he is engaging in insulting behaviour but would not consider changing, because, based on his track record, he seems to prefer and enjoy that form of “engagement.”

Although some Francione defenders on ARCO—only a few really—showed themselves to be respectful and articulate on the forum in question, most were not only insulting, but jeering, and showing contempt for rational discourse. Even the moderators of the forum wrote that I should not publicly challenge the approval (by the moderators) of insults on the forum, and that I should write to them privately on the issue at most, even though it is a general issue that should be democratically addressed and openly discussed by anyone who is concerned about it. The moderators used weak excuses for tolerating insults: that it occurs on all sides (not always true—but even so two wrongs don’t make a right), that they would have to delete most posts (moderating does not require this but only warning or booting people as needed), and that if insults were removed, the content of posts would not be left intact (even though personal put-downs are always gratuitous and like all ad hominem fallacies, adding nothing of value to any argument). These moderators are really just saying in effect, it seems to me, that they like the ad hominem style. It seems a raw expression of preference, boiled down, because they haven’t a leg to stand on rationally, unless you think “everyone is doing it” works—which is not only untrue, but is also rejected as a form of argument when it is used by speciesists.

The Francione supporters also said that intellectual work of the sort that I do is irrelevant to animal rights, and that we need to move people, not impress them with concepts. However, the only hope our movement has is to convince people by reasoning and also appealing to their hearts. That is what I’m in the business of doing, and people have at times been persuaded by my arguments. Simplistic propaganda will gain many converts, and is valuable, but it will not convert all of society, let alone its leaders, nor change the laws or it already would have worked, since it has already been widely used.

Perhaps the Francione supporters may be refuted logically by the arguments in “Animal Rights Law,” but use too much bogus reasoning, insults, and distortion of their opponents’ arguments to even realize that they have been refuted. I don’t think their distortions are created just to throw others off the trail, but reflect confusions in their own minds. I may be wrong about that, but the Francione supporters have not offered any logical refutation of what I have done. That was one of the really cheering aspects of my participation in the forum. Personally, it felt like being lowered into a piranha tank at times, but at an impersonal level, no one lodged any serious criticism against my arguments, although Karin for example certainly tried (as we will see below), and they would have taken a shot at my arguments if they felt able to do so.

Francione himself has stated that he is not interested in responding to my extensive arguments, and is delegating some other(s) to respond. I was told of this by two of his close followers, who happen to be Canadians like me, but who are presently living abroad: Jeff Perz and David Langlois. We will have to see what kind of response is given. David Langlois, now a doctoral candidate at Harvard University, has indicated that he will respond. Perz, who is still my friend, does not currently have the time to respond. Now also on ARCO Langlois, for reasons best known to himself, gestured that he would not wish to publish his reply in the journal in which my "Animal Rights Law" was published. He is a junior scholar, though, and can be forgiven for not realizing that no scholarly journal will publish a response to an article that appeared in some other journal. Perhaps that means there will be no response after all. Who knows?

Langlois himself called a piece of writing that I offered on ARCO “creepy.” Now this sort of unethical mudslinging should be challenged. It was done in a public forum, and although I responded to the issue on the spot, Langlois went on to defend his behaviour, and this sort of slander richly deserves to be confronted in a blog on a site that logs several tens of thousands of readers per year, based on my web page reports. What was the writing that was found “creepy”? The objective facts (which anyone is free to verify by logging onto the site in question):

(1) A German woman, Karin, posted a critique of “Animal Rights Law,” my essay published in The Journal for Critical Animal Studies (current issue); I responded to her critique, carefully pointing out how she used various fallacies or errors in reasoning: the straw man fallacy (distorting my view, e.g., claiming I am a closet utilitarian, although I refute that ethical theory in “The Rights of Animal Persons”) no less than 17 times, and many other fallacies such as begging the question (declaring dogmatically), special pleading (falsely asserting that the fundamentalists promote veganism while implying that others such as myself do not), among others; but she is also a mudslinger, stating that my essay is associated with “sheer intellectual deficiency” and shows a “depressingly low level of intellect”; Karin was not embarrassed at all by her own fallacies, nor apologetic in the slightest about her incredibly extensive misrepresentations, but merely rejoined later with more jeering, baiting, and insults. My own real views were left untouched;

(2) Later on, Karin responded with a message inviting me to participate in a podcast debate on Vegan Freaks at the next opportunity, and claimed her message was also in the voice of Francione himself;

(3) I am advised that this poster, Karin, actually works with Francione, so I had reason to think it was quite possible that the message was partly from him as she stated;

(4) I made it clear to the list that I would not necessarily respond to mudslinging messages, so logically enough, I decided I would respond to the Francione-seeming part of the message alone and ignore Karin’s part; I addressed the letter so that it was a response to the invitation IF indeed Francione had a hand in the message, but that the message was addressed “to oblivion” if he did not; it seemed harmless and worth a try since other list members say that Francione monitors this particular forum, occasionally responding to participants, and also has correspondents who regularly email him with updates; as well, he is now actively participating in an ARCO forum meant only for his followers (it amuses me to consider that he has probably seen all or most of the dialogues I was participating in);

(5) The moderator on the list responded appropriately in the respect of warning me against emailing people who are not on the list; I was unaware of this rule, and it is simply a matter of policy, so I was content to be corrected on this simple matter of protocol;

(6) Then Langlois barged in and called my “possible reply” to Francione “creepy” and explicitly mischaracterized the situation as me pretending to be in a “dialogue” with Francione, although I was merely sending a “possible message” to him, depending on whether or not he is on the receiving end (and prepared to acknowledge that fact!) as Karin implied. Langlois mixed together insult and mischaracterization in the same manner as Karin and others on the list. He was pitching low, below the belt in fact. Although apart from the insult he otherwise seemed civil on the surface, the insult not least of all indicates that he buzzes with aggressive intensity below skin-deep.

Now let’s think carefully…what aspect of my message could have been “creepy”? Was it responding to an invitation? That’s not creepy. Was it presuming that Francione would get my message? The letter explicitly stated that I was not presuming that Karin was accurately representing that Francione had a hand in her message. Why is it that no one on the forum focused on the fact that Karin was claiming to speak for Francione on this list? Surely it is more presumptuous to claim to speak for someone else on a forum in which they are not actively participating than merely to send a possible, throw-away message to someone in a conditional fashion. Was it “creepy” to break a rule of which I was unaware? I merely broke it and then responsibly accepted the correction not to do that sort of thing again.

When called by me on his “creepy” charge, Langlois responded that it is simply “true” and he is sorry that he offended me, but at the same time, he wrote further on, he would not mind if I am offended by his statement. The claim to “truth” is really just a continuation of the smear, with Langlois trying to make himself appear respectable. What could be wrong with stating the “truth”? (However I have shown there is no basis in “truth” for such an insult.) The second part is simply a self-contradiction, an odd fallacy for a philosophy candidate at Harvard to commit. No one is “sorry” for offending someone if they do not mind that this someone is offended! His insincerity is manifest, and only furthered by the fact that he defended his pugnacious behaviour as perfectly justified. In earlier emails, Langlois was posturing as though he was my personal friend. But in this recent activity he has revealed himself more truly to be a mudslinger, trying to elevate himself by putting others down in the manner of a bully. Right-minded people can see through such tactics, although others might be misled, but meanwhile he deserves a reminder that he is advancing neither his own reputation nor his anti-welfarist cause by resorting to such tactics: he merely gains some smug self-satisfaction in the moment of firing off such insults, only to pay for them later. Will Langlois’ promised formal response to “Animal Rights Law” contain more of what I found in his comments on the same discussion list, namely insults, misinterpretation, misrepresentation and illogical reasoning? Only time will tell.

I noted how Langlois, Karin, and others resort to the straw man fallacy. However, as in the use of ad hominem attacks, as I show in “Animal Rights Law,” Francione himself unwittingly uses the straw man fallacy in arguing his two main points: (1) that all animal “welfare” laws are ineffective (which he tries to show using his straw man argument that “new welfarists,” in his terms, are saying that animal welfare laws will “cause” abolition; instead it is far more appropriate to state that some animal “welfare” laws are conducive to abolition (as I argue in detail) rather than solely “causing” it) and (2) that such “welfare” laws are immoral because inconsistent with animal rights theory (although I show how such laws can be perfectly consistent with my own animal rights theory that—like his own—uses dilemma reasoning).

Many movement leaders and others have written to me expressing agreement with my legal arguments in “Animal Rights Law,” and I have received several reports of people who have crossed the floor. Once they agreed with Francione on this matter and now accord with the view for which I argue. I will not name these people since they never indicated that they wished their names to be published, and I do not wish them to suffer any possible harassment by Francione followers. These converts used to be ardent supporters of Francione’s fundamentalism, quoting him left and right. But the converts prove that not all of these fundamentalists are alike: some are open-minded, respectful, and open to genuine reasoning. I assume there might well be others persuaded out there (perhaps who were previously undecided in some cases) who have not taken the trouble to write to me, as well as more to come.

Francione himself refusing to respond to my arguments suggests perhaps that he does not feel up to doing so, or perhaps his refraining is just another childish insult. After all, there can be no question as to whether it is intellectually and objectively worthwhile for him to respond to me (on the face of it) since my arguments are winning converts. Anyone who advocates a position would objectively find it worthwhile to: (a) convert newbies to one’s cause who might encounter others’ arguments first; (b) convert the undecided to one’s cause who might be swayed by effective arguments by an adversary; and (c) prevent one’s own followers from being converted. His “same old lines” will not do, since these are carefully considered and refuted in my essay. Now he can very well continue in this manner if he likes, so far as I am concerned. Is it perhaps better for my arguments to stand unchallenged when considering the cause that I share with a majority of animal rightists? Some might think so. Many animal rights pragmatists agree that his anti-welfarist stance is divisive and destructive of real chances for dramatically improving the lot of animals. I think it is better for everyone if he responds in the interest of people being accountable for what they say to masses of people and being open to reasonable discussion, thus furthering the cause of democracy. It would also be better if I refute any reply he might make using the same classical methods of reasoning that I employ in "Animal Rights Law" and other places. I believe that those who employ illogical arguments in the first place cannot in principle find logical ways to defend them at some later time (unless it is a case of an incomplete argument that just needs to be "filled in" with more justification, or more premises to entail the conclusion--but I suspect that is not the case here). Illogical arguers are, for the most part, doomed to carry on with more fallacies unless they come up with a completely new strategy of justification, or perhaps change their position even more fundamentally. There is something timeless about logic. Arguments put forward now or thousands of years ago or to come will still be subject to the same laws of good thinking, and validity or invalidity of conclusions drawn for example will hold regardless of when the inferences are iterated.

The fundamentalists on this list-serve, in any case, remind me of the tactics of many speciesists: dogmatically begging the question, distorting views, ridiculing and insulting others. I pray that society in general evolves towards more civilized critical reasoning, as I believe that such a transmutation constitutes our most serious hope for the animals.

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A Quickly Passing Storm: Steven Wise's "Thunder without Rain"

Monday, November 26, 2007

Lawyer and legal theorist Steven Wise offered a commentary on Gary L. Francione’s book, Rain without Thunder (1996). I myself have written a response to that same book’s line of argument that all animal “welfare”[1] laws are unethical and ineffective. I argued the contrary, presenting a unified theory which justifies animal rights laws for the long-term, and “welfarist” reduction of suffering as the best that we can manage for animals in the legislative short-term (although individuals of course can simply adopt a vegan way of life right now). In writing my earlier paper, “Animal Rights Law,” I did not have access to Wise’s commentary. However, none of my arguments would have been altered in light of Wise’s reasoning. In fact, although Wise offers one of the very few essays (there are no books, although Dunayer 2004 discusses this issue in a way that is broadly though not absolutely sympathetic with Francione’s own approach) with a sustained critique of Francione’s approach to animal “welfare” laws, I will now extensively take issue with Wise’s own critique. Let me add that I have immense respect for the work of Steven Wise. His Rattling the Cage is quite brilliant, with truly mind-opening research. I love to assign it to my students. I think everyone should read Wise's book. Wise's book review I do not think is up to the same standard, but it is still important and worth considering. When it comes to reviewing Rain, I agree with Wise in two key claims that:

(1) Philosopher Tom Regan (1983) got it right to assert that the respect principle is at the heart of rights theory[2]; and

(2) if “welfarist” laws can “help alleviate the suffering of nonhuman animals,” (Wise 1997, 54) then that “is an entirely laudable goal.” (Ibid.)

Actually, I would backpedal a bit on the second claim. I would not applaud the injustice of speciesist “welfarist” laws. However, overall I might praise such legislation as progressive, depending on the particular law. Apart from these brief moments of agreement, I find myself unmoved by most of Wise’s arguments by far, even though I largely concur with his conclusion in favor of some “welfarist” laws. In the remainder of this entry I will briefly reconstruct Wise’s eleven key arguments, in the order that he presents them, and offer my critical responses:

(1) Wise begins by noting Francione’s claim that there is a “structural defect” in New Welfarism which is twofold:

(A) animal interests never prevail so long as animals are property; and

(B) if animals have rights now, then it is wrong to compromise them now.

I myself critique both (A) (Sztybel 2007, 8-11) and (B) (Ibid., 14-18) respectively. Wise reproduces Francione’s five criteria for acceptable animal “welfarist” reforms, and I will do likewise: (i) an incremental change must constitute a prohibition; (ii) the prohibited activity must be constitutive of the exploitive institution; (iii) the prohibition must recognize and respect a noninstitutional animal interest; (iv) animal interests cannot be tradable; and (v) the prohibition shall not substitute an alternative, and supposedly more “humane” form of exploitation. (Wise 1997, 46) I myself criticize Francione’s platform for incremental reform in “Animal Rights Law.”

Now for Wise’s response:

I argue that New Welfarism does not contain a ‘structural defect,’ but a ‘structural inconsistency’ that is necessary to achieve Francione’s goal of abolishing the property status of nonhuman animals in a manner consistent with the moral rights of animals. (Ibid.)

I take issue with the “New Welfarist” terminology rather than assuming it without comment as Wise does.[3] Also, I think that Wise concedes too much in agreeing to a “structural inconsistency” in animal rights pragmatism (which means, for my present purposes, sometimes supporting “welfarist” laws). The theory that I present offers a perfectly consistent way of justifying animal rights laws for the long-term as well as animal “welfarist” laws for the short-term. To acknowledge inconsistency is to indicate a flaw that need not exist, although it is granted that short-term “welfarist” laws are different from and incompatible with animal rights laws. Briefly, without the full nuances of my arguments, I show that both types of law may be viewed as consistent with a higher principle of promoting the best that is really possible for sentient beings at any given time. I make it clear that this argument is not utilitarian, by the way, but poses a clear case against utilitarian abuses such as vivisection. (Sztybel 2006)

(2) Wise objects that Francione “assumes that his arguments for the moral rights of nonhuman animals apply to their legal rights as well.” (Wise 1997, 47) Regan is noted, by Wise, as maintaining that arguments for and against moral and legal personhood may be irrelevant to each other. (Ibid.) Francione himself, as noted by Wise from Francione’s Animals, Property, and the Law (1995), has professed a positivist theory of law which denies that the validity of legal rules is dependent on conformity with some moral standard. (Wise 1997, 47) Wise tries to correct Francione by stating that the property status of animals will change when legal as opposed to moral arguments are given. (Ibid.) Well, let us seek to clarify different senses of legal validity. In my view, some types of “validity” for law do not directly depend on ethics:

(i) laws being considered “valid” because democratically approved or

(ii) laws being valid since they are de facto indications of what is the law of the land, i.e., legally valid in an of themselves.

However, why make a law rule the land? Why democratically approve of a given law? I believe these questions do lead us back to ethics in the end. Surely laws are meant to be a part of what we call “the justice system.” Ideally, laws should reflect justice—an ethical notion (problematic though it may be). To argue otherwise is perhaps to be either unconcerned with laws being just, or to be positively opposed to justice. In short, I do not share Wise’s objection to moral rights as a basis for legal rights—as they ideally ought to be formulated at any rate.

(3) Wise claims that legal rights are awarded to beings who have complex cognition that is sufficient for autonomy and self-determination (in keeping with Wise’s own cause of advocating the extension of such autonomy rights to chimpanzees and bonobos). (Wise 2000) Francione and I would agree that this is a speciesist basis for legal rights, designed to privilege those who are human(-like). Even Wise himself, in another work later than his book review, acknowledges: “If I were Chief Justice of the Universe, I might make the simpler capacity to suffer…sufficient for personhood,” (Wise 2002, 34) however, he notes that the capacity to suffer “appears irrelevant to common-law judges.” (Ibid.) Yet although such rights for, say, chimpanzees may be speciesist, they can be defended as logical extensions of human rights in the short-term and as the best of limited dilemma choices open to legislatures. Non-speciesist rights may still be advocated in the long-term. In any event, we cannot take it for granted that rights are to be organized around autonomy as Wise seems to assume. Other models include rights based in welfare (Sumner 1987—a source Wise himself considers in his review) or a combination of both rights to autonomy and to welfare (Gewirth 1978; Pluhar 1995; Sztybel 2006) As an additional note, Francione used to support the Great Ape Project (GAP), which partly overlaps with Wise's initiative, but Francione has since changed to opposition against GAP on the grounds that it is speciesist.

(4) Wise objects to Francione’s use of the term “animal” firstly, because it excludes humans and reinforces the idea that humans are not animals, (Wise 1997, 49) and this supposedly “endangers the prospect of achieving any legal rights for nonhuman animals, as it permits opponents to characterize humans and nonhuman animals improperly as different in kind rather than degree.” (Ibid.) Wise has a point here, formally speaking. But in substantive terms, “animals” as a short-hand is used by speciesists and anti-speciesists alike. “Humans” is a short-term for referring to “human animals” or “human beings.” Using “animals” in a similarly abbreviating way avoids tedium, not any truth that of course humans are animals too. I do not know if those who deny humans are animals are a politically significant faction (perhaps the upsurge of fundamentalist Christianity in the United States means that they are), but it is not a theoretically significant issue. Moreover, deniers that humans are animals will never be convinced by a use of terminology, or swayed either way, if in doubt, by a choice of words. Perhaps, though, some such people can be moved by arguments which use the abbreviation “animals” in some passages.

(5) Wise objects to Francione’s definition of “animal,” secondly, since Francione follows Regan’s definition of “animal” as a subject of a life, (Ibid.) which Regan identifies with the class of mammals aged at least one year. But Wise points out that Animalia has more than a million species, and only 4,000 of them are mammals. (Ibid.) Wise unwisely claims though that there is no evidence that mammals other than chimpanzees and bonobos have a sense of the future, an emotional life, or a psychophysical identity over time. (Ibid., 50) Take a pig by way of counter-example. Of course they evidently have feelings and anticipate feeding time! (I will not even tread on the well-trod terrain of evidence in this field.) Pigs do not bandy about phrases such as “psychophysical identity over time,” but they are inherently aware of their minds (i.e., everyone is conscious of their consciousness ipso facto from being conscious in the first place) and bodies, and their memories and anticipations do not mysteriously exclude these core aspects of pigs’ lives. Wise writes that Animalia is too broad at the same time. True rights for chimpanzees might be endangered if they are equated with rights for mosquitoes, (Ibid.) but I will not deal with this point here, worthy of attention though it be. Francione himself does not evidently use “animals” in an overly broad sense that would give equal rights to mosquitoes compared to humans in dilemmas, and rights to nonsentient animals such as amoebas perhaps are.

(6) Next, Wise disputes Francione’s model of rights as involving prohibitions and claims that are correlated with duties. (Ibid.) Rather, Wise observes that the most fundamental human rights involve immunity rights. Immunity rights do not merely forbid or negatively command, but impose disabilities which “legally incapacitate or deprive entirely of power.” (Ibid., 51) Is this, however, a distinction of much import? Laws do not mentally or physically “incapacitate” those who might do wrong: they merely order people not to do things just as prohibitions do, and create duties of a legal nature. Suppose claims are used. Wise fails to account for the fact that society can claim rights for all sentient beings in principle (presumably in the far future), and guardians or trustees can claim rights for animals (and mentally disabled humans, for example) in practice. So animal rights law that relies on claims is not obviously so problematic. In any case, when immunity rights are infringed, does not a claim need to be made in court?

(7) Wise writes on Francione’s assertion that he’d give a drink to a thirsty cow at a slaughter facility but would not approve a law providing that all such cows be given water. I criticize Francione on this point as well. (Sztybel 2007, 21-22) Wise declares that it is “nonsense to characterize the passage of legislation requiring cows be given sufficient water on the way to the slaughterhouse as violating the rights of cows.” (Wise 1997, 53) I think Wise misses the point here, that laws approving of slaughter are at variance with animal rights. However, Wise is credible in claiming that if he were given insufficient water as a slave, he would pray for a law granting him water rations. Also, I show that such a water-for-cows law may be consistent with a philosophy that advocates what is really best for sentient beings at every single juncture, a philosophy that also justifies strong animal rights that may be adopted by individuals in the short-term and by societies in the long-term.

(8) Wise admits that reinforcing the property status of animals “certainly is a ‘structural defect’ in the New Welfarist position, as Francione complains. However, that does not mean that the New Welfarist position is structurally defective.” (Ibid., 54) Is this incoherent? Anything that has a structural defect is structurally defective. A vase that has a crack is cracked. Wise presses on: “New Welfarism is not structurally defective; it is structurally inconsistent. But this is how it must be structured to avoid violating Kant’s Categorical Imperative [sic—a modified version of that Imperative, extended to animals, as in Franklin 2005—DS] and Regan’s respect principle.” (Wise 1997, 54) It plays into Francione’s hands to concede inconsistency, or at least I try to show how that charge does not apply to a sophisticated animal rights pragmatist position. It is a very serious structural defect indeed for a view to suffer from logical inconsistency. Also, I think it needs to be acknowledged that “welfarist” laws are not fully respectful of animals to the extent of animal rights, although they might still win as much respect as can now be won.

(9) Wise grants that “welfare” laws might delay animal rights, but pleads that “future generations have no legal rights and it is extremely controversial whether they have moral rights either.” (Ibid., 55) Yet we must have regard for future beings, and favor rights for them as much as possible. Typically polluters and the like resort to these sorts of arguments discounting future beings and the world they inherit. This is a dodge on Wise’s part.

(10) Wise argues that rights cannot be incrementally assembled, and that they will “occur all at once” (Ibid., 57) in a “quantum” leap (Ibid., 56) based on the “intuition, judgment, and sense of what is both right and appropriate” of judges. (Ibid., 57) They will not come by logic alone, he warns. (Ibid.) I fear this account does not do justice to the role of logic, and places too much emphasis on intuitionism, which I argue elsewhere is a logically bankrupt route for moral theory. (Sztybel 2006, 8-9) However, in any case, we are mainly discussing legislators who make new laws in this context, not judges who interpret existing laws. Perhaps Wise thinks of judges since it is they that he hopes to persuade by extending rights to chimpanzees and bonobos, based on criteria for rights now judicially applied to children, for example.

(11) Wise wonders why judges would create a new legal norm of a “proto-right” that “duplicates the existing norm of legal rights?” (Wise 1997, 58) Here I do not think that Wise reflects Francione’s own thinking, which itself could be rendered far more clearly by Francione himself. Francione is not speaking of legislatively passing proto-rights into law in a way that would duplicate rights. Rather, Francione is advocating prohibiting specific practices that would be banned if animals’ interests were wholly respected. Such bans are consistent with a principle we can call a “proto-right.” Or at least, that is how I interpret Francione. Such a view does not merely duplicate rights, but advocates measures that self-consciously fall short of full rights.

I think Wise’s response overall is largely a wrong execution of the right idea, for as I argue, Francione himself (1996) is wrong in opposing all animal “welfarist” laws. “Logic plays no favorites,” though, as Regan penned. (Regan 1983, 183-184) We require not only the right conclusions or opinions. We also need right reasoning, using the classical rules of logic (bringing to light validly entailed implications of what is evident and ruling out all fallacies), without which we cannot be confident in coming to any conclusions. Francione, though, I have argued does worse: he urges both the wrong conclusion and also relies on flawed reasoning. I hope, however, that I have provided a case in favor of limited forms of animal “welfare” laws where Wise’s arguments have seemingly failed.

Endnotes

[1] Joan Dunayer (2004) puts “welfare” in quotation marks when referring to animal welfare. In Sztybel 2006, 1-6, I show further that speciesist forms of animal “welfare” are perhaps better conceived of as animal illfare in nonspeciesist terms. Hence I will put “welfare” in quotation marks when referring to speciesist so-called forms of animal “welfare.”

[2] Francione used to favorably cite Regan, till the two had a falling-out; more recently Francione (2000) defends a basic right not to be considered property—which I will argue on another occasion is surely a move for the worse compared to Regan’s insistence on a most fundamental right to be respected.

[3] I have since added to this critique that “new welfarism” is also inappropriate in its “new” designation, since Henry S. Salt (1980), the late Victorian animal rights commentator also advocated a hybrid advocacy of animal rights in the long-term and “welfarist” reforms in the short-term. This means that animal rights pragmatism, as I call it, is hardly anything “new.”

Works Cited

Dunayer, Joan. 2004. Speciesism. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

Francione, Gary L. 1995. Animals, Property, and the Law. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

———. Rain without Thunder: the Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

———. 2000. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Franklin, Julian H. 2005. Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gewirth, Alan. 1978. Reason and Morality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Salt, Henry S. 1980. Animals’ Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress. Clarks Summit, PA: Society for Animal Rights. Originally published in 1892, with revised editions in 1905 and 1922.

Sumner, L. W. 1987. The Moral Foundation of Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sztybel, David. 2006. “The Rights of Animal Persons.” Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal 4 (1) (2006): 1-37.

———. 2007. “Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism.” Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1): 1-35.

Wise, Steven. 1997. “Thunder without Rain: A Review/Commentary of Gary L. Francione’s Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement.” Animal Law 3: 45-59.

———. 2000. Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.

———. 2002. Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights. Cambridge: Perseus Books.

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Francione's Futilitarianism

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Francione and his followers oppose animal “welfarist” legislation for two main types of reason: that it is ineffective and unethical. I interpret that his main point is not ethical. At least I hope not. After all, I point out in “Animal Rights Law” that although he would not support a law giving water to desperately thirsty cows on their way to slaughter because that would condone slavery and exploitation, his own proposed measures (e.g., a plain example is his proposal to ban dehorning and castration of bulls) would form a part of speciesist laws condoning slavery/exploitation as well, just as the “welfarist” watering measures equally would. In his Rain without Thunder p. 2, he writes: “rights theory…rejects completely the institutionalized exploitation of animals,” and, Ibid.: “Just as the theory of animal rights is fundamentally different from that of animal welfare, so, regrettably, is the theory of animal rights fundamentally different from its realization in the social phenomenon called the animal rights movement.” At the same time, he would approve of protecting one whole interest 100% but not others (e.g., liberty of movement absolutely, but bodily integrity not at all). That is also quite a bit short of realizing animal rights theory in the animal rights movement, or is well short of “completely” rejecting exploitation even as “welfarist” measures are also far short of animal rights. Now he states that his proposed acceptable legal changes are "imperfect," but presumably the acceptance of imperfection (of others?) should not alter his basic principles of what he sees as right: completely rejecting animal exploitation and having the animal rights movement reflect the idea of animal rights. To suggest otherwise would be akin to someone who advocates ridding an organization of racist segregation, and then later conceding that any end result will be imperfect (perhaps because of unspoken racism), and therefore only partial de-segregation will be the goal. Imperfection of the world is no excuse for altogether abandoning one's principles. I have argued elsewhere that he should have more sophisticated principles, but a vague allusion to "imperfection" is never a sufficient justification for abandoning one's own principles. Francione means the ethical criticisms seriously but they cannot be taken quite as seriously for these criticisms are self-mutilating, like proud Oedipus the King clawing his eyes out. Here we have a profession to vision lost in blindness. His ethical critique, then, carries the futility of being practically self-defeating. However, Francione does not so obviously fall short on the effectiveness front. At least, the problem is not so glaringly self-evident as a doctrine suffering from the very same key deficiencies that it decries.

However, I say that his approach is more generally futilitarianism, or unwittingly promoting futility. It does this in at least eight ways.

(1) Its ethical critique is futilely self-defeating as pointed out above;

(2) It is futile to demand that anyone believe that any form of acceptance of animal "welfarist" laws makes any profession to animal rights inconsistent (see "Animal Rights Law").

(3) Only in futility does he insist that animal rights pragmatists such as myself are not "abolitionists" like he is.

(4) It is futile to try to apply the label "new welfarist" to animal rights pragmatists since they are not "new" and also none of the 5 characteristics of new welfarists apply to people like me as they are meant to (see Ibid.).

(5) It is futile for the futilitarians to point out that we would not demand that child abuse be done more "kindly," when (a) animal rights pragmatists also totally and publicly denounce animal abuse; (b) calling for any laws against child abuse is immediately feasible whereas it could take centuries for comprehensive laws against animal abuse to be feasible; and (c) the futilitarians themselves say it is OK for now to outlaw castration/dehorning of bulls and nothing else, or to secure freedom completely while other interests are utterly neglected--that is not comparable to totally outlawing child abuse by any means, making the futilitarian rhetoric hollow, i.e., futilely self-contradictory, once again.

(6) Futilitarians declare all animal “welfarist” initiatives to be futile (sometimes saying they won't be attained; other times saying if they are attained they will be "meaningless," and that such laws cannot one day lead to animal rights), and so the futilitarians would cut off that potentially useful legislative path. It is weird to say that cruel laws are more likely to lead to animal rights law and that kind laws are unlikely or less likely to lead to animal rights law. I have defended the usefulness of “welfarist” legislation in reducing suffering in the short-term and cultivating a "kindness culture" that is conducive to animal rights in the long-term; a cruel culture by contrast is less useful because it is positively not conducive to animal rights. (See Ibid.) A side-note: If enough people believe the futilitarians, then seeking "welfarist" reforms may indeed be futile as a self-fulfilling prophesy.

(7) Francione recommends proposals, such as securing 100% protection of interests (e.g., liberty of movement in fully generous animal quarters), which really are futile to seek in the legislative short-term. Remember that when he demands 100% protection of an interest, it would have to satisfy the interest just as if animals were liberated or not considered property. That would have to mean that “money is no object,” or funds-outlays would have to match generous fundraising by an animal liberationist society to secure the fulfillment of the interest. These generous funds would have to come mainly from profiteering animal exploiters together with a subsidizing government which shares the same corporate-elitist bed, on the one hand, and from widely cynical and often impoverished customers of animal exploiters, on the other hand. Oh, and animal advocates and their groups can be counted on to throw in a couple of drops in the rather large bucket of necessary billions as well. In any event, the money to pay for such provisions needs to come from somewhere. So on this theory pro-animal funding in a deeply and pervasively speciesist society must equal funding in a far-flung (though not impossible in the long term!!!) animal liberationist society. Hmmm...now what could be wrong with this picture? Welcome back to reality, folks. In the short-term, this is a ludicrous dream for all of its futility. It is as absurd as expecting an abysmally sexist club to suddenly break out in song and dance championing equality for women.

(8) Although Francione would accept "proto-rights" reforms discussed above, he generally believes that animal rights activists, for the time-being and evidently some time to come, should be "outsiders" to the legislative process, or be abstainers, and focus on animal rights campaigns with the general public instead. Their reason for this move, which he seems to advocate over proto-rights (that doctrine is just for those who wish to try their hand at legislative reform against Francione's advice) is the apparent belief that it is futile to seek "insider status" since it allegedly would only dilute radicalism to the vanishing point, as it were. This aspect of animal rights futilitarianism is discussed in my paper, "Animal Rights Law," where I illustrate, contrary to Francione, the potent possibilities of animal law reform in the legislative short-term. It is also eminently possible for advocates to put their cards on the table that they are aiming for animal liberation in the long-term, but they would, with reservations of course, accept "welfarist" measures in the short-term.

So the term “futilitarianism” seems fitting. Francione’s “conceptual rallying position” as he terms futilitarianism in Rain without Thunder illusorily paints one useful path as futile and promotes another path as useful which is really futile. It is hard to see how a more successful promotion of futility could be had than doing one’s level best to make the useful seem useless and pretending that the useless is useful. However, as a legislative outsider, he thinks it is useless even to advocate "proto-rights," the supposedly useful, for now and the foreseeable future, i.e., who knows how long. Therefore the name “futilitarianism” applies: creating futility on the short-term legislative front. Ironically, his "conceptual rallying position" would, if allowed to take hold, make "ghost events" out of any attempts to mount rallies in support of progressive animal law. Let us do better than that, shall we?

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Is "Futilitarianism" an Insult?

Sunday, December 16, 2007

I have criticized the futilitarians in the past for engaging in insulting behaviors. For example, calling anyone such as me a “new welfarist” is an insult since it is not descriptive and is evidently just intended to upset people. However, futility is a key theme descriptively and truly associated with Francione’s anti-“welfarism.” It is even more descriptive than “animal rights fundamentalism,” which only examines one aspect of the futilitarian position. It is not ad hominem, or directed against anyone’s personal characteristics, but rather impersonal exposition. It is not even an exaggeration. Is it satire in the sense that it is intended to make us laugh at the foibles of people who are lost in ways of error and causing harm? I have to agree with that assessment, but satire is not insult, but rather a civilized substitute for insult. Satirists invite deserved ridicule of a position that involves vice or folly. Futility deserves to be highlighted as a fault if it is indeed a shortcoming as it extensively is with the futilitarians. It may be insulting to subject someone to an indignity. It is indeed undignified to carry on with futile behaviour. However, I am not “subjecting” the futilitarians to that. They are engaging in existential absurdity of their own accord, however unwittingly. I apologize in advance if anyone feels insulted by the label. “Futilitarianism” is intended to be purely descriptive and satirical, or to highlight an irony in a certain movement that purports to be full of activist and noble purpose. Few would consent to be satirized, but few would consent to abolishing satire itself. For satire is a valuable tool for social criticism and social change.

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The Brock "Miracle"

Tuesday, December 31, 2007

I am referring to the blossoming of critical animal studies at Brock University, which is located in southern Ontario, Canada, in the city of St. Catharines. Although the language of miracles is a superlative, it may still be thought to sell short what is actually occurring there. It did not just appear spontaneously, but due to years of effort primarily on the part of my mentor and senior colleague, John Sorenson, Professor of Sociology at Brock. For years he has pioneered new courses in Animals and Human Society, Animals and the Law, and has recently had approved other courses in critical animal studies, as it is called, including one for animals in cross-cultural perspective, and another for students who seek a Master’s in Social Justice and Equity Studies. Recently approved too has been a Minor in Critical Animal Studies.

The success of these efforts is mainly, but not solely, due to Professor Sorenson. His colleagues also deserve credit, paradoxically, for extending to animals what is perhaps only their just due. However, in unjust times, when animal oppression is so widespread and acute, it takes a certain generosity, if you will, to rise to justice when injustice is the norm. It is a kind of breaking of the mold, and even a setting of new molds. There are a total of seven courses in Critical Animal Studies which have been approved by the Department of Sociology at Brock. Of course, these offerings are not literally molds meant to turn out robots to prefabricated specifications, like widgets in a factory. Rather, freedom of inquiry in the area of critical animal studies is being opened up at Brock: a mold for a large and ongoing intellectual conference, metaphorically speaking, leaving students free to learn and come to their own conclusions. Freedom of inquiry requires structures and resources, after all. Are there conclusions that everyone should arrive at, such as universal rights? Authors may argue this in earnest with respect to animal rights, even as many already do with universal human rights. However, it is up to every individual scholar to arrive at his or her own conclusions. Indeed, it is futile to say that someone simply “must” think a certain way. Minds and spirits always contain their own precious freedom. Dogma is an insult to intellectual freedom, although reasoning is not. In any case, the miracle is due not only to Sorenson’s colleagues, but also to students, who demonstrate a strong interest in this area of study by their strong enrollments in these courses. Those are the people who are coming to their own conclusions in this visionary program. And helping them are a stream of dedicated and hard-working teaching assistants and still others crucial to the success of this academic program.

One T.A. in particular is exceptional and therefore deserves note: Jillian DiTillio. She has TAed critical animal studies for 4 years now and has been noted for her valuable contributions in terms of facilitating discussion, grading, and learning. The unusual thing about her is that she hopes to continue in this role, unlike most TAs, just because it reflects her passion for educating others about animal issues. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, this passion manifests itself in a marked pursuit of excellence in this educational field.

The Brock Miracle is not just a small blip on the academic map. It might even be called a leader in critical animal studies in North America. I have been in correspondence with Dr. Kenneth Shapiro, of the Animals and Society Institute. He is in the business of publishing in critical animal studies, long been chief of Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and editor of the journal, Society and Animals. He also promotes critical animal studies programs and majors throughout North America. According to him, the only place that compares with Brock is Notre Dame de Namur University in California. Now this program offers a Major in Critical Animal Studies, which I believe is on its way at Brock given the slew of new course offerings. Indeed Brock has approved 7 courses, which compares with the 6 now in the program in California. On the basis of such reflections one can safely conclude that Brock is a leader in North America in Critical Animal Studies. It is one of the top two such programs, and perhaps even the top one, depending on which criteria are used.

I have been pleased and honored to participate in “the Brock Miracle” this past term in the Fall Term of 2007, during which time I have been given the opportunity to teach a course in Animals and the Law. I am teaching three more courses this current Winter Term 2008. I had full enrollments, and many of my students either became animal liberationist, or came to have a stronger intellectual respect for the position. Many students felt obliged to surrender their personal investment in animal slaughter as a result of the course. It is not something the course pushes, but rather what the data and the arguments draw many compassionate and just students towards, as plants growing towards sunlight. The arguments can be laid out impartially as possible, but I do not think that speciesism can really be made any more attractive, intellectually speaking, than racism or sexism in the end. There are many more critical animal studies at Brock than most universities, which do not have any sociology courses devoted to animals. At most, a philosophy department might have a course in “environmental ethics” which examines animal ethics as a supposedly subsidiary issue (really it is not, since animals are no more merely part of the human “environment” than humans are merely part of other animals’ “environment”). An exception was Queen’s University’s Philosophy Department, which offered a course in Animal Ethics as well as Environmental Ethics.

I am grateful for the Brock Miracle also at a personal level since I had a five-year unchosen hiatus from university teaching. I do not take it for granted that I have access to such job opportunities, and I have no reason to. I was earlier planning to write a much more sombre blog entry on being an animal rights scholar “in exile.” Let me explain this. When I graduated with my Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Toronto, the professor who was in charge of helping graduates market themselves took a look at my c.v., and although I had more publications and international conference presentations than most of my fellow graduates, he said, “You know David, hiring committees are going to take one look at your c.v. and toss it in the garbage. They’re going to say, ‘He’s just an animal guy.’ I don’t mean to discourage you by saying this.” He said this even though I had instructed a few courses in philosophy at the University of Toronto, Canada’s most prestigious university, with excellent reviews, and I was given the chance to run the Philosophy Essay Clinic in the U of T for my year after graduation.

I think he was right about how people would narrowly view my c.v. though—until the Brock Miracle, that is. I was in telephone communication with the Philosophy Chair at McMaster University at one time, and I asked if I could help fulfill their teaching needs. He had received my c.v. electronically, and intoned snobbishly over the phone, “We don’t do your kind of philosophy here.” He was really saying that I am an animal guy. I am fully qualified to teach ethics, and indeed I outlined a new ethical theory in my dissertation, but since I am so much “about animals,” suddenly my other abilities were papered over or tossed into mental garbage cans. That, of course, is garbage thinking, since any Philosophy Department does “my” kind of philosophy, and should care about it, if they are against prejudicial discrimination, inequity and injustice, and are in favor of rigorous philosophical argumentation and open-mindedness, as well as academic freedom to specialize in any area that one pleases. I “do” ethics, the most popular of the subdisciplines in Philosophy. The Chair’s statement was just a reflection of prejudice. I “do” the justification of ethical theory as much as other moral philosophers. In no other area of study would one be criticized for academically presenting and publishing in one’s area of specialization. On the contrary, that is usually praised as “the right path” and encouraged. This kind of secondary speciesist prejudice (applied to animal advocates rather than the nonhuman animals themselves) was also evident in Unleashing Rights: Law, Meaning, and the Animal Rights Movement (University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. ix), in which the author, Helena Silverstein, offers a study of the animal rights movement but is quick to add in a preface that she "was hesitant to study [the animal rights] movement out of fear that [she] would be labeled and animal rights activist masquerading as a scholar." Can you imagine a human rights supporter and academic being dismissed as “an activist masquerading as a scholar”? We see speciesism rearing its unattractive head once more.

I managed to win a Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Queen’s University with a research proposal to study anti-vivisection ethics. I was shocked, as were others, that an animal rights idea won out over post-doc applications to all other Departments at Queen’s, which is a top research university in Canada. It was a great year there, with my own corner office and supervision of graduate students, but I could not so much as get an interview after that. This, even though I was credited by many experts as developing the strongest (devil’s advocate) case for anthropocentrism in ethics. In any other area of study, any recent graduate who came up with the best version of any given argument would get interviews at the very least. I am not trying to brag, by the way, but merely to illuminate that merit does not necessarily figure into a supposed meritocracy when speciesism rules.

This brings us back to Kenneth Shapiro, and the journal he edits. In 2002 Society and Animals: Journal of Human-Animal Studies did a special issue on their tenth anniversary. It features 15 articles profiling the marginalized status of human-animal studies. The latter is roughly defined as any kind of academic study that takes animals seriously as more than just objects or resources, and it could occur in any discipline such as anthropology, sociology, literature, psychology, political science, economics, law, etc. In any event, this study which was breath-takingly sweeping (in both time and space) found that over a twenty-year period in countries such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, South Africa, among other nations, people who graduated with a doctorate degree in human-animal studies were not found—ever—to go on to supervise other such doctoral candidates. In other words, doctors of human-animal studies never, quite unlike their colleagues, landed prestigious professorial jobs which involve the supervision of graduate students, in particular, doctoral students. There are indeed professors who profess animal rights, but they all got their credentials in other areas of study that are not regarded prejudicially as animal rights is. For instance, Peter Singer did a doctorate on Marxism. Tom Regan studied the philosophy of G. E. Moore. They did not encounter the furry ceiling because they were not then associated with anti-fur campaigns and the like. This wall of prejudice was referred to by the authors as “the furry ceiling” as an analogy to “the glass ceiling” concept which is used to refer to the fact that women tend to be invisibly limited in the opportunities that they may rise to.

At a recent conference at, yes, Brock University in June 2005 many scholars complained that their human-animal studies have been marginalized, and that many such scholars lack an academic home. I was among the homeless, so to speak. I was trying to land a job, any job without much success. I would gladly sell books, or usher people into movie theatres. I was jealous of anyone who had any job at times. I was judged overqualified or inexperienced, and in any case had oodles of competition from any number of other seekers in a rather desperately competitive job market. In the last three years I retrained as a high school teacher. I now work part-time as a substitute teacher in the Board (Durham) to the east of Toronto as a second job besides Brock. I was picturing myself teaching high school up till retirement until I got caught up with the sweep of the Brock Miracle. I was appointed as Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, but it seemed that no one in academia who is a “gate-keeper” cared how much I accomplished as an “animal guy.” I had many fellow graduate students who found jobs, and it seemed to me that these people did not write particularly important theses or articles (if they had any publications, which many of them didn’t). Toeing the speciesist line has an unspoken premium value in academics, it would seem.

I had actually applied to teach Brock courses on animals before, but could not make the interview stage, a pattern I was getting resigned to. One can only go through so many years of rejection in university teaching before changing careers becomes a practical necessity to attempt. In any case, I was not prepared to give up easily. My publication record is already stronger than many tenured professors, and I was happy that writing is one area of opportunity that the speciesists could not deny me, which is more valued by me than the capacity to teach at any university.

Then Brock advertised a Canada Research Chair in Social Justice. I applied. I put a lot of effort into the app. I did not make the interview, but Professors of Sociology there were so impressed by my arguments that my background is relevant in an interdisciplinary way that they were convinced I could teach their “animal sociology” courses. This turned out to be crucial, as I was granted the opportunity to teach these courses without even needing an interview. This is because I am a known quantity to Sorenson, as I have presented at each of his three interdisciplinary conferences in Critical Animal Studies. These were great conferences that were part of the miracle at Brock. Negative discrimination on the basis that I am an “animal guy” turned into positive discrimination where I was actually sought for my academic interests, abilities, achievements, and experiences.

Did I say that referring to a “miracle” at Brock does not do justice to the honest real-world efforts of John Sorenson? Not necessarily. Him I call “the miracle worker,” although he would be roundly embarrassed by any such talk. Just as Helen Keller's teacher earned that name helping a child struggling in her own world of blindness and deafness, so Sorenson persevered through peoples' blindness and deafness in relation to conscious beings of other species, and effected startling change that many would have thought improbable or even impossible. To him we owe the Brock Miracle, and I especially am much indebted to him both professionally and personally.

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Shifting to a Homemade Blog

Monday, January 1, 2008

Today I am shifting from my free Tripod blog builder to a more homely, because homemade, blog format. That is, I am reprogamming the thing from scratch using HTML. (What you are reading now is the new blog configuration.) The problem with Tripod is that other things came free with it too: long wait times to visit the blog, long wait times to revise it (up to the better part of an hour at times!), lost entries, lost formatting, and program errors that do not permit indexing of entries, etc. All for free!!! One day I plan to offer a new website on a different service (this one is free) and pay for a plan that excludes obnoxious and time-consuming (for loadup purposes) advertisements, but that is a project for another day.

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Two New Web Publications!

Friday, January 11, 2008

I have just published my first book! Literally, since I have published it myself on my website. It is entitled Acts of God and was mostly written during my doctoral years. I want to make it available for free in order to help the movement against oppression wrought by people who insist on oppressive practices stemming from the Bible.

Another publication is a "MIRROR PRODUCTIONS" version of "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism," for people who find the original academic article too dense, or if they just want a short, quick version of the essential ideas.

Enjoy!

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On the Futilitarian Front We Are Winning, But Have Not Won Enough!

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

There is currently a kind of massive conflict (I shy away from calling it a war due to the attendant gross connotations) between the animal rights futilitarians on the one hand, and animal rights pragmatists on the other. (Note: In long form we would say "animal rights futilitarians" rather than just "futilitarians," since, as I found out, I did not invent the term; "futilitarian" is used mainly in end-of-life debates about the futility of resuscitating people who have life signs and little more.) I say without controversy that the pragmatists are already winning, as they have been since the dawn of futilitarianism as expressed by Gary Francione (see previous blog entries for more context, although there have long been people of like-minded thinking and sentiment). My essay, “Animal Rights Pragmatism,” will help us win more, I hope, since there is otherwise a vacuum for theories that can be used to justify animal rights pragmatism. However, it is not enough that the futilitarians are already marginalized (for good reasons does their philosophy not sit well, intuitively, with most animal rightists). Their number and cause—that of the futilitarians—must be reduced further to the maximum possible extent so that animal well-being and animal rights can be promoted to the maximum possible extent. Let newbies to the debate become pragmatists rather than futilitarians. Let old-time futilitarians change their minds. And let an overwhelming animal movement push hard, though not obnoxiously, to win more and more respect for animals’ interests over time. Being in the majority on an issue is no cause for complacency, especially when so much is at stake. Progress for animals, and what is related, being able to cooperate with animal protectionists more broadly, are all hinging on the progressive outcomes of this massive conflict, so let’s not let the animals down. It is not realistic to expect to convert die-hard futilitarians who will not listen to reason, anymore than it is reasonable to expect conversions with speciesists who are so hidebound, but at least the damage they do to others and the animal protection movement in general can be minimized, and a much more positive and hopeful vision can be actively promoted. The futilitarians cannot simply be dismissed as “losers,” but need to be taken seriously as a threat to what is good and true, although the good intentions behind their misguided philosophy needs to be honoured as well. Lamentably, the real losers are the animals, who stand to lose further due to futilitarian activism. But as animal rights lawyer, Lesli Bisgould, said of the animal rights movement in general, in a talk some years back: “We’re going to lose, and lose, and lose again. And then we’re going to win.” Ultimately, this is about winning for animals, not winning for “us” as some kind of shared ego trip. So much loss for animals must be grieved continually, but let us not simply grieve the positive potential for them that may be lost through unwise maneuvering. We have reason to be active about what the futilitarians are trying to do specifically in promoting their brand of futility, while sabotaging really possible gains for animals. At the same time, their vegan animal rights activism is still in many ways is to be celebrated. We also have reason to despise futilitarian tactics, such as their dismissing of the pragmatists as not really “abolitionists.” No matter, the dominant position I believe will prevail ever more and more as truth will triumph in the end, and people will literally opt for what is better—or at least many will. Animal rights pragmatists of the world unite!!!

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The Red Carpet

Thursday, January 16, 2008

Francione, in Rain without Thunder, and whenever he speaks or writes on the topic, calls animal rightists “outsiders” to the legislative process. His reason is that animal rightists would not be taken seriously by contemporary legislators, and to be taken seriously, the activists would need to water down their activism.

This is a falsifiable claim. Consider the case of Austria. This country was one of the first to ban battery cages for hens. Such cages are consummately cruel. Typically they are made of wire, and stacked up to 20 high, imprisoning hens who lay eggs. Stacking that high means the birds poop and pee on those living below them through the wire floors. Their toenails, ordinarily kept trim by walking around, often grow around the wire of the cages, becoming entangled, in this environment where they never get to exercise outdoors, and breathe clean air. The stench makes human visitors gag, and so they often wear gas masks. The birds’ feathers are often lost and skin rubbed red raw from being stuffed often 5 to a cage whose dimensions offer the “floorspace” of a folded up newspaper. The birds are thus driven insane, and the noise is a horrid cacophony in their sentence to nearly always darkness. Often one bird, who would be the submissive one in a normal pecking order, passively starves or dies of dehydration in a corner of the cage, but is calculated to be “expendable” by the exploiters, who count pennies but not animal suffering. Veterinary care is confined to removing dead birds—but often not even that. And so on. Francione, in Rain without Thunder, makes it clear he would only abolish battery cages if a substitute fully respects hens’ freedom of movement (the complete respect for a given interest requirement which I discuss in “Animal Rights Law”). That’ll be the day, when legislators grant as much space as an animal-rights-governed animal sanctuary! At any rate, Austria banned the practice, and no doubt brought in confinement systems that are not quite what an animal rightist would ideally desire. The shortcoming is predictable, frankly, due to prevailing speciesism and capitalism. However, before this legal coup there was a press conference of all the animal protection groups in Austria, protesting the battery cages. Such a feat is unheard of in Francione’s home country, the USA, and my own of Canada. But that unity in the campaign contributed to its political success. Now some of these groups were animal rights groups.

Politicians are not dummies. They know that the animal rights groups are more radical than the campaign superficially suggests, and advocate the abolition of keeping hens for egg-laying altogether some day. But the politicians took these animal rights groups seriously, and these groups did not need to compromise their radicalism. These animal rightists did not hide or pretend to be something they are not. It would not be best for animals, these animal liberationists must have thought, to play the role of political outsiders. The politicians knew they represented part of an overwhelming spectrum of popular votes since the campaign electrified the nation through effective media usage. So Francione is dead wrong that groups need to compromise to achieve insider status. His calling for animal rights supporters to be political outsiders creates marginalization of these activists as a self-inflicted wound. Animal rights fundamentalists, astonishingly enough, are "self-marginalizers." Not just achieving "welfarist" legislation is key. It means a lot to have animal rights voices at the negotiating table, even if those voices are understood more than heard outright. Otherwise, as a logical feature of Francione's vision, it would be just traditional "welfarist" voices in the halls of political decision-making. Such voices see relatively minor dispensations to animals as their only due.

Apparently he is waiting for a red carpet to be laid out for him before he sets foot in a legislature to advocate laws to help animals. Yes, as he says, he only wants to be an “insider” if he does not lose his radicalism. He does not just mean radicalism in the above animal rights pragmatist sense of having a long-term goal of the eradication of speciesism. No, he means that he should comfortably be able to demand his version of “proto-rights” now, and be taken seriously by the politicos who run the country. But that cannot be for the foreseeable future, hence the abandonment of legislating as a futilitarian goal for the time being.

Let’s think on this a moment. What would it take for a legislature, or members of it, to take seriously Francione’s proto-rights measures? Why, they would have to be in favor of , or demonstrably open to being persuaded that, animals should receive 100% protection of this or that interest (such as freedom of movement in the example given above). Why, then they would have to be animal rights people, or just achingly on the cusp of becoming that, virtually waiting to be persuaded, because only animal rights people favor 100% respect of interests. Others agree that animals should be used “humanely,” and the animals’ usage (which I characterize as ill usage in “The Rights of Animal Persons”) takes a priority. This state of affairs in turn means that human interests (including profit-making ones) must take priority. Human interests taking priority is normally incompatible with 100% respecting of any given animals’ interest. It just works out that way since larger hen spaces cost humans money. That is why the legislators would need to be animal rightists (or wannabe animal rightists) not animal “welfarists”--in the speciesist sense where humans take priority--if the law-makers are to be genuinely and practically receptive to Francione's proto-rights for animals.

So Francione is waiting for the carpet to be rolled out by fellow animal rightists in the legislature, or wannabes. That is the inescapable logic of the situation. But that is not all. Francione is not talking just about preaching to the converted. He wants to change politicians’ minds. So if there is a minority of animal rights sympathizers in a legislature (and even that today is a remarkable political achievement), it is not they who pose a threat to Francione’s “insider status” being watered down. No, the concern is with those who disagree with animal rights who would not take animal rights seriously, and according to Francione, pragmatically require that he “water down” his stance. So he would still have to stay out of the legislature, because he would still “need” to water down his views given the minority status of animal rights in the legislature. That minority would not be enough to pass legislation, and he would have to deal with the animal-rights-hostile-or-indifferent majority of law-makers. What about one day, when there is a majority of animal rights politicians in the legislature? Why, then he could march in proudly, and the red carpet would be firmly waiting for him. Before then, there would presumably be no animal-protective legislation, by his lights, since under his leadership, there would not be any such vain “insider-status-seeking.” So up until whole animal interests can readily be protected, a far-flung day I might add, animals will get no legislative relief at all.

The red carpet he is waiting for would be red with the blood of animals whose lives would be that much more hellish because he is “waiting for the day” with his cronies. You can read about the Austria example in the second edition of In Defense of Animals, in the essay, “How Austria Achieved a Historic Breakthrough for Animals,” by Martin Balluch, a leading activist in the campaign. The Austrian ban and how it was won proves that Francione’s basic concern about insider status is dead wrong. (At least if the animal rights radicalism is to be logically defensible.) And the logic of Francione’s “waiting game” proves that animals will end up much more wrongly dead if people follow Francione’s example. The animals will not get legislative relief from the worst of vivisection, factory farming, and the like until “the day.” Well, I’m not waiting, and hope you will join me in my impatience with futilitarians, who in turn are so impatient for animal rights that they lose sight of the realities of our present situation.

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Retraction and Apology

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

I would like to issue an absolute and unequivocal retraction of the allegations that I made earlier in the history of this blog to the effect that Professor Gary L. Francione in any way plagiarized the ideas of Professor Robert Garner. To help clarify, the matter was over the insight that animal welfarism’s restriction against “unnecessary suffering” can logically lead to abolishing speciesist practices (for a discussion of this idea in a completely different context, I refer the interested reader to “Francione on Unnecessary Suffering,” i.e., the blog entry for July 28, 2007). Now there are always common ideas that can be found amongst any thinkers and the two professors have very different ways of thinking. Francione sent me his thoughts on the matter, which I found to be informative. I add that I should have sought out his thoughts on this to begin with, and I do sincerely regret this error of omission. Francione’s own opinion, if I may paraphrase my understanding of the ideas in question, is that Garner’s argument is part of his general stance as an “animal welfarist.” Francione himself argues against such animal welfarism, and so the fabric of the ideas in question is unmistakably distinct and different. (To see my own reflection of the animal welfarism vs. anti-animal-welfarism debate, and of Francione's and Garner's polarized views, please see generally Sztybel, "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism," Journal for Critical Animal Studies V (1) (2007): 1-35.) To sum up briefly, my finding is that the case in question does not constitute a case of “intellectual theft.” I was in error about this matter.

I would also at this time like to issue an unmitigated apology to Professor Francione and also to anyone else who might suffered due to my rash and regrettable actions. Let none of what I wrote in the deleted blog entry in question cause anyone to so much as seek to bring into question Professor Francione’s academic integrity and honesty.

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A Public Service: "Motivating Yourself to Study"

Friday, February 1, 2008

I am now switching gears in my blog. For personal reasons, I am going to take a break from critiquing animal rights fundamentalism and the work of Gary Francione for a while. I made an honest mistake with respect to Professor Francione, for which I again sincerely apologize on this occasion, as the mistake caused considerable upset. But now it is getting to be time to move on. I will write on other topics in this blog, after what is soon to come: clearing my desk of futilitarianism commentary.

One piece of writing that I have been meaning to post for some time is called "Motivating Yourself to Study: A Guide for Students." One of the hats I have worn is that of a substitute teacher. I was impressed by many of the teenagers I met, most of whom by far were courteous, fine people. However, I noticed that many of the students seem de-motivated academically, and this concerns me. I think it is a massive phenomenon, certainly in public school, but even to some extent in university, where students often pay their own tuition. They are chronically frustrated, locked into a vicious cycle. I have a lot of empathy for these students, and whereas many parents or teachers are inclined to judge them as "lazy" and verbally whip them to that effect, I would have to guess that many of these students are experiencing some form of psychological blockage. I am not an educational psychologist, but I have had some teacher training and experience counseling and so I offer my guide to people who wish to help themselves, or to help others suffering from this dreadful problem. It might just help turn the corner in someone's life.

I recall I was asked by a family friend many years ago to meet with their son, who was academically demotivated. After a session or two, he really turned around, starting to achieve his potential for academic excellence. Now, whenever I happen to see him, he is happy, well-adjusted and a keen achiever in his own right. I do hope that some people will find this to be helpful. I insert a copy here in my blog, and also will keep a copy on my web page:

Motivating Yourself to Study

A Guide for Students

By David Sztybel, Ph.D.

Back in the day when I was in high school, I suddenly became keen to score finer marks so that I could enter university in good form according to my choices. I succeeded, but along that journey I remember consulting a book on studying (whose identity will pass unnamed). On the topic of motivation to study, it had no separate section, but only a passing comment, which I remember today for its cruelty, lack of imagination and empathy, and unhelpfulness. The comment was that no one can help you with motivation to study, and that if you lack the motivation that’s your fault. Blame implies that people wantonly refuse to study because they are wicked in some way. As a professional scholar, and as a teacher with some sympathy for students who find difficulty studying and would like to apply themselves more than they actually do, I in fact find that often people are blocked in their will to study by various factors. Frequently people are not to blame for succumbing to these considerations, but merely human, or unaware of what is blocking them, or as yet not treating the issues as a serious problem, to be approached in a problem-solving way. Some people indeed do blame themselves, and then give up not least of all for that reason. And still others, including some teachers, may be content to just join in “the blame game.” How destructive! I am not an educational psychologist, but an educator with years of counseling experience, and I can at least hope to offer advice on motivation to study that is more helpful than the “expertly” written study guide that I mentioned—which was of value in other respects, and indeed was an inspiration that helped motivate this article! The author referred to earlier probably had no problem studying and felt superior, and therefore pettily gratified, when surveying those who fell into difficulty.

Perfectionism. This can be a huge demotivator, even with people who on the surface do not seem concerned with excellence. Very often there is an intrinsic motivation to excellence, but it has been crushed or subdued, and yet perfectionism may lurk beneath the surface. Perfection can be grand. The thing about perfectionism is that it is an obsession with perfection in an imperfect world. We cannot rationally expect perfection as a general matter in a world in which so many things go wrong, and in which we find ourselves frankly imperfect. If people expect perfection, they demand perfect conditions for studying (ignoring the need to push a little bit sometimes to get into studying mode), a perfect idea for starting (even though warm-ups are often needed as the mind naturally gets into gear), and perfect performance. If the first two factors are missing, the studying might never begin. If performance seems to falter—and is actually only all too human, since to err is to learn—then the studying may suddenly cease. However, with the surrender of needing perfection this powerful demotivator itself may cease to have any effect, and give way to a healthy enjoyment of laughing at one’s foibles—in a gentle way, preferably. Most people are average, which fact renders totally irrational the idea that everyone should pursue perfection (this insight about averageness is derived from a similar discussion in David Burns’ excellent book, Feeling Good: the New Mood Therapy). If you accept being average as perfectly OK, you may just find a welcome resting place from which you can launch yourself into personal excellence, which is so much better than perfection not least of all because it is a realistic goal. Remember that average performance compared to others is well compatible with personal excellence in one’s own efforts.

Comparing oneself to others. There will always be others who perform better or worse than oneself, and often there is a mix of better and worse. Much of the contemporary economy is hyper-competitive and this only encourages such comparisons. However these comparisons are destructive. If someone performs better this can lead to feeling deflated, feeling that “gap” in a de-motivating way, and if someone does worse this can lead to complacency and gloating which also detracts from getting “real” things done. Such thinking merely endanger true productivity, equanimity, focus, and the ability to relate well to others. If someone does equally well then a mean desire to “beat” the other can surface. If you accept who you are, what you are, wherever and whenever you are, that is a good place to start that will not give rise to these destructive feelings that arise from comparing oneself to others. It makes more sense to compare oneself to oneself. That will give one a sense of whether one is making real progress, will be truly relevant to one’s own performance, and will help supply one with answers as to what needs work. Once this obsession ceases, true work can better begin.

Distractibility. People vary quite a bit in this as to personality, but people who are in all ways so-called “normal” can easily create or allow distractions that can undermine the activity that is study. Do you have a quiet place to work? Are there visual distractions? Are there annoyances? If your physical space is free of distractions, what about your own mind? A lack of focus is not necessarily distraction, since one may simply have difficulty focusing, but focusing on something else is not going to get you walking along the road to productive studying.

Cynicism. This term is difficult to define and has many philosophical senses which are quite irrelevant to the present concern. What I mean here is a negative assumption that study is useless, or boring, or annoying, or given to other negative associations. What these are in fact are labels that plaster over someone’s prospective idea of studying, and negative associations demotivate like nobody’s business. Studying is not always of great interest to the student, but in those cases the study may have value as a means to something else, such as a degree in good standing which can lead to other studies or career opportunities that are of great interest. The “uninteresting” often relates to the interesting in ways that make it all of some real interest.

Lack of structure. Sometimes people are told to study, or tell themselves to study, and somehow they drift into study-like behaviours such as picking up books and then drift into phone calls or emails or television and somehow the studying dissipates. Or they go on studying until they are overtired and thus physically demotivated. Either outcome is unsatisfactory. It makes sense to schedule study activities, to let people know one is not to be disturbed within reason, to let the answering machine or the computer handle one’s messages, and to clearly distinguish study from other activities such as entertainments. Limiting the time one studies is also key, otherwise one becomes tired and discouraged, feeling guilty for no good reason. I remember a time of difficulty in completing my doctoral thesis, and it helped enormously to schedule a time for study that I could easily keep. I ended up honouring it, and felt refreshed after, and remarkably focused during the activity because I was dedicated to it. The defined study time period made it possible to feel satisfied after achieving it, which is not possible if one only drifts from one thing to another. Everyone is different so the structure of study depends partly on how oneself is structured psychologically, physically, socially, and also in part on how one chooses to structure oneself through repeated choices that lead to habits. Every time we choose this reinforces neural “wiring” in the brain, so habits have, in part, a biological basis.

Fears. This is a different problem than cynicism, which itself may feel fearless. People fear failure, how they will be “rated” by others, incomprehension, or any number of problems which may prove entirely groundless. People can indeed worry to excess. One instead can keep an open mind that there may be no problems, or that one can afford to encounter difficulties and see them as an opportunity, as Einstein put it, and deal with real problems with real solutions instead of being vaguely haunted by general fears. These will surely cramp motivation that exists, and be a positive de-motivator in relation to studying.

Ego problems. It is crucial to avoid overgeneralizations of all kinds, but many fall into the trap of making generalizations about themselves, that they are “great” or “losers” and so forth. This leads to ego problems, where one expects to be great and so cannot deal with “flaws.” Flaws in “oneself” can better be translated into the thought of “problems requiring solutions—or perhaps no solutions, since not all issues are like that.” Overconfidence can mean jumping to conclusions or trusting excessively to easy judgment, as well as obnoxiousness which horrendously interferes with study as a potentially social activity. Underconfidence—that just leads away from studying altogether. Everyone needs self-assessment, but paradoxically it should lead away from self in a sense and focus on particular issues, actions, problems, etc.—what works and what doesn’t? What needs improvement and what is good, and what must simply be accepted for what it is? Some people feel the need to think of themselves as great not to feel good about themselves, but because others have the expectation that they ought to be great as “good people,” or as the child of someone who is intellectually brilliant, etc. Studying however is impossible without some peace of mind, and a large part of that is first of all accepting what is, as a matter of fact, before one concerns oneself with ideas of what ought to be. One can best progress to a more ideal state with a firm footing in reality. Rejecting reality as it is because it is not as it “ought” to be can reach irrational extremes, and some have called it “shoulding” all over oneself. Rejecting reality then becomes destructive, demotivating, disorienting, and ego becomes lost, not feeling “great” at all. It is also an ego problem of a social nature to be afraid of being considered a “nerd.” This can actually demotivate students. A good student is just that—treat the category of nerd as an amusing stereotype that we should not use in earnest at best, and a cruel attempt to belittle scholars at worst. No one can put you down without your permission, but those who try to make others feel bad are usually academically demotivated themselves, feel badly about it, and think they will feel better by putting others down. If you genuinely have nerdy traits such as absent-mindedness, do not fear it, but accept yourself as you are, and laugh with others who laugh with you.

Lack of priorities. Some people feel no inclination to study because they have made overly large priorities out of other worthwhile things, such as socializing, amusements, reading the news, sports, and so on. If other activities entirely absorb one, then one simply has not left room for studying. Unfortunately, the de-motivators that I am discussing can lead to studying-avoidance which itself makes studying fall to a lower priority than even the student feels right about, so all of these factors are interconnected. Any one action connected with studying needs the flow of motivation which can connect to any of the factors discussed here and more.

Hedonism. Some people see clearly the value of fun but fail to appreciate the value of work. Or they fail to distinguish enjoying something as one of life's pleasures, and taking satisfaction out of a job well done. Satisfactory study activities do not have to be “fun,” although they sometimes can be, especially if one is “psyched” to study.

Being spoiled. Some students, frankly, are people who have been overindulged by parents who simply provide all needs and wants, not requiring responsibilities in any department of life, and this does not conduce towards taking responsibility for any work including studying. Many do not appreciate the sheer opportunity to study and what it means in comparison to many who are students but have no resources.

Fatigue. I have already discussed this in relation to structuring time to avoid overtiring oneself. Trying to do too much our of overeagerness is self-defeating and leads to the opposite of eagerness only too quickly. However, one must sometimes also honour the fact that one is too tired even to begin studying productively, and forcing oneself unkindly to do so may lead to a self-inflicted distaste for the general activity. Taking a break to take a walk, eat a healthy snack, or call a friend briefly can be just the thing for a break.

Depression. Did it ever occur to the author of the book on studying that sometimes students are de-motivated not due to any character flaws, or even necessarily being naïve about study tactics, but because the student may be ill? Depression is an illness that is intrinsically demotivating. It is not the fault of the person who has it. This illness will typically last as long as 9 months if no intervention is taken. That is enough to derail any student’s studying career, at least temporarily. Often it is not even diagnosed. Effective treatment requires not just pills—although persistent trial and error in this department can be very helpful. Treatment of the mind as well as the brain and the body--i.e., cognitive therapy—is also key. What we think always affects what we feel, and the earlier comments on cynicism clearly illustrate this fact. If one thinks of studying in negative terms, guess how one will feel about it? Take your pick of negative feelings: fear, sadness, anger, frustration, indifference, and so forth.

Addictions. Some people are self-aware enough to realize they are addicted to alcohol, drugs, sex, foods, praise, or whatever, but they may fail to take into account that addicts tend to obsess about the object of addiction and lose interest in everything else. Someone who underestimates the sinister power of this phenomenon may think they are not interested in studying when in fact they are merely endangering themselves. Kick any existing addictions with kindness to yourself and others and persistence—whatever else it takes.

Relationship problems. The individual student is a social creature, and key relationship issues may involve an emotional toll that hacks into study motivation. Keep relationships healthy not just because everyone deserves it regardless, but as a part of good study hygiene.

Financial instability. Although financially poor scholars can accomplish magnificent work, it cannot be underestimated how much this can interfere with studying through stress, excessive demand to work for pay, self-blame, and so forth. Do not borrow or spend too much for starters, although I will not digress here except once again to be cautious about confusing lack of motivation to study with being a “bad person” who has no such interest. People are so much more complicated than that, and what they are actually can be very different from what they are potentially.

Stress in general. Study is a form of work, but we cannot work at our best unless we also learn how to relax. Ways of relieving stress as well as causes of stress are legion, but do not forget to get enough physical exercise, as many students are wont to do, since an underexercised body is itself stressed with poor energy, concentration, feeling poorly, etc.

Excessive criticism. Is there a concern then that there is still no motivation to study? There is a tragic expression that curiosity killed the cat, which usually involves a lack of empathy for cats, but a more applicable maxim would be that cattiness may kill curiosity. Curiosity is natural and all children who are not abused or deficient in nutrition or other physical respects have and exhibit it. Many children lose curiosity due to cattiness on the part of instructors, who are supposed to be facilitating learning. I have heard that what people fear most, even more than public speaking, is criticism from others. There is a reason for this. Criticism entails a problem that one genuinely faces—or perhaps the whole category of problems, and nothing is more problematic than that! Or else it is not a genuine problem, or not perceived to be so, and then one has to satisfy someone on a point where there is nothing wrong, which itself is another kind of problem. So no wonder people fear criticisms, when feelings of self-worth, so central to one’s being, may also be at stake! People often focus on problems in a working sort of way to try to improve matters. Taken to excess, however, then one has an endless stream of problems and no satisfaction in what one is doing. Therefore, inevitably, the activity becomes unsatisfying. Therefore, predictably, one has little or no motive to do it. It is important to be positive and affirming of what one accomplishes. Not excessively so, and not making overgeneralizations about oneself as an entire person as egoistic people might be tempted—for it is particular things, traits, achievements, etc. that we have to be positive about. Criticism is of great value. It is what can make us better and also feel better about what we do. But it can be exaggerated to the point where people dread it and then they may cease to learn from it altogether in a self-defeating cycle. Positive criticism or praise has a place in keeping things satisfying or gratifying. People can only handle so much negative criticism at a time so it makes sense to be generous with praise, and to pace either criticism, or more realistically, pacing one’s attention to individual criticisms so one can handle it all a bit at a time. This applies to all things including studying: big things can be intimidating, but little logical steps that are part of a master-plan are generally inviting.

Lack of fit with abilities and interests. Sometimes one studies what one is not so able to do, or one’s personality is not so suited to the subject matter. This should not be confused with lack of study motivation in general but should be respected along with one’s general uniqueness.

Laziness. This is a possibility, but usually I have found that students are merely blocked in their motivation in one of the ways I have mentioned or in other respects. The author of the “self-help” book I mentioned at the beginning would no doubt be a fan of this typically unhelpful label. So there is a lack of motivation. Why? What can be done about it?

Getting motivated to study is often just a matter of realizing the reasons why one is engaged in the activity: to learn, achieve, make some career progress, eventually earn money as a means to many other ends, and so on. Getting motivated, since people are naturally curious and interested in these other rewards, is often just a case of getting “un-demotivated”! As de-motivators are progressively defused, studying can emerge as the rich, rewarding and enjoyable activity that it can be for absolutely every student. Happy studying!

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Update of “Animal Rights Law”—with New Insights

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Some will wonder if I have given up the ghost when it comes to discussing both sides of the animal rights fundamentalism versus pragmatism debate. The answer is: no. I have taken a breather of several weeks, but the truth I am confronted with is that the issues continue to be of importance, and it falls to me to address them since there is a dearth of other people doing the same work (see my Nov. 26 entry on one of the very few academic exceptions to this rule, Steve Wise's book review of Rain without Thunder). It is also worth keeping in mind that this debate is about billions upon billions of nonhuman animals, and the real and possible laws which directly affect them, more than it is about human animals, although in general terms, each human also has a dignity as well as duties.

Now my essay, “Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism,” Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37 cannot be revised because it is published in a journal. By contrast, the MIRROR PRODUCTIONS version of “Animal Rights Law,” a popular audience version, can be revised since it is published on this site. I am pleased to report that I have revised and re-edited the MIRROR PRODUCTIONS presentation, and it contains new insights that are not given in the academic article. That is because, well, I did not have them at the time, but blogging has, as one might hope, stimulated new thoughts. However, time is a precious, non-renewable resource, so here is a list of the additional ideas for those who wish to expand their insight with a minimum of fuss:

1. p. 3, first full paragraph, last two sentences. Regarding the objection that “welfarist” laws are like asking that child abusers soften the blow rather than calling for an end to such abuse. Of course pragmatists also call for an end to such abuse a.s.a.p. and there are other familiar points given, but what is added is the realization that Francione’s own approach is more like softening the blow than abolishing child abuse completely, to use the often-made comparison. To see how this is plainly the case, see passage.
2. p. 4, first full paragraph. Discussion of “cruel culture” and “kind culture” is amended to say “crueler” and “kinder” culture since we are not talking about absolutes. China has a “crueler culture” regarding animals, not a “cruel culture” in all respects.
3. p. 4, second full paragraph. I have added a supplement to my argument for the long-term effectiveness of the pragmatist approach: a list of absurd statements one would have to believe, in part or whole, to dispute my model. I wouldn’t want to be someone disagreeing with these statements as the reader will perceive!
4. p. 5, under list of Francione’s “futility factors,” as it were, I consider the objection that only minor counterexamples can be given for the effectiveness of animal “welfare” legislation. An entire Western nation is no minor counterexample.
5. p. 7, second full paragraph. The point is made that we cannot meaningfully speak of sacrificing something unless we already have it or at least have access to it.
6. p. 7, second full paragraph. I point out that if animal “welfarist” laws sacrifice animal interests, then so do Francione’s own proto-rights measures for reasons given.
7. p. 10, first partial paragraph. A commentary on Francione’s title of his website: “Animal Rights: the Abolitionist Approach,” [emphasis added].
8. p. 10, first partial paragraph. An indication of the incoherence of the “new” part of Francione’s “new welfarism” concept.
9. p. 10, reply to objection 5. In response to the objection that we should never ask people to stop short of the ideal, I simply point out that Francione’s proto-rights proposals also do this.

A fundamentally flawed position will continue to manifest more and more problems, by implication, the more closely it is both elaborated and scrutinized.

Have a lovely day!

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New Guide: ANIMAL ACTION!

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

I am pleased to note that I have a new guide to animal activism available freely on this website. I devised it in response to a problem I have had teaching Brock University students in Critical Animal Studies courses. I would show them PETA documentaries on how animals are used and abused in society, and they would be ashen-faced, looking helpless and horrified. Hence the guide on things they can actually do, taking a cue from Joan Baez that "Action is the antidote to despair." The Guide is also available for activists in general:

http://sztybel.tripod.com/popular_menu.html [see first item listed]

and of course for my Brock pupils, or indeed other Critical Animal Studies students:

http://sztybel.tripod.com/guidemenu.html

See the first web-reference for a list of the guide's many features. One of the things that makes the guide distinctive is its treatment of activism towards the self, e.g., in dealing with feelings of apathy, guilt, rage, and despair, and also tips on how to be diplomatic, and how to deal with unsupportive people. The overall message of the booklet is one of EMPOWERMENT, and how to think in ways that empower ourselves as ambassadors for the animals!

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One Jury Is Back

Saturday, May 31, 2008

I note that at Brock University I devoted two weeks to the question of animal “welfare” laws as a possible part of animal rights legislative reform, in a 4th year seminar course called “Animals and the Law.” First Francione’s position was presented by tabling key chapters from his book, Rain without Thunder, and then the next week, my article, "Animal Rights Law," was one of the readings. Actually, more of his material was tabled than mine since more than a few chapters of his book were presented, whereas my essay was presented as a stand-alone alongside another paper related to animal welfare, but the other paper did not comment on the debate in question although its author was generally amenable to welfarist reforms without mounting a systematic justification for that stance. I ensured a high degree of students doing the readings by the use of a weekly assignment. At the end, I asked out of curiosity if anyone happened to agree with Francione’s view. No one raised a hand. By contrast, the presenter on my essay claimed I “proved” my case. I myself was surprised, and would be more reluctant to use the strong language of “proof.” Students often praise my classes as free forums of discussion where different views are welcome, so I do not think that was a concern in this case. I go to great lengths to impress upon my students that they should not take for granted anything that I say, but check it out for themselves, that I will not give them "the answers," and everyone has their own answers, etc. The situation did not ensue for lack of student assertiveness. Evidently, his arguments evidently just failed to convince, especially in the fuller context of critical analysis that was cultivated in the seminar. I take that as a very promising indication about the success of my arguments respecting illfare-reducing laws in the long-term, and look forward to trying out the same readings on a fresh class of students next academic year for the same course.

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Francione's Proposals: More "Welfarist" than the "Welfarists"

Sunday, June 1, 2008

It is well known that Francione rejects animal “welfarist”1 laws. In “Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism,” (published in the Journal for Critical Animal Studies and reprinted under academic articles on this website) I conceded that Francione’s “proto-rights” proposals that he would accept as law are “abolitionist” as he says (a classification which I still accept). However, in that essay I denied along with Francione that his proposals are animal "welfarist." In earlier drafts of my paper, pre-publication, I argued that Francione in fact offers animal "welfarist" legislative proposals. I am now switching back to my original interpretation for reasons that will become crystal clear presently. In my published article, I wrote on p. 14:

We must be careful not to object to Francione’s legal proposals because they are “welfarist” in his sense of merely regulating animal exploitation without abolishing it, or treating animals more “humanely” while instrumentalizing them. It is true that the animals are treated better, and there is no wholesale abolition. However, he does seek to contribute immediately and in the long-term to abolition with the particular prohibitions that he sets out, and also to strongly recognizing animal interests so that sentient beings are not treated as mere instruments. He does not pretend to perfect abolition or de-instrumentalization, but only to imperfect increments of a very particular sort.

However, recently, I have been forced to reconsider my position in thinking about this state of affairs. Francione’s proposals for legislative reform are still abolitionist or tending towards abolition—but so is my own stance as I explicate in the essay. Altogether, I thought that Francione’s ideas of protecting an entire animal interest2 really does resemble animal rights as he claims, and abolishes part of animal exploitation. Thus, it did not seem fair to lump his proposals with other animal “welfarist” legislative proposals.

I now wish to rationally reconsider how to classify his proposals. First of all, everyone would agree that his proposals (which may involve protecting a whole interest, such as liberty of movement for hens, or alternatively, abolishing a whole area of animal exploitation, such as animal circuses) are not fulfilling animal rights. Animal rights proposals would protect all interests, not just some interests, and they would abolish all areas of animal exploitation, not just some. Francione calls his proposals “proto-rights.” I do not wish to dispute that usage. I agree that one can “grow” animal rights by first protecting one or some interest(s) and eventually protecting them all. In my paper, I use my own version of “proto-rights,” which is not as stringent, and allows protecting degrees of interests of animals, not just entire interests—the more the better. So I would approve of protecting 80% of liberty of movement in cases in which protecting the whole interest—namely 100%—is not feasible. So just because we all agree that his proposals are “proto-rights” proposals does not logically entail that they are not animal “welfarist.” My 80% protection of liberty of movement is both proto-rights and “welfarist.”

It would be fair to evaluate whether Francione deals in “welfarism” by considering his definition of “welfarism” and of terms intrinsic to animal “welfarism.” By Francione’s own definition, an animal “welfarist” seeks to regulate animal exploitation rather than to abolish it. However, by protecting one whole interest such as liberty of movement for hens, this regulates the practice of confining hens for eggs; it does not abolish the practice. The Francione sympathizer would then say, though, that although the entire practice is not abolished, a disregard of an interest is prohibited, and therefore a piece of abolition is achieved. Indeed, that very reasoning is, again, why I initially agreed that Francione as a theorist is not a “welfarist.”

In response to Francione, others, and my original writing on this subject, I offer two arguments. The first will examine the meaning of regulation, the most key term to animal “welfarism” in Francione’s own definition which I used in my essay. The second will try to use the elementary principle of classification based on greatest similarity to settle this conceptual conundrum.

First, what is a regulation? In law, it involves adjusting or controlling something, in this case animal exploitation. It makes a practice conform to guidelines. However, that is what ensuring enclosures with full freedom of movement for hens does. So the substitute form of confinement conforms to Francione’s own definition of animal “welfarism." Note here that Francione’s criteria for acceptable reforms, it will be recalled, forbid substituting a more humane form of animal exploitation. That restriction would presumably be in place because such substitutions are what animal "welfarists" do. Yet that is what a fully generous enclosure for hens would mean.

My next argument systematically compares similarities and differences. The fact is, Francione’s proto-rights proposals are partly like animal rights, and partly like animal “welfare.” Let me explain. First, protecting one whole interest resembles animal rights in that under true animal rights legislation, that whole interest would also be protected (along with, ideally, every other interest of animals). However, we can accurately characterize animal “welfare” laws as disregarding animals’ interests. That is roughly what exploitation is: certain practices, especially of usage, that do not respect the interests of others. Francione’s proposal resembles animal “welfarist” laws in that although one interest is wholly protected, the rest of the animals’ interests might be left entirely unprotected.

Now logically, if something is partly like X, and partly like Y, to make an overall assessment on how to classify the thing, one would need to decide what the thing most closely resembles. For example, an Aboriginal community might be examined to determine if self-government is in place. It might not be perfectly the case. After all, the Native government might in some ways interact within a scheme of federal politics. However, if the community’s governance is more like self-government than submitting to the authority of some other power, then we can reasonably conclude that self-government exists, if only to some degree—or imperfectly. Such is the case of the Inuit nation of Nunavut in northern Canada, my own country of residence.

I was charitable in my earlier interpretation of Francione's work. Charity of interpretation means being generous, and interpreting arguments the way their authors would wish, even if it is possible to construe them in a way contrary to how they would like. I believe in charity since it makes for civilized dialogue and helps to avoid misunderstanding, among other benefits. However, owing to my reconsideration, I can see now that I was only too generous.

Francione’s proto-rights proposals more resemble animal “welfare” laws than animal rights laws. This conclusion can be guaranteed mathematically. Consider that in the hen case, only one interest would be wholly protected. The rest would be woefully violated. The total number of interests an animal would have is never specified by Francione, nor myself, for that matter. But whether the total number is 4, 6, 8, or 36, only one interest being protected means that many more interests are disregarded. Disregarding interests is what welfarist exploitation does. Therefore, straightforwardly, such a proposal of Francione’s more closely resembles “welfarist”—really illfarist—animal exploitation than animal rights. We compute this fact by counting and comparing the number of interests that are protected versus unprotected in Francione's proposals.

Therefore it is fair to conclude overall that his proposals are animal “welfarist.” Or if it is insisted to be a hybrid of animal “welfare” and animal rights elements, then it is not an equal merger. By far the dominant part is the animal “welfarist” component. This conclusion could only be subverted by holding, absurdly, that things should be classified based on what they are dissimilar to, or by "conveniently" ignoring the disregarding of animals' interests in Francione's proposals.

Another sort of practice that Francione approves, as I note in my essay, is protecting against some insults to bodily integrity, such as dehorning of cattle, while permitting other insults to bodily integrity such as hot-iron branding. This is problematic not just because, as I noted in the essay, it blatantly contradicts the notion that interests must be protected without compromise, although banning such a practice as dehorning entirely might be seen as vaguely abolitionist in character. Approving such a state of affairs means that an even tinier portion of animals’ interests are respected, and even more disregarded (e.g., only a tiny part of bodily integrity is protected), thus increasing the resemblance to animal “welfarist” laws. That is because not even one whole interest is protected, but in a way, only one practice relevant to protecting that interest.

There is a third kind of acceptable proposal to Francione: banning an entire area of animal exploitation. Is that more like animal rights or animal “welfare”? I would say this is the most like animal rights perhaps of Francione's incremental reforms. But since only one area would be banned, and animal rights involves banning all of the many areas of animal exploitation, it can be argued that even such a state of affairs, though partly abolitionist, more resembles animal “welfare” law, or contributes to an overall body of animal “welfare” law since that is what is what remains after the reform is completed. There would still be interests disregarded in any number of other areas of practice. Such a law would join an existing body of speciesist laws, which, ironically, is what readers of Rain without Thunder will recall Francione denounces in those who would approve of laws providing water to thirsty cows awaiting slaughter. Is it “unfair” to look at the whole body of law? In all fairness, animal rightists are aiming to change the whole body of laws. Parts cannot be realistically understood in total abstraction from the wholes of which they are a part. Such bans are in a way partly abolitionist, but they nevertheless leave an overall state of lack of abolition. I agree that such bans are perhaps the strongest forms of incremental reform that animal rights advocates can aim for though. They are intrinsically quite abolitionist, although they form part of a body of law that is still not characterized that way. This sort of ban, though, is not the most original or interesting part of Francione’s legislative proposals, since animal rights people have long looked forward to banning types of exploitation even if not all of it can be eliminated at once. The two types of legislative proposals considered previously that are original to Francione though are mostly animal “welfarist” in character on any fair or objective reading.

A fresh example would be in the field of worker’s rights. Suppose management is willing to concede full dental benefits to negotiators on behalf of striking workers. That would be “welfarist” reform for workers if no other area of exploitation is addressed such as lack of holidays, poor pay, hazardous working conditions, etc. The dental benefits might just be a token benefit in that context.

I am not denying any degree of resemblance to animal rights in Francione’s proposals, nor am I disputing whether some progress is made towards abolition of animal exploitation. I am just saying that his suggestions more resemble animal “welfare,” and I believe that I have objectively proved my point.

Let us anticipate and answers some possible objections to my analysis.

Objection 1: Having achieved a fraction of something does not imply that animal rights is not adhered to. If a company only has a share of the market, it is still wholly that company that has the share that it has. Similarly, whatever share animal rights people have of how animals are to be treated legally is 100% animal rights.

Reply: This analogy would work if a certain sector of how animals were treated legally conformed to animal rights. One might think of the case of a country that signs onto the Great Ape Project. Would that not be a portion of animal rights? Interestingly enough, yes and no. Ape rights are animal rights—yes. Yet granting rights to apes on the grounds that they are like humans is contrary to animal rights generally, and that is why most people at this stage would sign on with the Project. However that may be, the analogy does not work in the case of Francione’s own proposals. According to Francione himself, if only a certain percentage of an interest is secured, that is not enough to be characteristic of animal rights. Similarly, securing only one of several interests and having all other interests violated is not characteristic of animal rights either. So the analogy fails since no sector is secured that is describable as animal rights given his proposals, especially the first two kinds considered (protecting a whole interest, or abolishing, say, dehorning but not hot-iron branding), but also even if a certain kind of animal usage (e.g., animal circus acts) is abolished on anti-cruelty grounds rather than as a part of implementing full-fledged animal rights. However, if we only pay attention to the protected whole interest in Francione's proposal, is that not consistent with animal rights, so long as we ignore the other neglected interests? Yes, but neglecting animals' interests and considering them unimportant to reform or even analysis is something that speciesists do, not animal rightists. Also, we are not disputing whether protecting a whole interest in isolation is consistent with animal rights. We are asking if broader proposals with implications beyond just the one interest (e.g., hen enclosures with maximum bodily movement) are similar to animal rights. So on an animal rights analysis which refuses to overlook disregarded interests, and which also resists a purely fragmentary view, his proposals are, of course, "welfarist."

Objection 2: We can focus on only one interest at a time to build towards a full recognition of interests.

Reply: I am not suggesting otherwise in many cases. Only, this idea seems to contradict Francione’s principle, which I quote in my essay, that we cannot trade away interests of animals today so that they can have rights tomorrow. We “trade away” interests by leaving most interests unprotected and only safeguarding one as Francione suggests, in hopes of building towards animal rights—the protection of all interests entirely.

Objection 3: Percentages or fractions of abolition count as “abolitionist” and are not “welfarist.”

Reply: On this reasoning, fractions of interests being protected would be abolitionist too, as I argue in my paper, and this also makes progress towards abolition. Francione understandably would not welcome such a consequence. For then, absurdly for Francione, bona fide “welfarist” legislation that does not even protect whole interests would not be “welfarist,” which is a complete self-contradiction generated by such an interpretation. Everyone else would consider such laws to be “welfarist,” including Francione in other contexts.

Objection 4: At least there is progress towards full animal rights in the long term.

Reply: My own framework too has animal rights in the long-term, but that does not prevent anyone from calling laws that I approve in the short-term as “welfarist.” The same logic must apply, in all fairness, to Francione’s proposals. Long-term animal rights does not guarantee that imperfect median-term proposals are not “welfarist.”

Francione fails to altogether refute animal “welfarism,” as I have shown in my paper, although granted “welfarism” is contrary to animal rights in many respects, and the latter is desirable as a goal for legislatures in the long-term (it is desirable for laws right now, only it is not realistic). Not only does Francione fail to repudiate animal “welfarism” in theory. He does not divest himself of it in practice, contrary to what he says. He fails to perceive that his own view is substantially “welfarist.” He compares speciesist animal “welfarists” to Jeffrey Dahmer, calling them, in effect, counterproductive, morally impoverished, etc. All of these criticisms must apply to his own view then.

Ironically, there may be a few unexpected logical twists to the situation beyond what I have already shown. We could even justifiably call Francione’s proposals more animal “welfarist” than the vast majority of animal “welfarist” laws or proposals. How does that work? Well, a view is “welfarist” that regulates animal exploitation rather than abolishing it, while notably disregarding animal interests. However, a view is more strongly “welfarist” if the concern for animal “welfare” is more intense, and greater regulation occurs to ensure animal interests—short of animal liberation and still with gross disregard for interests of animals, who are still used for standard purposes. That is how his own proposals can fairly be described. So Francione is more animal “welfarist” than the animal “welfarists” that he so roundly condemns! A second implication is that I have disputed the general applicability of "new welfarism," Francione's term, since mixing animal rights and animal "welfare" goes back to Victorian times at least. However, his own proto-rights is indeed relatively new, and therefore a kind of "new welfarism" if any animal rights view can fairly be described that way (which I have also disputed elsewhere, but Francione begs to differ). He views animal “welfare” as alien and so does not see its structure mirrored in his own logically imperiled dreams for the legislative future.

Notes

1. I place animal “welfare” with the quotation marks in place because I do not hold that what is normally referred to as “animal welfare” is really befitting of that label. Rather, what people normally call “animal welfare” is animal illfare, and only if animal rights were respected would true animal welfare be realized. Some may regard the quotation marks as tedious, but I think the constant misrepresentation of “welfare” in our everyday speech is infinitely more trying, and in fact much worse, part of the worst sorts of oppressive horrors. See my "The Rights of Animal Persons," Journal for Critical Animal Studies, pp. 1-6, published also on my website.

2. Note also that I refer to several passages from Francione’s writings in this blog entry which are not cited here. However, I cite “Animal Rights Law” which in turn provides citations for all of the relevant Francione passages.

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Great Apes Activism: Fending Off Futilitarian Animal Rightists

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

I was teaching a fourth-year seminar class on “Animals and the Law” last term at Brock University and we explored rights for great apes for many weeks. We looked specifically in one week at resistance to great ape rights. Some of the opposition is blindly speciesist. But some of it is by thoughtful anti-speciesists, who think they have a better perspective than other anti-speciesists who are prepared to support rights-for-great-apes campaigns. Animal rights pragmatism versus fundamentalism is a debate that bears implications for great apes activism, such as the Great Ape Project (GAP), which tries to secure a commitment to give great apes (chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans) the rights to life, liberty, and freedom from torture. I believe that apes deserve not merely to be free from torture—an excessively conservative goal—but to experience well-being or welfare, for example on animal sanctuaries. However, that aside, I generally support the GAP. Steven Wise advocates rights only for chimpanzees and bonobos in his book, Rattling the Cage. I think we can successfully win rights for more great apes than that. I address the Great Ape Project in passing in “Animal Rights Law,” but not in depth. However, this Project is of immense importance, and so I feel the need to contemplate it today.

Now, animal rights fundamentalists sometimes (not always) take issue with great apes activism. Joan Dunayer, an animal rights fundamentalist, supports great apes activism—with a qualification that it can only legitimately be based on arguments that the apes are sentient; we must never cite their higher intelligence, according to Dunayer. Gary L. Francione used to support the GAP (he was a contributor to the volume, The Great Ape Project, St. Martin’s Press, 1993), but has since condemned it. By contrast, philosophers who advocate animal liberation such as Paola Cavalieri, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, Steve Sapontzis, Richard D. Ryder, Marc Bekoff, Stephen R. L. Clark, James Rachels, Collin McGinn, Dale Jamieson, Harlan B. Miller, and Barbara Noske advocated the GAP in their articles in the GAP volume (along with others such as Jane Goodall, Roger and Deborah Fouts, and Richard Dawkins) presumably without any backpedalling. Yet none of these authors, to my knowledge, has engaged with fundamentalist negativism about the GAP. So first, I will outline an animal rights pragmatist defense of great apes activism. Then I will deal with Francione’s objections, and finally show how Dunayer’s position on great apes activism needlessly undermines the effectiveness of the general campaign.

Animal rights fundamentalism in its core form is very simple (a more elaborate understanding of this topic is presented in my article, "Animal Rights Law"). It holds that anything contrary to animal rights is morally wrong, or inconsistent for an animal rights activist to support. Francione’s own view is more complicated than that. However, the version of animal rights pragmatism based in best caring ethics holds that animal rights is not our ultimate consideration. This suggestion might startle many animal rightists, but allow me to explain. Rights are mere things, and nothing matters to any mindless thing including stones, toasters, and rights. However, sentient beings are another matter. Many things matter to sentient entities. So it makes sense, if our actions are to have any positive significance, to act ultimately for sentient beings. And we cannot do better than to advocate what is best for sentient beings, as best caring ethics urges. It is best for sentient beings to have full rights, and that is what is unequivocally advocated both in the near-term and the long-term. Individuals and groups can and do embrace animal rights through social transformation. Yet with respect to law, it is different. We are not about to pass laws granting equal rights to sentient beings any time soon in legislatures. That is why, in “Animal Rights Law,” I argue that we should do, in the legislative near-term, whatever is best for sentient beings, even if that would be contrary to making "rights" our ultimate consideration. Let it be clear though: animal rights laws are advocated to be put in place as soon as possible.

Now in addressing potential legislators and judges, there are two ways of making legal progress for great apes:

1. We can convince others to adopt our own beliefs. Thus, animal rightists seek to convince everyone that all sentient beings deserve rights.
2. If we fail to convince others of our own beliefs, we can try to show others that even according to their own beliefs, they should make concessions to the animal rights movement.

Granting great ape rights would be one such concession along the lines of 2. Many people argue that anyone with self-awareness, rationality, linguistic capacity, social awareness and other cognitive abilities deserves rights. That is why they say, albeit questionably and I think wrongly, that humans have rights. We can therefore use these people’s beliefs as a lever to grant great apes rights. Such a use does not logically imply that we are saying such people are right. Using the first appeal too states rather that they are wrong. The use of the second appeal as well only implies that we recognize that others believe differently than ourselves, which is simply true. It is an appeal in favor of others' integrity and against their ongoing hypocrisy. Of course, we should also urge that great apes deserve rights simply as sentient beings, but to fail to make the secondary appeal is to fail to convince multitudes of people who are not persuaded, at least for now, solely by appeals to sentience. It is a failure to help others to realize the full logical development of their view which would be better not only for them but for others as well. Failing to convince others has a cost: lack of rights for great apes. Francione does not even make the distinction between these two types of appeal, let alone provide the slightest argument as to why simply appealing to others to be self-consistent is somehow unacceptable or wrong.

We do not have to claim that appeals to humanlike cognition are valuable in the sense of being correct or true, or that they promote the greatest possible good of sentient beings in principle. On the contrary, such arguments seem incorrect and to fail to support what is best for all in the abstract (which is crucially different from what is best in context—see again "Animal Rights Law"). However, they are manifestly useful appeals, because they do convince people who might not be moved by sentientism in general. And great apes rights are a viable form of animal rights in the near-term, since they have already been accomplished in some countries. Britain, New Zealand, and Sweden have banned the use of great apes in scientific research. The Baeleric Parliament of the Spanish Baerlic Islands has gone ever farther and supports the Great Ape Project itself.

In contrast to the success of GAP-like initiatives, equal rights for all sentient beings are not viable in the legislative short-term. If we make great ape rights part of a general campaign for sentient beings only, then we might list great apes among the many diverse animals whom we wish to see protected by animal rights laws. Even having a special paragraph on the great apes would be seen, by this logic, as making a “special” appeal on behalf of apes because they are like us. I predict that such a weak and unfocused initiative would fail to win great ape rights by far. Or at least such a campaign would be much less effective than a focused campaign that moves all the levers it can on behalf of great apes, including calling people to be consistent with what they already believe, even if they cannot be made to embrace different fundamental beliefs. So option 1. would make not bring rights for sentient beings in general any day sooner—I will now argue that this retardation of progress for great apes would set back animal rights in general. At most, a fundamentalist such as Francione might focus on freeing individual chimps from hellish enclosures, or seeking habitat protection or appropriate veterinary care for their species. Such campaigns would be weakened without the motive force of peoples' already cemented convictions.

Great ape rights make a noticeable dent in speciesism. Entrenching rights for great apes, even if some believe that is because they are humanlike, would further breach the species barrier in the granting of animal rights. As noted, we have already done this, or at least some nations have. Such a move only makes people take animal rights all the more seriously. And there is no reason to fear that we will stop short at great ape rights with no further progress if animal rights arguments and activists are worth their salt. Questions of animal rights generally have not died off in countries where great ape rights are granted. Such nations are regarded as advanced in animal rights, and that can only advance the animal rights cause. As I have argued in "Animal Rights Law," creating a kindness culture is conducive towards animal rights. However, it is also conducive to animal rights laws simply to build up animal rights in the lawbooks rather than their absence. Such an achievement suggests that animal rights are appropriate and feasible, and only invites further questioning as to what other extensions of animal rights may be right and possible.

Animal rights pragmatists, in the legislative short-term, face a choice between goods and evils:

1. advocate sentient being rights in general, and great ape rights only as a part of that general advocacy, but then lose the momentum of a focused, maximally effective campaign on behalf of great apes, or
   
2. support not only sentient being rights, but campaigns specifically for great apes, using not only sentientist arguments, but also citing humanlike cognitive capacities; such an appeal to humanlike characteristics we do not regard as ideally correct or just, but many others do, and such a tactic will convince many to back great ape rights.

Pragmatists should recognize that 2. is the lesser of evils, and indeed the greater of benefits, for sentient beings. Both 1. and 2. permit and encourage critiques of speciesist favoritism for more humanlike beings, so that is not a distinctive advantage for either approach. However, consider the four advantages of the pragmatist approach which the fundamentalist does not share:

1. is more conducive to animal rights more generally, as I argued above;
2. wins rights for great apes, preventing their exploitation and perhaps extinction;
3. promotes self-consistency, which helps to make logical progress in the development of views; it also encourages critical thinking skills leading to animal rights (which is yet another factor that might conduce towards animal rights more generally);
4. it makes people less hypocritical, or promotes the virtue of integrity in the world, which is beneficial to the character of the one with integrity and to the community at large.

So it seems to me really a matter of fact which is the better approach, or which best approximates the best. One advantage is moot between approaches, and four key advantages, on any reasonable view, are enjoyed only by the pragmatist option as against the minority position of the futilitarians.

Francione needs to establish that it is best for sentient beings if animal rightists refuse to support the GAP. (Dunayer needs to show it is best to restrict ourselves solely to arguments regarding sentience—which I will soon discuss.) We cannot intelligibly argue that it is “better” for apes to languish without liberation, let alone “best” for them. Francione’s approach would be too little, too late, and the the upshot is that great apes might very well go extinct without adequate protection in the near future, a near future road marked by horrifically unmitigated exploitation and neglect of these magnificent creatures.

Let us now consider and rebut Francione’s specific objections to great apes activism in his blog entry for December 20, 2006:

Objection 1: He rejects “the similar minds position,” or trying to base rights for great apes on the premise that these beings are like us.

Reply: I reject such an argument too in terms of its being illogical, or untrue, and not ideally best for all animals. However, as said, there are two ways to convince people, and one of them is to persuade them with reference to what they already believe. That is not immoral if it is crucial to securing the best we can for sentient beings. Most humans now believe that only humanlike beings deserve rights. That assumption provides plenty of leverage for winning rights for great apes. Francione’s “generalist approach” which would seem to mean simply listing great apes among the sentient beings who need rights would be weak, unfocused and certainly would not have won the legislative breakthroughs such as the New Zealand’s law to end experiments on great apes. Again, we do not have to think the “similar minds” position is right. Other people do that. We need only recognize that humanist assumptions are useful towards getting the most that we can for sentient beings in the short-term, in terms of increments of progress. That is what matters to animals in the end: securing their good. They do not much actually care what humans believe, I would have to guess. I am not however arguing that peoples' beliefs are irrelevant to the cause of animal rights. We would be at least one increment short of what is possible without great apes activism, since neither they nor any other sentient being would have legal rights in the wake of a successful anti-great-apes-activism-campaign, for a very long time to come. Francione writes that we should not link “moral status of nonhumans to the possession of humanlike cognitive characteristics.” True, but great apes activists need not do this, but only recognize and make use of the fact that other people do so even in the face of protests from animal rightists such as myself. Is there a fear that such campaigns after all “imply” that anthropocentrism is correct? Any such loose implications can be swept aside if the campaign explicitly rejects anthropocentrism, while still calling on humanists to be self-consistent in the interests of the apes themselves.

Objection 2: Great apes activism does not challenge speciesist hierarchy but reinforces it in that

(a) it suggests that only beings such as great apes have certain characteristics such as intelligence, emotions, and complex social relationships, and other sentient beings do not; and

(b) it suggests that such cognitive characteristics have moral value.

Reply: I have already refuted (b) from an animal rights pragmatist perspective. My campaign does not affirm higher intelligence as a criterion of moral standing, for example. As for (a), this is in no way claimed by even one single author in The Great Ape Project. It is merely argued that great apes have higher cognitive abilities than many other animals, which is true. It does not deny that many other animals have very high levels of cognition. This is merely an unfair and unsubstantiated imputation of Francione’s, much like his false claim that the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics promotes a view of animals as things (see my blog entry for April 25/07).

Objection 3: Humans who are mentally challenged do not deserve less rights than normal humans.

Reply: True, but the animal rights pragmatist is not saying otherwise, so this objection is irrelevant. Again, practical use is being made of a humanistic assumption, without any endorsement of its truth or ethical rectitude—just the contrary, ableism against the mentally challenged and speciesism are uniformly denounced by animal rights pragmatists.

Objection 4: Francione writes that great apes activism is “like having a human rights campaign that focuses on giving rights to the ‘smarter’ humans first….We would certainly reject that elitism where humans are concerned.”

Reply: It is true we would not make such appeals in the case of humans. But the case is disanalogous. The world cultural climate is more or less receptive to universal human rights appeals, even as it is increasingly receptive to great apes rights campaigns. It is not receptive to sentient being rights appeals at the legislative level, so the analogy utterly breaks down. It is not “elitist” to advocate rights for all sentient beings in the long-term, and to secure whatever increments we can for sentient beings in the short-term. Rather it is neglectful to fail to fight for great ape rights and to just watch while these animals go extinct, while smugly handing out fliers about rights for all sentient beings that give no special mention to the great apes—except perhaps to poo-poo promising campaigns focused on their liberation.

An additional concern that I can foresee is that the secondary appeal can be viewed as cynically manipulative, rather than calling people to believe what is right. However, an appeal to embrace what is right is already being made, and indeed to extend what others already view as right. Furthermore, it is not unduly "manipulative" to find common ground with others to make progressive legislation, in the way that consistent humanists and animal rightists will tend to share common ground as GAP proponents. These parties should work that way together, not just with one side "manipulating" the other. Any further concessions to animal rights can be left to the long-term workings of democracy. What could be wrong with that picture?

Francione and I agree that we already know great apes are similar and do not need to fund more research on the apes. Many know of the similarities, but many do not, as my course amply demonstrates to me. My students learned huge amounts of data about the amazing abilities of great apes other than humans. I do not advocate experimenting on great apes against their will, nor indeed does the GAP. I am as ever an antivivisectionist. That research on apes has been done and I agree that their amazing cognitive abilities have been well documented. No more invasive research should be done, and that is not an implication of supporting the GAP. But many need to be educated about these facts if it will help result in rights for these great apes. Peoples' awe over ape minds from these experiments should ironically help to inspire antivivisection with respect to apes. Research could be funded that just collects together amazing facts about primates that have already been established to "wow" many into supporting the GAP.

Francione speaks in Rain without Thunder of banning areas of animal exploitation, including I would imagine marine animal acts. Yet part of what will win further protection for dolphins, beluga whales, and killer whales in particular is their advanced cognitive capacities. This has already won some progress. Would he oppose focused campaigns of this sort too? Perhaps he is “obliged” to in light of what he believes about the GAP. Moreover, as my friend and long-time animal rights activist JoAnne Schwab points out, a lot of sympathy with whales' advanced minds generated the admittedly imperfect moratorium on whaling that exists. If researchers just mentioned that whales suffer that would not have inspired the same victory, any more than citing the suffering of fish has stopped fishing. People thought, "Oh my gosh! Aside from their different bodies, the whales are so much like us!" People often do not think the same thing of fish. Thinking of whales as very similar to us naturally more easily inspires similar treatment of both humans and "humanlike" creatures. (Of course, again, I am not saying that rights should be awarded based on intelligence.)

Now, unlike Francione, Joan Dunayer supports great ape rights activism—qualified support though. In brief, she argues that it would be “easy” to win great ape rights: “If someone thinks that a great-ape campaign is more winnable than others, they should go ahead. However, they shouldn’t argue based on the shared characteristics (other than sentience) of humans and other great apes.” (Speciesism, pp. 117-118) Why are such campaigns, which are by no means "easy," more winnable? Because they implicitly play upon humanist assumptions about rights. Why not play upon that more explicitly then for even greater success?”[1] Such rights are indeed winnable as Dunayer observes and foresees. However, we would not be as likely to win them, or do so as quickly, if we do not make use of the humanist assumptions that people already have. If we advocate great apes rights purely on the basis of their ability to suffer, that will no more move people than appeals that other animals suffer—which is an appeal with only limited success thus far. Yet appeals to apes’ ability to reason, use language, etc. dramatically win public sympathy and thus increase “winnability” exponentially.

A pragmatist will denounce speciesism, and favoring animals on the basis of intelligence, but they will still criticize humanists that they should at least be consistent with what they already believe. Anyone can legitimately be criticized on that score, quite apart from whatever new beliefs they should acquire. That is standard practice in academics where it is accepted that a diversity of opinion prevails, and implications of others' views are routinely spelled out, whether they like it or not (I do that a lot in this blog!). Indeed, we are much more likely to persuade others of implications of a belief they already hold than to adopt a brand new belief of rights for all sentient beings. Francione entitles his blog entry, “The Great Ape Project: Not so Great.” I say rather that the GAP is a momentous idea whose time has come, and it is a legislative proposal that should be implemented with full force, in the greatest possible way, using whatever legal arguments are most effective. Rejecting the GAP, or strait-jacketing it as only allowed to appeal to sentience, is a way to lose rather than to win achievable animal rights. An exclusively sentientist great apes campaign will convince fewer people, and as Steven Wise demonstrates in Rattling the Cage, the restriction will not enable us to connect as well with existing legal precedents. Wise himself mentions in a later book, Drawing the Line, p. 34: "If I were Chief Justice of the Universe, I might make the simpler capacity to suffer, rather than practical autonomy [which requires advanced cognitive capacities], sufficient for personhood and dignity-rights." However he points out that sentientism is irrelevant to common law judges. Still, Wise models how one can advocate both sentientism and progress for great apes that uses appeal to higher cognition as a campaign mechanism. Let us be winners rather than losers of winnable battles on behalf of animal rights—for the animals’ sakes.

Notes

1. Animal “welfarist” laws are also more “winnable” than truly nonspeciesist laws, but in fairness, she is not committed to supporting “welfarist” laws just because they are winnable. She thinks, anyway, that she can self-consistently reject “welfarist” laws just because they are speciesist. “Animal Rights Law,” my essay, I think puts to rest the idea that anti-speciesists morally must reject “welfarist” laws in the short-term, but let us continue to focus on great apes rights for now.

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Veganism as a Moral Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Friday, June 13, 2008

Francione writes that veganism is the “moral baseline” for animal rights, and that we should unequivocally support veganism alone. He wrote in a blog entry of April 9, 2008 that we should not waste time with organizations that say that some forms of animal abuse are worse than others. This implies that we should be equally dismissive of lacto-ovo vegetarians and meat-eaters, and be equally condemnatory of factory farming and traditional “family” farms that try to be humane towards animals. I agree that veganism is a baseline for animal rights. One cannot be fully an animal rightist without eliminating all animal products from one’s diet, since all of these usages involve exploitation and harm to animals. I also agree that animal rights groups should promote veganism, and not directly promote injustice or lacto-ovo vegetarianism.

However, I do not agree that ethics is all-or-nothing, and that there are no distinctions to be made in the practices I outlined above. I also believe that while we should not promote lacto-ovo vegetarianism, it would be a mistake not to be at all positive about someone moving to that as a new diet. I also think we should refer them to resources that they seek, in hopes that they will start with that and then progress to veganism. When I say we should not promote lacto-ovo vegetarianism, what I mean is we should not ask for still-oppressive practices in our campaign. However, if someone responds wanting to go only part-way, resources about lacto-ovo might come in through the back door. You can call it not so much as failing to refer them to veganism (which of course is the most preferred course of events simply as such), as a more sophisticated attempt to refer them to a road to veganism, which subvegan vegetarianism will be if all goes well. If encouragement of walking along the road is offered, that is part of things going well. If discouragement is at once and always thereafter introduced, the road to veganism may well not even be trodden upon.

The reasons why I avoid Francione’s all-or-nothing approach relate simply to truth and goodness. The truth is, such a dietary switch has much positive about it, but also something very negative for dairy cows (and of course veal calves, since those are the male offspring of dairy calves) and chickens used for creating eggs. Lacto-ovo vegetarians assist animal rights by degrees by respecting the rights of some animals, though not all. By doing this they help offset speciesism, a human health epidemic related to eating animal products, and an environmental disaster for all animals, again related to human consumption of animal products. That should be praised as progressive because it does indeed make progress, while also it should be pointed out that lacto-ovos are not only imperfect, which can be innocent, but commit injustice, which is not innocent.

So it is absurd to put all forms of animal husbandry on the same “moral baseline.” Francione himself would abolish dehorning of cattle as a legislative proposal, as I have discussed elsewhere, and presumably this is based on the assumption that it is “better” to do without the dehorning. Well, this can be generalized to ridding animals of all factory farming hellish treatments. The animals would have no trouble identifying what is preferable and neither should we.

I would like to contrast two approaches to a lacto-ovo vegetarian who falls short of veganism, but struggles to make progress:

1. Fundamentalist: rejects that some forms of animal abuse are worse than others, and so negates a moral distinction between meat-eaters and lacto-ovo vegetarians, and factory farming and “family” farms; so meat-eaters, lacto-ovo vegetarians, factory farmers, and traditional animal agriculturalists would equally be greeted with rejection, scorn, dismissal, etc., as tends to be the actual animal rights fundamentalist response;
2. Pragmatist: rejects all forms of animal abuse, claims that we are morally obliged to be vegan as a duty of justice, but that some forms of animal abuse are worse than others, that factory farming is a much worse evil than traditional rearing of animals for flesh, and that lacto-ovo vegetarians are more progressive than meat-eaters; accordingly, while all animal agriculturalists would be considered morally wrong and unjust, and the same goes with all animal consumers, an element of praise could be had in that some forms are worse than others, and trying to eliminate abuse by degrees deserves some limited praise and less blame.

These two approaches involve two different senses of veganism as a moral baseline for animal rights:

1. Fundamentalist animal rights requires veganism, and every other kind of diet is equally bad or on the other side of the baseline in an equal way, since we "should" not proceed on the assumption that any form of animal abuse is worse than any other;
2. Pragmatic animal rights requires veganism, but not every practice is the same distance from the baseline; factory farming and meat-eating are farther away than traditional farming and lacto-ovo vegetarianism for example.

So is veganism the moral baseline of animal rights? Yes, but the form that baseline should take is crucial. Some conceptions of veganism as the moral baseline of animal rights are better and more accurate than others.

I have seen Francione confuse the issue, on a part of his so-called “The Abolitionist Approach” website (the title of course arrogantly and wrongly assumes there is only one abolitionist approach—namely Francione’s) by stating that my sort of approach simply calls eating animals “acceptable.” That is an oversimplification. And it is based on an oversimplified picture of animal abuse and flesh-eaters. I reject the flaws and accept the parts that are progressive. I reject eating eggs and milk, but I accept not eating cows, goats, pigs, and fish. That, logically, is how it should be, and also cannot logically be equated with full acceptance. I condemn what is unacceptable, and praise what is acceptable. Francione’s negative and in fact illogically distortionist approach is thus unrealistic or lacking in truth-value as well as being too stingy in the appraisal of others.

Perhaps fundamentalists have had the experience that if veganism alone is praised, and everything else is condemned, people might have a “crisis of conscience,” and admit, “Yes, you are right. Veganism is the best way for all concerned. I’ll become vegan.” This is one possibility. The problem for the fundamentalists is, my approach has the same advantage, since I also praise veganism as best and the only just way, condemning all other approaches by degrees. My approach thus can get exactly the same response by making an ethical appeal.

However, Francione’s approach is apt to get other poor responses which my approach does not engender, and here it is relevant to try to do some movement psychology. At the ethical level:

“Vegans are high-and-mighty and holier-than-thou. They are unpleasant people. They reject me. I don’t want to join that club, thank you very much.”

Howard Lyman states in his talks that studies show that people like the message of animal rights but they often don’t like the messengers. That would seem to indicate that animal rightists are often too angry, self-righteous, and negative in their approach to activism.

Another common reaction at the practical level could well be:

“It’s too much for me to handle becoming vegan all at once. If I can’t get help from animal rights people to at least cut down on animal products, then I don’t think I’ll bother at all. Why go through any part of my life as a lacto-ovo vegetarian if I’ll always get flack from animal rights people and still have them compare me to Jeffrey Dahmer, the psychopathic murderer?”

So they may not become lacto-ovo vegetarian, and may well be much less likely to go on to become vegans, since the only way most people get to veganism is not through an overnight change, but through a gradual evolution of diet. As my friend and fellow animal activist JoAnne Schwab tells me, by far most people who change to vegetarianism are adults, who have years of conditioning to animal consumption. As well, she insightfully points out, it is not necessarily selfishness which produces reluctance to change since some cannot change diet to save their life, as the cases of those who needlessly fall to heart attacks, strokes, and other ailments silently testify. Given the gradualism of most changes to veg*anism, if the gradual stages are eliminated, then so too goes the veganism in most cases. It does not help to berate these people that veganism is easy, although in so many ways it is. Most people need time to adjust and adapt. I myself took most of a year to go from vegetarian to vegan some twenty years ago. I know someone who went vegan overnight, and I admire him for that, but apparently he is exceptional in this respect. Fundamentalists agree it can take time to switch, but the crucial difference is that they are less encouraging or supportive about gradual changes. That can make all the difference in some cases.

So the one advantage of the fundamentalist approach, that it can get some people to change on ethical grounds, is shared by my approach. However, Francione’s negative approach has the following disadvantages that my approach does not carry at all:

1. Fundamentalist vegan campaigns make changes to veganism right away (the one possible advantageous response to this negative approach) less likely because most people really do not wish to listen to, let alone associate with, those who are negative in their approach. This is a basic fact of human psychology.
2. A negative image of animal rightists is fostered in the immediate recipient of the fundamentalist campaign as intolerant, unkind, impatient, condemning, blaming, accusing, judgmental, etc., unlike the more positive approach which will be experienced as inspiring, enthusiastic, progressive, offering praise where it is due and blame where it is due (i.e., fair), patient, kind, more fun, etc.
3. Will lead to negative word-of-mouth among others about animal rightism and ill repute for vegans in general too, extending right into media portrayals as well.
4. Might discourage people from going for any kind of vegetarianism and thus veganism (see above discussion). This is ironic since fundamentalists pride themselves on being the most pro-vegan of all animal rightists. However, indirectly, they weaken the vegan tendency overall even though they directly advocate it as do the pragmatists.
5. Does not account for problems such as feeling overwhelmed or stressed out by dietary changes, or intolerance by friends and family; if a supportive attitude that is positive and encouraging is not offered, efforts may flounder and fail quite easily in the face of such social conditions. Not everyone is equally strong in the face of such challenges.
6. Dietary campaigns are educational, so let us evaluate them on that basis. As a teacher who received training at a first-rate teacher’s college, I was instructed that teaching involves information, focus, and emotional support. The fundamentalist approach provides some information, although it is imperfect in claiming that all forms of animal abuse are equal; it provides some focus, although it is confusedly all-or-nothing and has no subtlety of degrees or parts of wholes; and it scores almost a zero in terms of emotional support.
7. Fundamentalists of the sort that Francione portrays do not recognize the positive in partial solutions, only the negative, so people will rightly feel cheated in how fundamentalists “judge” them, and will resent and rebel accordingly. People’s defenses will go up rather than be open-minded. Personal attacks have a way of arousing defensiveness whereas personal dialogue and sharing have a way of maintaining free and open spaces of community in which so much more is possible.
8. Fundamentalism will undermine attempts to prevent cruelty in animal agriculture. In “Animal Rights Law” I argue it would be a mistake to miss the opportunity to outlaw factory farming, or aspects of it, out of a crude ideology that “equates” all forms of animal abuse.

So there we have it. Negative attitudes just create more negativity. Perfectionism notoriously leads to a more imperfect world. If two approaches have the same advantages, but one carries several disadvantages, people should get the point that something is wrong with the disadvantageous standpoint. By the way, I do not count as an advantage that activists get to feel smug, superior, “great,” or powerful by putting down others. I only count advantages that are legitimate and compatible with genuine and full respect for all sentient beings. So let veganism be considered morally basic to animal rights. But let a view of parts and wholes, of degrees and fullness, also be a part of any “basic” view in terms of both truth and goodness. “Baselines” or “basics” should not lead to oversimplification. Francione acts as though all forms of animal agriculture and animal consumption are equally on the other side of his “baseline.” Forms of vegetarianism short of veganism form percentages of animal rights, even as veganism forms 100% of animal rights in the dietary aspect.

Francione is inconsistent in maintaining that we cannot praise percentages of animal rights since his theory would approve of a law wholly protecting an entire animal interest with a proto-right, while the same law might neglect all other animal interests (see my essay, “Animal Rights Law” for a discussion of this view). That would only amount to a limited percentage of animal rights—and a minor percentage at that—since animals possess many different kinds of interests. I have argued that such an analysis makes Francione an animal “welfarist” in a previous blog entry. However, his negative approach to vegetarianism as a whole, while it does produce some fine results, merely prolongs animal illfare much more than a truly positive approach.

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Am I "Obsessed" with Gary Francione? No.

Saturday, June 14, 2008

Some people might wonder about this "issue." In my mind it is not a serious question, since I know what I am about, but it might seem an interesting question to others, so I will say a few words in order to lay any doubts to rest. An obsession, according to The Oxford Concise Dictionary, is an “unreasonably persistent idea in the mind.” Actually, the idea of Gary Francione himself is not even what persists in my mind. Believe it or not, I am not overly fond of thinking about Francione. Rather, I am currently drawn to thinking about some of the things that he states. I do not address Francione as a person, with personal attacks, but merely discuss the issues that he raises.

Is it “unreasonable” for me to discuss the issues that he raises? Let me share some of my reasons. This blog, A Philosophical Animal Voice, focuses for now on Francione’s philosophy as one of the greatest threats to promoting animal rights and welfare in society. Speciesist arguments are for the most part easy to refute, because they are so transparently logically flimsy and false for the most part. Other animal rights thinkers than Francione do not exert such a destructive influence. Joan Dunayer argues along comparable, though not the same lines, as Francione, but for whatever reason she has not built up as strong a following, with an ever-growing internet presence as has Francione. In any case, I deal with her own contributions to the debate in my essay, "Animal Rights Law."

Francione’s own arguments, although often simple enough to refute for one well-versed in the ways of logical arguments, have the advantage of being partly right. Francione emphasizes sentience, animal rights, veganism, and other aspects that are fine to affirm. Yet part-truths are a greater stumbling block to inquiry than sheer falsehoods. Also, many are not well-trained in logic and may not be able to come to grips with poorly reasoned appeals that may easily seem slick and intellectual. Indeed, logic often proves to be an unsuspected problem even for professional theorists. So good people can be misled by seemingly sound arguments that are really wanting in logic, as I have extensively demonstrated in this blog. Not everyone has my particular qualifications for researching and engaging in critical analysis, so I am offering a public service, and there are reasons for me to be doing this. As I have argued, responding to his philosophy should be a high priority for the animal rights intellectual community.

Let me further characterize how his approach threatens the animal rights movement. Aside from individual activists whom he has spoken of with great negativity, he has attacked People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the Great Ape Project (GAP), and the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics (OCAE), organizations dear to my heart which he savages unjustly. There are legitimate criticisms of PETA and the GAP, to my mind, but his wholesale rejections I have tried to show are severely unjustified. Francione’s thinking obstructs offering animals relief in the form of animal “welfare” legislation, which is also conducive towards kindness culture. Is cruel culture more conducive to animal rights than kindness culture? This should be a no-brainer, however, his flawed thinking potentially affects billions of animals, and if people believe what he says, he could actually derail the GAP.

So my blog entries are profoundly issues-driven, and they derive from the fact that I have recently published a significant peer-reviewed journal article, “Animal Rights Law,” on Francione’s beliefs about movement strategy. It is only natural that when a researcher engages with a body of work by an author, that they may come up with a variety of results that they wish to share. So I have good academic as well as activist reasons to offer my results. Since there are several different topics, it makes sense to address them in different blog entries. And given that further thoughts occurred to me after publishing my essay, it makes sense to present them, or else to expand on some existing points.

I will not write on Francione “forever,” and what will determine the time limit is not any “obsession with Francione,” but rather how many significant issues remain in what I wish to discuss. Again, believe it or not, his work is not of unlimited interest to me. I started my blog when Francione referred me to his blog’s attack on the OCAE, and I was moved to respond to his illogical and harmful misportrayal.

So there is no shortage of excellent reasons why I’ve persisted in this course, and it should be obvious by now that “obsession” has nothing to do with it. I am merely a passionate scholar trying to do my job of offering relevant and accurate critical analysis, in an effort to promote not only separating truth from falsehood, but to try to benefit and protect sentient beings in crucially important ways. If, after considering all of this, someone still thinks I am “obsessing,” then he or she must be irrationally obsessed with that particular idea.

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Ways in Which Animal Rights Fundamentalism Harms the Animal Rights Movement

Sunday, June 15, 2008

In the last post, I referred to ways in which animal rights fundamentalism harms the animal rights movement. It is worth, however, trying to list some of the different ways that animal rights is threatened:

1. Failure to promote kind culture that leads to animal rights, thus delaying animal rights incalculably
2. Failed unrealistic proto-rights campaigns, or even more likely, abstaining from legislative reform at this stage in history, leaving in the wake of such misguided practices the cruel culture of unmitigated animal misery; thus each interest of animals which should be protected by a right is either unprotected or hovering at a miserably low degree of being respected (i.e., it is substantially disrespected)
3. Failure to effectively promote animal rights laws such as the Great Ape Project
4. Leads to prevention or dissolution of potentially powerful alliances between animal rights and animal "welfarist" forces
5. Leads to fighting between animal rights fundamentalists and the alliance of pragmatists and welfarists
6. Causes infighting, hostility, lack of communication and cooperation among animal rightists
7. Spreads a bad image of animal rightists as harsh, judgmental, unrealistic, lost in theory, illogical, etc.
8. Spreads a crude, oversimplified and ultimately unworkable theory of animal rights (I will elaborate on this point in future posts)

Not everyone will agree that these harms are involved, but I think they are plainly associated with the animal rights fundamentalist movement.

It may be objected that I am also involved in "infighting." True, I am fighting animal rights fundamentalism. However, there is a world of difference between a fight to unite people who already exist and end infighting, and a fight to divide a movement in which it is inevitable that there will always be animal rights pragmatists. The fundamentalists, paradoxically enough, seek unity through infighting. The only unity envisioned by fundamentalists is what might emerge on the impossible scenario in which only they prevail. It will be a unity of animal rights, considered a fringe group, with any alliance with the welfarists lying in smoking ruins. Fundamentalist unity would also lie in a far-flung future, whereas my kind of unity is at work right now, and though dominant is threatened to some extent by fundamentalism.

I would not wish to exaggerate how much a pragmatist approach is threatened. It would be interesting to get some sociological data on how widespread is fundamentalism. My experience is that only a few out of sizeable animal rights groups will have that bug, and that must be indicative of the larger movement since I have seen this pattern in group after group. Often the fundamentalists are rejected by the larger group and they splinter off to form their own concern. Francione's blog touts his new book, Animals as Persons with the remark that he is widely regarded as the most interesting thinker in animal ethics, or something like that. Others insist he is "fringe." I think that's closer to the truth, judging from my observations of movement politics.

Now back to the concept of unity. By contrast to the fundamentalists, while I effectively argue for people to switch from animal "welfare" (really illfare) practices, I can tolerate and work with such people without being entirely negative and attacking towards them. Also, I am taking on the theories of animal rights fundamentalism by way of defense. It is in the nature of animal rights fundamentalism to attack other animal rightists as unethical and ineffective, and I am only undertaking part of the equally inevitable response.

If animal rights pragmatism is argued effectively, then it will not shut down dogmatic ideologues, but will play the vital role of (as my friend Michael Schwab puts it) reaching out to the huge number of people who are thoughtful but undecided, or who keep an open mind. We can build stronger animal "welfare" laws and thus grow animal rights, converting as many individuals as possible to the rights model. That is a very positive vision. By comparison, Francione has already attacked PETA, the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, and the Great Ape Project, and would not mind seeing them go down. He fantasizes if he thinks he can have that kind of influence, although I am concerned he can do these damage by misleading people. I say "misleading," but we can assume this is done in a relatively well-intended way, reflecting how he himself is misled by illogical reasoning.

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One of Greatest Animal Rights Pragmatists' Life in Danger: An Appeal for the release of Dr. Martin Balluch

Monday, June 16, 2008

One of the animal rights activists I admire is in deadly danger. He is on hunger strike in an Austrian prison, arrested on charges without specific evidence. He was gotten naked out of bed at gunpoint and thrown into prison, and has gone on hunger strike. His group was responsible for getting a joint news conference of ALL the animal protection groups in Austria and got a ban on battery cages for hens, animal circuses, fur farms, rabbit cage-farming, and vivisection on chimps. This is the most animal protection won legally in the world. For details and who to write to see:

CLICK HERE FOR WORD DOCUMENT

Next I will write about how Francione has slammed Martin Balluch, who is one of the greatest animal activists the world has ever seen. This was before Dr. Balluch was arrested. Incidentally, Dr. Balluch was just about to launch a campaign for constitutional rights for chimpanzees, a project Francione has attacked when he tried to negate the Great Ape Project; as well, as I noted in "Animal Rights Law," Francione has mysteriously rejected constitutional rights for animals.

Please write to support and help save the life of one of our best activists!

P.S. Of course, it would be worth writing to save ANY activist, but Dr. Balluch deserves to be praised for the powerhouse that he is and is in danger due to his hunger strike.

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Responding to Martin Balluch's Essay, "Abolitionism versus Reformism"

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

This blog entry will comment on Dr. Martin Balluch’s essay, “Abolitionism versus Reformism,” then on Francione’s attack on the essay, and finally, I will make some observations regarding Balluch's reply to Francione.

Dr. Balluch appears correct when he states that both animal “welfarist” reformism and animal rights start with empathy and compassion. Thus he is able to state: “The ideology of animal rights and the animal rights movement have their psychological and political roots in animal welfare.” He states that there is a “deep philosophical gulf” between animal welfare and animal rights, but psychologically and politically they are on a continuum. I would comment that there is indeed a gulf in terms of magnitude of respect. However, animal rights and animal “welfare” not only start with empathy, they build respect for animal interests such as welfare and freedom by degrees, and so they can be conceived on a philosophical continuum, wherein animal “welfare” often involves pitiful dispensations of protection for these animal interests, and animal rights affords very strong degrees of protection for these same interests.

It is incredible that in no small part due to Balluch’s activism along with legions of other people, Austria has recently achieved breakthroughs such as no dogs and cats being used for fur or meat, no fur farming, no animal circuses, and no vivisection of great apes. Balluch argues that these reforms leave behind “pure welfarist ideals.” I would agree with him there. My own understanding is that traditional welfarism would just make fur-farming, animal circuses, and vivisection of great apes “kinder,” but these laws eliminate these practices. That is why these reforms fall into the second of the three categories I use in my animal activism guide:

1. traditional animal “welfarism”
2. partial abolitionist
3. total abolitionist.

These reforms are partial abolitionist since they eradicate a part of the animal exploitation spectrum. It is pretty much impossible to exploit animals in certain ways now in Austria. Balluch also notes that activists there have achieved language in their very Constitution: “The state protects life and well-being of animals as cohabitants of humans.” Balluch does not comment on this much, but this seems like a huge breakthrough. I have argued for a right to welfare or well-being, along with rights to freedom, life, respect, and nonviolence. Animal rights protects the good of animals and is the only true form of “animal welfare” as I have argued elsewhere. The idea of animals as “cohabitants” puts nonhumans on the same playing field as humans, at least conceptually, and that is very dramatic. So is making their lives significant. As well, in Austria there are now “animal solicitors” whose governmental job it is to work on behalf of animals in the court system.

It is thrilling to read an analysis of movement strategy by someone who has already achieved so very much. He states that his approach in campaigns is never to try to change individual minds, but to attack industries and businesses. Doing so creates a different social climate that is more favorable to animal welfare and rights, he believes, and the public will just go with the flow or take the path of least resistance if certain types of animal exploitation are banned: they will not seek it in other countries.

Balluch characterizes politics as purely consequentialist, or it is to be judged solely by consequences. I do not see that as necessary, although a concern with consequences is vital. A nonconsequentialist philosophy can animate political changes (e.g., my theory of best caring ethics). But I do not think we really disagree here. Later, he comments that abstract-rational theory can be deontological whereas politics is consequentialist. Perhaps on his thinking, we can even think of attaining deontological ethics as a consequence of a campaign. Here we are probably spinning our conceptual wheels. He states that government will side with whoever kicks up the most “fuss,” and produces the most political pressure. This Balluch has learned by extensive experience.

Specific tactics used that did not involve trying to change individual minds:

• protesting outside each animal circus show to make it “no fun” for those attending; after 6 years all wild animal circuses went bankrupt, and with no political opposition, it became easy to introduce a ban
• there were already 86% of the public opposed to battery cages, so it was easy to win political allies and to extensively badger the Conservatives to eventually take a more popular stand

I would caution about his analysis here though. No doubt it is true they did not try to argue with individuals about the ethics of these things, and “social climate” is vitally important in winning major changes. He states that humans are social animals more than rational animals. Perhaps. But protests no doubt not only made it “not fun” to attend animal circuses. I am sure the public also got an ethical message not least of all. Similarly, with the 86% of public support, that is individual minds that were changed. So his campaigns might rest on changing minds after all, although not perhaps as a direct tactic.

Balluch addresses the concern that reforms will calm consciences and people will suddenly consume without a second thought. He says there is no data on this question, but writes:

A positive image for animal welfare, after all, means that compassion and empathy for animals get a higher value, and that means there is more support for further animal welfare reforms. And if people do open up to the idea of animal welfare and its underlying motives, then the experience shows that they are more likely to be prepared to think about animal rights. Animal welfare and empathy form the psychological basis for animal rights.

This seems to me to be right, and is additionally supported by Balluch’s experience that there have been more and more animal protectionist laws in Austria since his successful campaigns.

Balluch offers some commentary on some who profess an “abolitionist” approach. He is too generous, I think, in leaving that name entirely to Francione and others. Balluch too favours veganism and abolishing animal exploitation. He claims that Francione is arbitrary as to what is called abolitionist and what is called animal welfarist. I have proved that Balluch is right in “Animal Rights Law” in which the same measures that welfarists would support are called “abolitionist.” Also, my blog entries proving that Francione’s measures are conceptually more like animal “welfarist” laws than animal rights laws supports Balluch’s point here. Balluch similarly criticizes Lee Hall’s uncompromising “abolitionist or nothing” approach. Balluch favors attacking the animal industries rather than trying to convince people, although he agrees that: “Using rational arguments, we can argue convincingly that animal rights is the ethical ideal.” He recommends centring campaign material on suffering and stimulating compassion and empathy in people rather than abstract-rational phrases. I agree that this sometimes may be more advantageous in terms of contemporary media since only sound-bites and flash-images are generally permitted, although I would speculate that progress towards abolition cannot be won without discussing the very ideas we wish to one day infuse in our laws.

Overall, I find Balluch’s analysis important. We should try to counter industry since he has been so successful in doing so. I do not see why that cannot be accompanied with trying to convince people though, and I have argued how his campaigns are seemingly dependent on people being convinced ethically. People were stimulated ethically at his circus protests, and that is why it was no longer “fun” to get inside and see the animals perform. That must be the only reason, since activists were not allowed to disrupt actual circus shows. Moreover, the 86% support for battery cage bans was a result of individuals being convinced. So he sells this aspect short. I am however nonetheless thrilled with his example, courage and achievement.

Now enter Francione’s commentary on Balluch’s essay. Francione claims there is no new approach to the rights/welfare debate in Balluch’s approach, conveniently ignoring Balluch’s new emphasis on not trying to convince individuals, and focusing instead on industry/business and the resulting social climate. This is indeed new, and Francione is too stingy to fail to recognize this, instead emphasizing only what Balluch has in common with other theories. Although Balluch has achieved, with his comrades, more legislative change than People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) or any other group, Francione does not have anything positive to say about Balluch’s achievements except a grudging concession that it is good that apes will no longer be vivisected, followed by Francione’s swift recondemnation of the Great Ape Project. Francione dismisses Balluch’s inspired, carefully thought-out paper as “long” and “convoluted,” rather than seeing an insightful analysis by someone with uniquely relevant experiences. Balluch and his cohort are not only pioneers, as are setters of weird and useless records in Guinness. He is an important pioneer in the history of the animal protection movement.

Francione frames Balluch as someone who would promote “welfarist” reforms rather than vegan education, and I think he might be right about that. I believe in vegan education as part of a full-spectrum approach. Also, ethical education: again, Balluch’s campaigns push off the platform of previous ethical education. Francione makes the tired old point that we would not push for more humane rape or child molestation, ignoring the point I made in my MIRROR PRODUCTION of “Animal Rights Law”:

It might be objected that we do not propose abolishing child abuse by degrees or asking to make it merely “kinder.” However, this is not an analogous case, since there are already laws and norms against such abuse. Even calling for the norm in child abuse means calling for its end, since that form of violence is normally unacceptable in modern societies. But calling for “normal treatment” of animals merely invites further abuse of these sensitive beings. Exposing animal abuse does not mean shutting it down unlike human abuse. That animal abuse is morally wrong does not make its abolition possible in the short-term, and thus may not change what is really best to choose in the near-term. No less damning is the point that, metaphorically speaking, Francione only abolishes child abuse by degrees too: after all, he will protect some animal interests but others not at all, or accept banning some areas of animal exploitation though not others. That is more like eradicating degrees of child abuse than eradicating the whole thing. He does not notice that he is guilty of that which he denounces.

Francione says animal welfare “does not work,” and only is conceded if it is economically beneficial. However, Balluch’s campaign to end battery cages was ethical, as he writes in his essay in In Defense of Animals, and alternative arrangements for hens are more expensive since more space is required, and also more food since hens use more energy moving around, as Balluch notes in "Abolitionism versus Reformism." These laws “work” in reducing suffering, but apparently that does not create any kind of blip on Francione’s radar. The legislation also works in promoting kindness culture, but of course that has not been taken account of in Francione’s thinking either. Francione protests that we should not marginalize veganism, but it is hard to see how Balluch is altogether doing that by trying to promote veganism in the way he thinks most effective. I agree though that vegan education is evidently being given an insufficient priority by Balluch. Balluch doubts there can be successful vegan outreach, but where I live, the Toronto Animal Rights Society holds outdoor video education displays and we make a lot of converts, and additionally, I teach Critical Animal Studies at Brock University and the films as well as the arguments happen to have an impact in convincing people to go vegetarian, etc.

Francione claims that people have already opposed animal suffering for a long time, but there is no evidence of an abolitionist direction. As I point out in “Animal Rights Law,” though, Sweden banned fur farming too and have signaled intent to ban trapping as well. That is a clear counterexample. The building up of bans in Austria is also evidence of what I call “partial abolitionism.” It is too soon to say what an animal rights pragmatist approach can accomplish since while animal kindness is somewhat old, animal liberation is still a historical novelty.

Francione mistakenly writes that on Balluch’s model, the general public is irrelevant, and instead we should go after the animal industries. Francione read dismissively rather than with care. Balluch noted that his reforms depended on 86% support of banning battery cages, and on people ceasing to turn out in sufficient numbers to animal circuses. What Balluch clearly stated was that the public as mere observers plays no role. Their role as consumers, indicators of public support, and as voters for politicians were absolutely and explicitly crucial to Balluch’s campaign. Francione distorts Balluch’s actual position, stating that the latter “indicates a profound lack of understanding of the political process,” meanwhile Francione is busy demonstrating a profound lack of grasp of what Balluch is truly saying.

Francione states dogmatically that welfare reform does not weaken animal industries. As Balluch stated, however, he helped shut down various types of industry. It costs more to switch gears if your fur farming is banned, or rabbit cage farming. And the industry for vivisecting great apes was not only weakened, but abolished!

Instead of stating anything positive about the animal circus bans, Francione notes that this does not ban domestic animal circuses. The constitutional amendment which I praised earlier is dismissed by Francione as what is similarly found in animal weflare laws. Francione misses the positives I accentuated above, even of any constitutional presence of animal protectiveness which is extremely rare. Rather than offer more than grudging praise of banning vivisecting apes, Francione reiterates his opposition to the Great Ape Project, a tactical direction that would have crippled Balluch’s campaign to win this protection for the apes. That is because Francione disallows focusing on apes as special, but lack of focus is fatal to any hope of a specific campaign. Francione states that animal welfare reforms do not do damage to industry, not noting the abolition of certain industry types. Francione cites a Humane Society of the United States study showing that banning the gestation crate is economically cost-effective, as though this disproves it is of any value to animals. Something can make a difference in being much less cruel to sows while also saving “producers” money. For some reason, Francione thinks that if anti-cruelty is cost-effective, it can no longer really curb cruelty. Where is the logic in that? It is just as illogical as Francione concluding that we cannot have “two-track activism” where one track is clearly wrong. Francione has not shown one iota how solid “welfarist” campaigns are either ethically or practically wrong.

Francione thinks he is clever in stating that it is absurd to promote welfarism in order to undermine it. This conveniently ignores that pragmatists can promote abolition of speciesism and welfarism at the same time, as PETA does, and also, higher forms of protection of interests can very well lead to higher and higher recognitions of interests—until we get to animal rights. It is only unclear how animal “welfare” can lead to animal rights if one lacks a clear sense of degrees of protection of interests.

In reading Francione’s response, I get the sense of extreme negativism, and grudgingness to concede any progress. I see in Balluch someone who really achieves things that are tremendously positive both for the short-term and the long-term. Balluch is really doing things for animals rather than undermining animal protection from the theoretical fringe as Francione does in a theoretically ineffective manner. Balluch is showing us a great road for progress that Francione would like nothing more than to block. Ideological blindness prevents him from seeing the importance of suffering-reduction as both a short- and long-term measure. When will the world wake up and follow Balluch’s visionary lead?

Balluch himself has responded to Francione’s commentary at: http://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080325Abolitionism/20080414index_en.php It is a devastatingly effective reply. The reader is of course encouraged to read the original papers. Balluch is quite right that Francione does not reply to most of his arguments, and takes other arguments out of context as though Balluch is arguing that “welfare” laws lead to abolition when that is not what is being argued at all. Francione accuses Balluch of statistical inaccuracy, in effect, in claiming that 35% fewer eggs are consumed in Austria, but Balluch was able to account for Francione’s faulty figure and to cite an authoritative source, the Laying Hen Producers Association. Balluch offers a clear counterexample to Francione’s claim that animal “welfarist” reforms only facilitate more profitable exploitation: many fur farms go bankrupt! Balluch gives examples of how we accept reformism in human cases: most think animal rights activists should not be locked up at all, but as long as they are, they should have vegan options, etc.

However, I continue to take issue with some of Balluch’s claims. Balluch argues that confrontational political campaigns are needed and friendly talk with individuals does not work. Here, again, I express some skepticism. Confrontational political campaigns do indeed work, and are needed to be effective as Balluch has shown in real life. But Balluch had popular support, and that is based on individuals quietly and peacefully figuring out the issues, often in conversation with others or from reading literature. Balluch reaffirms that while there is a psychological continuum between animal “welfare” and animal rights, there is a philosophical gulf between them, but I have disputed that above with my degrees of interests model. Balluch writes:

It is a very rare occasion that a person becomes vegan after hearing theoretical animal rights philosophical arguments. Its [sic] suffering and the feeling of compassion that moves people, i.e. animal welfare, to turn to animal rights. That’s because humans are social and rather not rational animals.

He may be right about this to a large extent. However, these dynamics may change as ethical theory becomes more advanced and more integrated into the education system. Once a lot of the suffering is cleaned up, we will need to rely on philosophical arguments to win animal rights.

Overall, I argue that a multifaceted approach is needed: educating individuals to build economic and political support for animal rights, as well as confronting animal exploitation industries and political figures as Balluch and his fellow activists have so masterfully done.

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New Site Name, Mission Statement, and Balluch Update

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

I would like to announce a renaming of my website: Liberation Unlimited. Rather than say why I do so here (and I will not reproduce the clunky old name I used before, now become gaseous and becoming one with the fine ether of cybervoid), I refer interested readers to the Mission Statement put in place right below the new name at the top of the Home page.

Martin Balluch is being artificially fed so that he does not die of starvation from his hunger strike. Regardless of whether one approves of his decision, people should defend the dignity of human beings in general and one the greatest animal rights activists in particular. As well, there is a question of who to believe, Balluch and his colleagues or the Austrian authorities. However, I have a lot of faith in people who brought about world-leading animal legislation. I have less faith when I hear about people who profess non-violence being taken at gunpoint in the middle of the night, being deprived of legal counsel, given minimal visitation privileges as though they are guilty, rather than presumed innocent until proven guilty. Far from proof, there are concerns that various animal liberation criminal offences have not at all been evidentially linked to the activists now in custody. Concerns over the legality and decency of Austria's actions have prompted Amnesty International as well as the Greens and Social Democrats to make some very serious statements and to ask some very pointed questions. See the website of the Association Against Animal Factories for more detailed updates: CLICK HERE

Also, for those who fear they do not have much time for letter-writing, the site features instant letters that you can send off to appropriate government officials.

Please seriously consider joining the campaign to free these abused prisoners!

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Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

I would like to comment on the animal rights fundamentalist threat to the alliance of animal rights pragmatists and "welfarists." This is a point I mentioned in my outline of harms to the animal rights movement posed by the fundamentalists, and I will now expand on it. Animal rights fundamentalist movement strategy plays right into the hands of the arch-animal-exploiters' own Napoleonic strategy of "divide and conquer." When I speak of animal industries I refer to the factory farmers, fur ranchers, vivisectors, and so on. They do not mind so much if there is a minority of animal rights advocates in society. They do not really find that threatening. What they are concerned about, and may well be prepared to pay millions of dollars to offset, is "welfarist" legislation which would protect animals and cost industrialists a lot of money. So as a strategy, these animal industries favour a "divide and conquer" strategy with animal "welfare" proponents. The best way to kill chances of animal "welfare" laws, from the point of view of animal enslavers and destroyers, would logically consist of several different prongs:

I. To weaken support for "welfare" reforms by taking animal rightists, together with their outspoken and influential advocacy, right out of the picture.

II. Industries want to pit their enemies (the animal rights people and the "welfarists") against each other, and this is accomplished through
(a) fundamentalists attacking the pragmatist-and-traditional-welfarist alliance, and
(b) the ongoing bitter and strategically costly conflict that ensues.

III. Taking out animal rights advocates of suffering-reduction takes a lot of oomph out of the reform movement, since animal rights people are more highly motivated, serious and passionate about animal interests. Even Francione is a very demanding "welfarist," I have argued, although he would disagree with that assessment. Traditional reformists might just say, "Well, it's OK to use animals, but can't we agree to make things a bit better?" When they are already willing to kill animals for a taste of their flesh that is an indication that animal interests will be much less strongly championed as a matter of psychological fact.

IV. Try to make animal rights fundamentalism, which sabotages strong "welfare" measures in the law, seem like the "only" approach to animal rights. This is done by Francione calling his site "The Abolitionist Approach," as there is only his way or no way, and him calling his followers animal rightists or abolitionists, and animal rights pragmatists are just mistakenly called "new welfarists" (see "Animal Rights Law," especially MIRROR PRODUCTIONS version, for a discussion of "new welfarism" as a misnomer)

V. Stir up hate against animal rights pragmatists and speciesists. See my earlier post on "Insults and Illusions." Using insults makes people hate or at least dislike each other and undermines chances of animal rights/welfarist people working together. It is not only profitable to disrupt alliances between animal rightists and animal rights pragmatists, but if traditional animal "welfarists" are compared to "Simon the Sadist" or Jeffrey Dahmer, there will be very little chance of humanist legislatures being receptive to the hateful animal rights message.

VI. Make animal rights industries seem committed to animal welfare and respecting the law. Francione furthers this goal by his definition of "legal welfarism" as mere rhetoric in favor of humane treatment which merely means adopting measures that make the exploitation of animals more profitable. This move makes "legal welfarism" the preserve of industry and exploiters, rather than of people who seek anything more progressive for animals such as Martin Balluch (whose contributions are discussed in earlier posts). Francione ironically states that any "welfare" laws will just make animal exploiters earn more money. Meanwhile, abstaining from strong "welfare" laws saves them a lot of money. Francione himself notes that factory farming's cramming saves money in rent, crap food costs less, as does no veterinary care, not cleaning up, etc. It follows logically that anti-factory farming measures will cost "producers" of misery money. However, Francione's urging that animal rightists abstain from political/legal reforms saves money to animal industrialists, not animals.

Now the fundamentalists help out a great deal with all of these goals, and are fervently animated in this general direction. So this is what futilitarians would have, a convergence of animal-rights-enemy and their own animal-rights-proponent strategy. This explains why, in my conversations with others, some fundamentalists are repeatedly suspected of being collaborators with "the other side." Even if they are not paid by animal industries, I would say they usually do an effective enough job to earn such a salary. The industries must be delighted that they are getting so much free work. By the way, I am neither stating nor implying that any given fundamentalist is an infiltrator. Such an interpretation would be mistaken. I am merely exploring the fascinating territory of trying to understand why some people in my experience (whose identity will be protected by me) have thought that way.

Ironically, fundamentalists often believe that animal rights pragmatists play into the hands of exploiters by posing legislation that is not animal rights. However, such legislation is not possible in the short-term anyway, so it is neither here nor there for the exploiters' agenda. Rather, again, it is "welfare" laws that are the real thing the industries are averse to, and animal rights pragmatists are much more likely to foil the animal industrialists' agenda in that respect as I have argued (i.e., fundamentalists staying as outsiders to the legal process may have something to do with that). Also, animal rights pragmatists are generally more effective in cultivating animal rights for the long-term, which means the pragmatists foil the exploiters' agenda more effectively in the big picture as well. It is a bitter turnaround for the fundamentalists that yet again they are guilty of that which they accuse others.

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The "Test Period"

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Francione often states that animal “welfarism” has been tried for hundreds of years, but it has failed to abolish animal exploitation. However, it is erroneous to say animal “welfarism"—as part of an animal rights pragmatist position—has been tried for that long. Yet that could be the only relevant "test period" for the debate in question here. We will see that it is unfair to declare the testing to be over even for this newer pragmatist movement. As for traditional animal "welfarism," it was never even meant to abolish animal exploitation in the first place. Francione's reasoning here is startling in its flashy irrelevancy.

What are we "testing" for? Francione seems to be testing for whether animal rights pragmatism, which he calls "new welfarism," will cause the abolition of the property status of animals. I have already commented on how the matter is not so simple, and the real question is not whether animal "welfare" laws simply cause abolition. They don't. Just putting out animal welfare laws does not magically bring about abolition, but then, no one but Francione ever seriously entertained the possibility of such magic happening. Rather: are "welfarist" laws conducive towards animal rights in the long run in conjunction with animal rights championed as a long-term goal? I have argued that such conduciveness can occur with animal “welfare” laws in my essay, "Animal Rights Law." I show how such legislation inherently passes the test of what is conducive towards kindness culture, and that such culture passes the test of what conduces towards animal rights. Crueler culture does not pass that test, but that is what we are left with if we remain outsiders to the legislative process, as Francione urges, or if we futilely advocate proto-rights that Francione would approve, but any contemporary legislature would utterly defeat. Another thing we need to test for is whether animal "welfare" laws significantly reduce animal suffering or try to make the best of the short-term. Sweden and the reforms led by Martin Balluch and others in Austria pass that test already as I have argued.

As for the long-term goal of animal rights, it is unreasonable to press present-day animal rights pragmatists for not having achieved this. Serious education about animals and the ethics governing their treatment has only penetrated a relatively small minority of contemporary society. An even tinier percentage has any kind of sure grasp of the logic of animal ethics, as opposed to superficial "fast food" for thought. How could anyone reasonably expect a tiny minority to produce animal rights laws in a democracy? The answer is: no reasonable person would expect this. We are nowhere near any point in history where we can "test" whether animal rights will one day succeed due to any given approach. It is too soon to tell. It is like contemptuously looking over a sapling and pronouncing, "This will never be a tree." And indeed, the animal rights fundamentalists have their own version of the sapling. Do we arbitrarily say their test period is over too?

The real question here is success in bringing about animal rights, and fundamentalists seem disposed to fail in being as effective in that regard. Although we cannot test the empirical effectiveness of animal rights coupled with animal “welfare” laws, we are at the point where we can test movement strategies for logical soundness. We can always do that. And the futilitarian position has been found to be contrary to what is best for animals, and comparatively ineffectual in both the legislative short-term and long-term, not only in terms of reducing suffering for animals, but indeed conducing towards animal rights in the broader society (see "Animal Rights Law"). Rather than speak of the end of any test period for any part of the animal rights movement, let's create a movement much greater than what we now find which will test the integrity and political will of the broader society. For it is the speciesists, and to a greatly lesser extent, the fundamentalists, who fail to pass the test of animal-rights-conduciveness, not members of the animal rights pragmatist movement.

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Francione's Mighty Boomerang

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

In my studies of Francione's ideology, I have noticed that he often accuses others of that which applies to his own claims in one respect or another. This is called "hypocrisy." Yesterday I collected more than 20 of these together. I call them "boomerangs" since he sends them out as accusing shots at his opponents, whom he mislabels "new welfarists," but they rebound back at him. If one is not careful, a boomerang can come back and knock one upside the head. However, he seems to be unaware of his theoretical predicament. Indeed, logical implications cannot be physically felt, let alone seen, heard, smelled, or tasted unlike physical boomerangs. Thankfully, Francione himself remains safe, however, the same cannot be said for the logical status of his position.

Francione’s Claim: “Welfarist” reforms are futile.
BOOMERANG!-1: His proto-rights recommendations sometimes overlap with “welfarist” proposals, e.g., banning the leg-hold trap. So why is such a proposal “futile” when a “welfarist” supports it, but a potent part of abolitionism when coming from the mouth of Francione?
BOOMERANG!-2: Logically speaking, his proto-rights proposals that protect 100% of animals' interests must be super-futile to pursue if much less stringent "welfarist" proposed laws are futile to seek approval of.

Francione’s Claim: Animal “welfarism” promotes complacency.
BOOMERANG!-1: Since Francione does not advocate any legal changes for animals now this creates complacency with total animal misery on the legislative front.
BOOMERANG!-2: His proto-rights proposals would create even more complacency. For then people would say that it is as though part of animal rights is achieved, with the entire protection of an animal’s interest. People would be much more complacent with something strong like animal rights over a weaker “welfarist” law that is enacted.

Francione’s Claim: Animal “welfarism” laws boost animal consumption.
BOOMERANG!: His proto-rights, if passed into law, would boost consumption even more by implication from his reasoning. That is because they promote more complacency or satisfaction with the state of animal law, as argued above, so fewer consumers would boycott the animal industries.

Francione’s Claim: We should not instrumentalize animals (which I can define as treating sentient beings as though they are merely useful while not respecting their interests).
BOOMERANG!: Francione opposes reforming laws because this will create complacency. The unstated (because embarrassing) logical implication here is that keeping laws so that animals are miserable will reduce complacency, since then people will be upset by all of the cruelty. This way of thinking perversely uses animal misery as a mere means towards reducing complacency.

Francione’s Claim: Many other animal rights advocates are “new welfarists.”
BOOMERANG!: He himself is a kind of animal “welfarist,” as I substantiate in my blog entry for June 1, 2008. And while mixing animal rights and animal “welfare” approaches is not new in general, his kind of “proto-rights” welfarism is indeed a relatively new form of welfarism, ironically enough.

Francione’s Claim: Animal “welfare” laws just mean that animals will be exploited more efficiently and profitably.
BOOMERANG!: Francione recommends abstaining from legal reforms at this stage. This gives animal exploiters total freedom to exploit animals more efficiently, e.g., through factory farming, which saves money by treating animals miserably (less space = less rent money, and crappy food is cheaper, as is lack of veterinary care, poor air quality, leaving animals in filth, no amusements, not letting them move around, etc.).

Francione’s Claim: His abolitionist approach will eliminate the root cause of animal suffering (as though this is unique to his approach).
BOOMERANG!: His opponents, the animal rights pragmatists will not only eliminate that cause too, but will do so sooner since a kinder legal culture is far more conducive to animal rights, as I explain in my journal article, “Animal Rights Law.”

Francione’s Claim: Animal welfarist laws are complicit with speciesism.
BOOMERANG!: He would approve of a law banning dehorning of cattle, which would join a body of speciesist laws. It is also conducive to speciesism in law to refuse to try to ameliorate speciesist harms through legal reform at this stage in history.

Francione’s Claim: We must reject the Great Ape Project since it favours animals who have “similar minds” to humans.
BOOMERANG!: He would save a human over a dog in an emergency, other factors being equal. This is presumably due to the different minds of the two, not their different bodies, although Francione merely states he “intuitively” favours this idea.

Francione’s Claim: We do not accept abolishing child abuse by degrees, as the “welfarists” advocate, so we should not accept this in animal law either.
BOOMERANG!: Francione’s proposals would also abolish exploitation by degrees, e.g., protecting some entire interests but others not at all, or banning dehorning but not necessarily hot iron branding.

Francione’s Claim: “Micro” animal welfare action is acceptable, but “macro” animal welfare practices such as laws must be rejected.
BOOMERANG!: If everyone should pursue “micro” animal welfare practices, as Francione seems to support, that automatically becomes a “macro” phenomenon.

Francione’s Claim: Seeking political “insider status” is counterproductive.
BOOMERANG!: Nothing could produce less benefit for animals than staying outside the legislative process for a long time to come: that guarantees zero productivity in that particular respect.

Francione’s Claim: We should not pursue legislative reforms since animal rightists will not be taken seriously by legislatures.
BOOMERANG!: Francione’s crew is among those taken the least seriously by legislatures since they do not even try for legislative change. By contrast, animal rights advocates such as Martin Balluch of Austria, as I have reported earlier, are taken so seriously that laws are signed into effect banning battery cages, fur farming, vivisection of apes, etc. This is accomplished without hiding long-term aspirations for animal rights.

Francione’s Claim: Animal “welfarism” laws play into the hands of animal exploiters by failing to advocate animal rights.
BOOMERANG!: Advocating that animal rightists abstain from legislative change plays into unmitigated animal exploitation more than any other approach. Or Francione’s accepted converse of proposing only laws that finance 100% protection of animal interests, which would obviously be defeated by speciesist legislatures, would also play into exploiters’ interests since then again no animal law reforms would result, a very happy outcome for animal industrialists.

Francione’s Claim: We cannot sacrifice animals’ interests today in the hope of winning animal rights tomorrow.
BOOMERANG!: He agrees to banning dehorning of cows while hot-iron branding would still be permitted. That manifestly sacrifices the protection of whole interests.

Francione’s Claim: It is “morally schizophrenic” to reject unnecessary suffering of animals while accepting practices that involve needless torment.
BOOMERANG!: Again, banning dehorning but not hot-iron branding accepts unnecessary suffering in a legislative proposal and is therefore “morally schizophrenic.”

Francione’s Claim: Do not support groups that claim that some forms of animal abuse are worse than others.
BOOMERANG!: Presumably his banning of dehorning rests on the presumption that it is worse abuse to have cattle industries which permit dehorning.

Francione’s Claim: Animal rights pragmatism does not focus on vegan education unlike his own approach.
BOOMERANG!: Usually animal rights pragmatism not only focuses on veganism, but does so more effectively since Francione condemns all non-vegans equally, and this negative approach discourages—through self-righteous condemnation—those who might only gradually work their way towards veganism.

Francione’s Claim: "New welfarism" is far from most conducive towards abolishing speciesism in the long-term.
BOOMERANG!: Animal rights fundamentalism, as I have argued, is far from most conducive towards animal rights in the long-term since fundamentalism promotes crueler culture in the legislative realm, and such a culture is obviously less conducive to respect for animal interests than kinder culture.*

Francione’s Claim: Animal rights pragmatism is unethical, since its proposals go contrary to animal rights and anti-speciesism.
BOOMERANG!-1: His own proto-rights proposals are also short of animal rights and anti-speciesism, while, like the pragmatists, claiming to affirm animal rights and anti-speciesism as much as possible.
BOOMERANG!-2: His philosophy goes contrary to promoting what is best for sentient beings in both the short-term and the long-term and on that basis, can be judged to be unethical.

These shots with the boomerang Francione perceives as demolishing the pragmatists' argument. Instead they reflect badly on his own stance (once the full implications are understood) while leaving the contentions of his opponents completely unscathed, as I show in "Animal Rights Law."

Notes

* I would like to thank Ian, who prefers his last name to remain anonymous, for taking the time to write to me and to discern and point out that the way I originally phrased this "boomerang" was not exactly in the logical form of a boomerang. I have corrected this problem thanks to Ian's feedback on Tuesday, August 5, 2008.

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Is Animal Rights Fundamentalism "Purist"?

Thursday, July 17, 2008

Calling animal rights fundamentalists “purists” actually gives them more credit than they deserve. It implies that they occupy the moral high ground and that they more than anyone else accord with principles of moral rightness or justice. However, this seems to me to be untrue. As shown in “Animal Rights Law,” fundamentalists are very much at variance with trying to secure the best possible for sentient beings at all times, including the legislative near-term (in which, as all agree, practically available options are highly unideal). And their conception of animal rights for the long-term is in no sense more “pure.” Therefore it seems like a mischaracterization to portray animal rights fundamentalists are “the pure ones” and animal rights pragmatists as somehow “impure.” “Pure what…?” is perhaps the salient question. It is also well to recall that Francione's proto-rights are far from pure animal rights, securing, say, only one interest while several are neglected, or accepting the banning of dehorning but not hot-iron branding. Joan Dunayer's philosophy would have a better claim to "purism" than Francione's, since she demands animal rights laws bar nothing. However, again, it would be a mistake to suggest that her disastrous recipe for the legislative short-term is somehow more purely ideal. The purest ideal I know, unsurprisingly, is what is best, and that is precisely what the pragmatists aim for at all times. However, animal rights pragmatism is not "the pure one" either since the best we can achieve is hardly synonymous with pure perfection. Purism seems allied with perfectionism, and that seems to be an irrational prescription for a world which must always be described as radically imperfect, and in which the nature of perfection itself remains safely obscure behind an impenetrable veil of mystery.

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Do-Nothingism Triumphant?

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

We have seen that although Francione claims one can reasonably abstain from advocating any laws at this stage in history, he does in his book Rain without Thunder accept legislative proposals that he believes amount to “proto-rights.” I outline Francione’s version of proto-rights in my article, “Animal Rights Law.” It includes, to take his most original example, respecting an entire animal interest (e.g., liberty of movement). Francione seems to advocate not bothering with legal reforms at this stage more recently. It is truly astonishing for any social activist to advocate doing nothing on the legislative front to improve conditions. The purpose of this blog entry is to assess which is more logically compatible with his futilitarian approach: advocating proto-rights or doing nothing on the legislative front? I think do-nothingism best fits his unfitting program, for several reasons:

1. He himself seems to advocate doing nothing legislatively, claiming that “vegan education” is the best use of activist time, although I have argued that unique and important gains can be had through legislative reform in my above-mentioned essay. Vegan education converts certain people one at a time and that is invaluable. Laws however may well affect billions of animals in dramatically suffering-relieving ways at times. That is hardly to be blown off as easily as Francione would like.
2. Proto-rights amount to nothing in the end anyway, as it is ludicrous to expect a speciesist society’s government, let alone animal industry, to shoulder the cost of 100% protection of any animal interests. So doing nothing saves the trouble in arriving at nothing anyway on the more activist version of the futilitarian legislative approach.
3. Francione, in the above-mentioned book, laments that animal rights is not reflected in the animal rights movement. However, his own proto-rights proposals are not only “welfarist,” as I argued in an earlier entry, but they violate animal rights and embody speciesism. Protecting one animal interest while leaving others neglected violates animal rights and allows speciesist treatment in the interests that are violated or disregarded. Joan Dunayer’s all-or-nothing animal rights legislative approach is wholly more consistent in this respect, or is consistent with advocating animal rights per se. However, it is also futilitarian, as I’ve discussed earlier, since if you expect everything you often get nothing.
4. In terms of effectiveness, too, do-nothingism is more consistent with what Francione professes since he insists that so long as animals are property, there cannot be any legal relations between owners and property, and therefore animal interests will not be taken seriously in animal “welfare” legislation. However, if Francione believes this, it is profoundly inconsistent for him to seriously entertain his proto-rights proposals. For they too seem to suppose legal relations between owners and their property.
5. Francione objects that “welfarist” laws will create complacency that animals are well-treated, thus hampering further progress in animal law, but the same reasoning applies to his proto-rights.
6. Francione argues that so long as animals are property, if they have no market value, then they have no value at all. However, this would be true of animals’ inherent value which he claims “proto-rights” would in part protect.
7. Francione notes how it is impossible that a pen should have rights against its owner since it is property; however, the same argument would apply to having proto-rights against the owner.
8. Francione claims that “welfarist” laws are negated too because there is a presumption that animal owners look after their animals. If this blocks “welfarist” laws it would do the same with proto-rights. Indeed, if it is perceived that owners look after their animals, only small changes at most would be allowed for, not the sweeping changes that Francione recommends.
9. Francione notes that animal “welfare” laws are not adjudicated in the animals' favor, penalties are minor, judgements not enforced, anti-cruelty laws often require the virtual impossibility of proving intent, and many species of animals are exempt from lawful protection. All of these factors, meant to discourage “welfarist” reform attempts, should even more discourage the much more difficult project of proto-rights.

Francione discourages the possible and beneficial to be found in animal rights pragmatism, but offers a “ray of hope” in the form of impossible proto-rights proposals (since again speciesist society structurally cannot fund 100% protection of any animal interests).

If it is structurally impossible for “welfarist” laws to succeed in a society in which animals are regarded as property then it is even more impossible for his proto-rights to succeed since they are far more demanding forms of “welfarist” laws (although Francione would not accept that label; see my blog entry for June 1/08). His negativism about “welfarism” boomerangs back on his positively presenting his proto-rights proposals in ways that he does not acknowledge, or perhaps is not even aware of.

Francione’s futilitarianism is indeed futile. His pessimism about animal “welfarism” applies with redoubled negativity to his proto-rights ideas. And so, after negating, negating, and negating we are left with a void of nothingness, and the vacuity of do-nothingism on the legislative front, an outcome that the animal industries would salivate over. None of this is true of animal rights pragmatism, however. For I refute Francione’s forecasting of futility in “Animal Rights Law,” along with his claim that animal rights is not to be found in the legislative short-term for animal rights pragmatists (whom he derisively labels “new welfarists”). We can find animal rights in the short-term in seed form, and also as a model to approximate as much as possible. Animal rights are seeded in the short-term since kindness culture in the law conduces towards animal rights in the long-term (see "Animal Rights Law"). I do not see how Francione's approach could logically be conceived as conducing to abolition any day sooner—just the opposite! When I think of "the abolitionist approach" that Francione boasts of on his website, I think what he and his followers would most definitively abolish is taking action any time in the foreseeable future on the legislative front. That is a disaster-recipe for animals in so many ways as I have discussed before. We can promote the closest thing to animal rights, which is the maximum respect for all interests, by demanding as much degrees of protection of interests as is possible in the short-term and on to the long-term. Here I speak of the really possible, not just what we can possibly conceive as an idea. Let us leave nothing to the do-nothingists and instead do something far more constructive in the form of substantive suffering-reduction laws. As Edmund Burke penned in another century, in a way that is no less relevant today: "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men [and women - DS] do nothing."

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Negativism in Francione, and Avoiding Negativism towards Francione

Wednesday, July 23, 2008

I find that much of what Francione suggests or advocates is strikingly negative in character or orientation. Consider:

1. Francione at times in his Introduction to Animal Rights argues in favor of one right for animals—not to be considered property (Francione 2000, xxxiv). At times he says, more consistently, that it is the basis of all other animal rights. (Ibid., xxviii) This is at base a right to something negative rather than expressing a positive vision. It therefore leaves anything positive to the dice of fate.
2. Francione tries to negate animal rights pragmatism as “new welfarism,” denying that such pragmatists are genuine animal rights abolitionists, although we have seen that he himself hypocritically buys into speciesist “proto-rights” outcomes
3. He negatively construes the majority of the public as being like the sadistic psychopath Jeffrey Dahmer since they eat meat, and obscenely portrays PETA supporters as “petaphiles”
4. He is immovable in his pessimism that “welfarist” laws only allows animals to be exploited more profitably, even after this idea is utterly disproven
5. He is sweepingly negative in his assessment of progress that has been won for animals thus far
6. He seeks to negate animal rights in the form of garbaging his former advocacy of the Great Ape Project
7. He only views, say, lacto-ovo vegetarians negatively, rather than having anything positive to say about what they accomplish

Of negativism what good will come? This is not to say that some things should not be negated though. I have tried to refute erroneous statements and illogical arguments in Francione’s work.

Sometimes advocates of Francione are biased in being mesmerized by certain positive aspects of his ideas, while conveniently ignoring many dire considerations associated with what he claims. Yet we must also avoid a biased account of Francione, or one that is unduly negative. I would like to conclude, therefore, with a recognition of what is positive in Francione’s professions:

1. He advocates veganism
2. He is assertive about animal rights, unlike some believers in that ideal
3. He does not wish to see justice compromised by commercialism, as it so often is in human affairs too
4. He tries to promote a rational vision of equality in the form of what he calls “the principle of equal consideration”
5. He recognizes that his “proto-rights” proposals are not perfect but instead “tries to approximate an idea in a sensible way”
6. He uses arguments to try to deflate speciesism
7. He tries to find the most efficient way of promoting animal rights that is most consistent with his perception of ethics
8. He strives to avoid outcomes that will conduce towards complacency and increased animal consumption
9. He has pioneered in the field of animal law
10. He contributes much education through his scholarship, informal writing, university teaching, talks for the public, and internet activism
11. He acknowledges that some attempts to promote animal welfare are fine, such as helping individual animals, and in general agrees that it is wise to avoid “unnecessary suffering” in a demanding, abolitionist construal of these terms
12. He tries to put forward an original theory of animal rights and animal law

Surely there is much that I have omitted regarding both his negativism and positive contributions. Certainly this is not intended as an attempt to weigh pros and cons of subscribing to his approach. Much of what is positive is just his efforts to realize animal rights with integrity. I have refuted that he is most effective in vegan advocacy, negating complacency and animal consumption, putting forward coherent theory, and a great deal more. However, intentions and efforts matter. For all their possible folly, they remain partial indications of character.

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New Series on Animal Ethics

Monday, July 28, 2008

Believe it or not, I have said all I want to for now concerning the animal rights pragmatism versus fundamentalism debate (on whether animal "welfare" laws are permissible, or even important, for the animal rights movement). I have written a lot about Francione's ideas on this score since he has a lot to say about the topic. I think this might have been the most urgent topic to discuss for the animal rights movement, since the outcome of the debate may determine what actions animal rights activists might take. There are some Francione followers who read my essay, "Animal Rights Law," and switched over to following the lead of my ideas on animal pragmatism, and they also desire to promote my blog which contains important additional insights not found in the essay just noted. I am pleased that I ended that series with a meditation on what is positive in Francione's approach, in keeping with my orientation towards being balanced and strictly issues-oriented concerning what he has to say.

Many other questions of animal ethics tend to be more academic. They are very important, but they are most often not apt to alter the behaviour of animal rights activists. However, theory is still vital for settling practical questions. In "The Rights of Animal Persons," I note how past theories of animal rights do not logically entail antivivisection. My own theory, I argue, does, and that is significant. I will comment in more detail in the Animal Ethics series how past theories do not logically rule out vivisection, since there are many different aspects of this problem.

While some people may be won over by reading philosophical arguments, it is not clear to me how large a percentage of society this amounts to. We should not underestimate in this respect though. We can list considerations which should cause us to conclude that so-called "animal ethics" matters a great deal:

1. Whether philosophizing should take place is in many ways independent of how often it happens to occur in the world at this time. That something is uncommon does not imply that it is without value. People ought to cultivate philosophy that they may choose more wisely, and hopefully not be dogmatic in what they believe but rather justified. That is not easy to do, but it is essential to being accountable. Perhaps one far-flung day adults who are unable to fully reason about their ethical principles will not be regarded as fully mature. That cannot be the case today, however, since supposedly the best theories on offer cannot thoroughly be rationally defended, in my view.
2. I myself have convinced people using arguments in favour of animal rights.
3. Testing one's view for rational adequacy helps one to be accountable to oneself, to either shore up one's beliefs or indicate an area of thought that needs to be developed. The process of reasoning could well even cause one to modify one's stance, either to a greater or lesser degree.
4. People read books on the subject to intelligently decide their stance on such matters
5. University students take courses studying such material
6. The leaders of society, politicians, lawmakers, lawyers and the judiciary, sometimes look to academic theories to ground their approaches, and then the practical reflection of what they believe may emerge in the rest of society
7. As society makes progress in the area of animal suffering-reduction, the next phase of progress will have to be more philosophical; there will be no more atrocity images to show since the blatant cruelties will have been taken care of and we will be left with forms of animal slavery that need to be debated on more philosophical grounds
8. Animal ethics are already debated to some extent in academics
9. I predict that if all goes well, ethics education will one day find itself into mandatory schooling for everyone in society; in both of the latter two contexts, one real and the other still only imaginary, winning arguments are priceless.

Winning arguments, ultimately, is what I aim to achieve. Whether I attain that in any given case is up to each person to decide for himself/herself.

My series on animal ethics will examine animal rights theories, and also theories that compete with animal rights. Believe it or not, I have not yet commented on Francione's animal rights theory (with the exception of his views on "unnecessary suffering"). I have only addressed his arguments on animal activism. However, we have had an abundance of Francione lately so I will turn now to other animal theorists, such as Tom Regan, Evelyn B. Pluhar (as her name appears on her important book; her surname is now Pluhar-Adams), Paola Cavalieri, Julian Franklin, Bernard Rollin, Steve Sapontzis, Mark Rowlands, Mark Berstein, and others. Eventually, I will get to Francione's own theory of animal rights. All in good time. I will illuminate my perception that animal rights theory is in a state of crisis. I have already argued this in "The Rights of Animal Persons" in a manner that many people have found to be right and even refreshing. There I argue that astonishingly enough, current theories of animal rights do not even logically entail rights in any strong form. However, while the article contains other, more specific criticisms of the theories of animal liberation, it could by no means be comprehensive. I will highlight what in other theories seems to me right or positive, while also criticizing in a way that recognizes problems. I will not be able to vindicate what I regard as right though without my own theory of morality, called "best caring ethics." (BCE) This is introduced in my published article (accessible on this website) called "The Rights of Animal Persons," and I will make some reference to that essay. The forthcoming series of blog entries will highlight why I think we need a book defending BCE at a length that permits much more depth and thoroughness. My book is on the way but still needs time before it greets the public.

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Is It Speciesist to Use the Term "Animal"?

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

Tom Regan nobly uses the term “NHA” as an abbreviation for “nonhuman animal” in his book, Empty Cages. After all, there are human and nonhuman animals, and we are all animals. By using “animal” in opposition to “humans,” some take that to imply that humans are after all not animals. An alarming number of religious fundamentalists actually believe that we are not animals. Now I would find it tedious to say “nonhuman animals” over and over again, and while Regan is savvy to use “NHA,” I do not think there is any universal obligation to use that abbreviation. Should we always speak of "NHA rights" when we mean "animal rights"? Someone might think I was referring to rights associated with the National Hockey Association (1909-1917), the forerunner of the National Hockey League. There are different acceptable stylistic choices available. In my own writing and speaking, although I am aware of the obnoxiousness of those who can witness that we are full of animal structures and functions who yet deny our animality, I sometimes use the term “animal” to mean “nonhuman animals.”

Now Joan Dunayer, who has done first-rate work on animal liberation language-usage in her book, Animal Equality: Language and Liberation, and who in my opinion does perhaps the best writing on the mental lives of insects, mollusks, and others, maintains in her book Speciesism that it is speciesist to use “animal” as I am wont to do (unless I say "nonhuman" emphatically of course). She objects that saying “humans and animals” is logically the same as saying “blacks and humans.” (Dunayer 2004, 12) I agree that someone using the latter phrase is assuming that blacks are somehow (I know not how!) not human. However, thanks to standard usage, someone who uses the word “animals” to refer to nonhuman animals does not imply that humans are not animals. In the case of such an utterance, anyone who is competent in the life sciences will speak and listen with the understanding that humans are animals too.

Dunayer would have us say “nonhuman rights” instead of “animal rights.” Yet “nonhuman” applies to stones and saucepans, and it also seeks to encompass animals with an ironically human-centred term: nonhuman. It can be construed as anthropocentric to require all uses of “animal” to be prefaced with a reference to humanity or non-humanity, as the case may be. It can be viewed as a celebration of animality independent of “us” to refer to animals without any reference to humans whatsoever. That is in a certain respect a more nonanthropocentric usage.

The short-form “animal” is defensible theoretically since its meaning will be well-understood, if it is otherwise stated or implied that humans are animals too. It would also be unwise to leap to the conclusion that a speaker who says "animal" must mean that humans are better than other animals. In general, I agree with the broader intellectual tradition that it is wise to employ the principle referred to as "charity of interpretation." That means interpreting what others say in a favorable way, or the way that they intend, unless there is a good reason to do otherwise. Certainly I can find no theoretical or practical reason to do otherwise. I have already addressed the theory part.

Practically, “animal” is acceptable in terms of animal advocacy. I reason this by answering some relevant questions in this context. Will using “animal” make anti-speciesists treat animals any worse? No. Will the word usage make speciesists treat animals worse? No. Will the word make speciesists less likely to be “converted” by anti-speciesists? I doubt it. Who has ever resisted “animal rights” just because they were not called “nonhuman animal rights” or “nonhuman rights,” as Dunayer would have it (and as advocates for the rights of stones would have it too, I suppose). Nobody dismisses “animal rights” because one stylistically awkward phrase or another is avoided. Therefore, there is no oppressive implication that humans are “above” animality, and the term “animal” can be defended both theoretically and practically.

It is a commonplace, and my friend JoAnne Schwab reminds me, that the way we use language affects how we think. However, I do not think seriously that deniers that humans are animals will ever change their views just because I use the term "nonhuman," let alone will anyone who agrees that humans are animals change their mind over word usage. It might help people who deny human animality though by reminding them and getting them to think about the matter. That is why this debate is not all-or-nothing. I concede there is merit in sometimes emphasizing, one way or another, that humans are animals too. I am just denying that it is oppressive to use the term "animal." It is more of a stylistic and practical consideration I suppose.

In her zeal to label people such as myself “new speciesists,” (I am in good company here along with Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar and others) I do not think that Dunayer, in this particular case, reflects lucidly on traditional usage. It is a pity, since much of her work on language is inspired. For example, she says we should call animals (or in her usage "nonhumans") who live with us "animal companions" rather than "companion animals," since the latter phrase implies it is the human or perhaps divine purpose of animals to serve as our companions. Her own rephrasing carries no such implication. Still, in the case of "animal," I say it is a case of revisionism that itself stands in need of revision.

Works Cited

Dunayer, Joan. 2001. Animal Equality: Language and Liberation. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

Dunayer, Joan. 2004. Speciesism. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

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Is It Objectionable to Use the Term "Vivisection"?

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

Vivisection used to mean “live dissection,” or cutting an animal while still alive. Vivi means “live” and “section” means to cut. Rene Descartes did so without anesthetics. The Oxford Concise Dictionary also defines vivisection as the “painful treatment of living animals for purposes of scientific research.” In other words, the term has expanded in meaning to encompass virtually all harmful or invasive uses of animals in laboratories. Tom Regan, in The Case for Animal Rights, (p. 363) objects to the use of the term vivisection since it means “live dissection.” Later, Regan issued a speech called “The War on Vivisection,” which is linked to from my main page, although he never gave a reason for the switch from disapproving of this term. Perhaps I can give a reason in this blog entry. Do we need to hesitate to use this term, instead opting for the more neutral “animal experimentation”? Not all animal experiments are contrary to the principles of animal liberation, such as experimenting with a poodle to find her optimum diet. Even “invasive animal experiments” is too wordy, and means the same as vivisection. Vivisectionists (those who advocate vivisection; a vivisector is someone who performs vivisection) do not like the term “vivisection” because they consider it inflammatory to associate all of their activities with the root meaning of live dissection. However, not only do vivisectors sometimes do live dissections, but they are proposing that this word be dismissed because it departs from its root meaning, set out above. Yet if we upheld this practice in general, we would need to jettison the word “capital” because it originally referred to heads of cattle (cap means “head” in this context). Perhaps the vivisectionists are embarrassed that the term has come to be associated with pain, or more inclusively, we might say suffering or harm. That is too bad. The experiments in question inherently cause harm. Even animals being regularly deprived of fresh air, sunlight, natural surroundings, decent food, friendship or love, amusements, exercise, as well as safety are due to laboratory confinement. This is literal harm, not just a metaphor. Additionally, animals are subject to surgery without anesthetics, drowning, cramping, crowding, freezing, burning, crushing, car-crashing, starvation, induced aggression or passivity, compression, irradiation, weapons targeting, disease infections, and so much more. That is vivisection in the proper dictionary sense. Requests that we pussy-foot around so as not to injure vivisectionists’ delicate feelings would be a form of speciesist repression, and a valorization of ignoring the suffering of animals just to make things pleasant for humans. There is no good reason, I conclude, to abstain from the use of the term “vivisection” and associated terms, although I would argue that there are any number of excellent reasons to abstain from vivisection itself. Let vivisectors be held accountable for the harms they cause, including through the deliberate use of appropriate terminology.

My first two entries in my Animal Ethics series have been about the appropriate use of terms. I will now launch into more theoretical questions. Next entry will be: are we facing a crisis in animal ethics?

Work Cited

Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

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Martin Balluch and Fellow Prisoners Now Free!

Sunday, September 20, 2008

Thank you for everyone who lent their support. A judge said that the penalties for the crimes in question are not major enough to warrant continued detention in jail. Dr. Balluch is now going to stand as a member of the Green Party in Austria, and I wish him all the best.

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Contemporary Crises in (Animal) Ethics

Monday, September 21, 2008

Animal ethics is really ethics, in some sense. Any fully articulated theory of animal rights, for example, must not only be an account of our ethical stance towards nonhuman animals. Ideally, it should offer a complete system of ideas pertaining to the ethical treatment of human beings too. When I say “animal ethics” in this series, I really mean “ethics,” and only indicate “animal ethics” to let it be known that I take animals seriously, quite unlike most ethicists in my estimation. In my journal article (available on this website under Academic writing), "The Rights of Animal Persons," I begin to articulate an ethical theory to account for our obligations, etc. towards all kinds of sentient beings. However, I did not compose this theory, or perhaps discover it, because I was complacently adding to a philosophical tradition that had it “all figured out.” On the contrary, contemporary ethics is in the midst of important, far-reaching, and deeply seated crises. Here is a listing of these important crises as I see them, which I attempt to address in my forthcoming book:

1. A crisis of justification in ethics, in the midst of which those who assert moral universals generally rely on variants of intuitionism, and those who deny such universals equally point to intuitionism only in a negative way. Widespread cultural skepticism might lead even noble people to become cynical about moral claims. Intuitions result in a stalemate between different ethical theories. The dead heat cannot be settled intuitively, for that just leads in circles. Yet without resolving the intuitive impasse, skepticism about ethics might well be justified. Tom Regan explicitly depends upon “reflective intuitions” in The Case for Animal Rights. Regan intuits that subjects-of-a-life (who are, roughly speaking, animals who might be the subject of rights, although there is controversy as to whether he means all sentient beings) have equal inherent value, which comes intuitively prepackaged with the idea that they must not be subject to utilitarian consideration. Others, such as Peter Singer, who criticize Regan's explicit intuitionism are what I call “crypto-intuitionists” (those who hide their dependence on intuitions) since Singer relies on his own intuitions. Singer is a utilitarian, and as moral skeptic Bernard Williams points out in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, utilitarianism depends on at least two intuitions: an intuited theory of value, and an intuition that we ought to maximize net utility.
2. A crisis in rights theories, such that they do not even logically entail protective rights. I write about this in “The Rights of Animal Persons.” There I show that the leading theories of human rights are so logically vacuous that they permit almost any practical ethic whatsoever, although of course such an outcome is at odds with the intentions of various rights theorists. This shows, in fact, that the leading theories of rights that are not explicitly intuitionist are in fact crypto-intuitionist. Since so many practical commitments are possible on the six most popular rights frameworks, it follows that principles such as strong rights are selected merely intuitively. They certainly do not follow logically from the given frameworks.
3. A crisis in animal liberationist ideas of equality, which are either vague or else lead to the untoward conclusion that we should flip a coin about whom to save, a baby or a mosquito. Joan Dunayer is a terrific writer, but she suggests that all sentient beings are equal, period. She recommends generally flipping a coin between a human and a dog, and one gets the impression that she would advise the same with a human or an insect from a close reading of her work. This is what leads a lot of people to reject animal rights as “absurd.” We need a coherent way of deciding such dilemmas that is not simply speciesist. Dunayer opens up a world of wonders describing the mental lives of insects and invertebrates of many sorts. Her writing is marvelous on such points. But I do not think such total equality which extends even to life-saving dilemmas is right or defensible. However, there is a crisis in that no account exists that resolves such conflicts nonarbitrarily or without simplying intuiting our way out of the difficulties, which is no help at all.
4. A crisis in anti-vivisection theories heretofore, since they not only do not lead to their avowed conclusion, but sometimes even conduce towards vivisectionism. This can be seen with respect to my showing the rights theories are ambiguous as to logically permitting utilitarianism, the #1 framework for rationalizing vivisection. However, I will show how even principles of the leading rights theories that are explicitly brought to bear on vivisection do not logically rule out this practice and may seem to conduce towards rationalizing it as ethically permissible or even required.
5. A crisis in critical moral theory, in which case (a) animal ethics theorists do not foresee logical objections to their own views, and (b) highly objectionable (to my mind) ethical theories are often rebuked, but there is a poverty of convincing refutations—a problem which applies to a whole gamut of such theories. This states of affairs constitutes a crisis since we need not only to assert our own ethical claims convincingly but also to rule out contradictory claims with sufficient reasons. We cannot rule out other views by fiat, or in effect, intuitively or with lame objections and expect to be persuasive in the end.
6. A crisis of sectarianism in ethics, in which narrow theories battle against each other, and there is no transcendence to a holistic vision which embodies the advantages but not the disadvantages of the competing theories. In “The Rights of Animal Persons,” I hint how best caring ethics may well have reached this level.
7. A lack of a coherent defintion of “speciesism” even among thinkers such as Regan and Singer. Dunayer criticizes their concepts ably, but succumbs to equally major logical problems in her own account;
8. A lack of recognition that the traditional concept of “animal welfare” is an oppressive euphemism. This means that the whole debate is not between "animal welfare and animal liberation," but rather, "animal illfare and animal liberation";
9. Continuing crises of denying animal minds in whole or in parts (although this trend is definitely on the wane, and a great deal of good work has been accomplished on this score); still much convincing argument can be provided to clinch this area of contention, I believe;
10. A crisis of widely asserted incompatibility between deep ecology and animal liberation. I will try to show that such an impasse is neither necessary nor desirable;
11. A crisis in religious ethics which casually permit violence towards animals. How can religionists be brought towards animal liberation on their own terms?;
12. A crisis in personhood theory in which claims are sometimes made for nonhuman personhood that are at once suggestive and unconvincing;
13. A crisis of a lack of refutation of the view, underlying so much of our culture, that I call “superiorism.” I will show that this view is so logically powerful that it can best existing animal liberation theories, and does not succumb to any of the prevailing objections to humanism (which I argue to be speciesism); this is a crisis of total impotence of existing animal liberation theory, as well as underdevelopment perhaps of humanistic theorizing. I am reputed by many to have come up with the strongest version of humanism in ethics, the better to refute it by tackling the strongest rather than weaker versions.

I will try to substantiate that these crises exist. I will also show that contemporary theory does not nearly meet them but generally allows them to deepen. We can address these “cultural emergencies” neither with denial nor complacency. Rather, we require sound theoretical provisions. There is also a crisis of global capitalism which undermines ethical commitment everywhere, but I intend to address that in a future work on political economy. Whether or to what extent I meet these listed crises in my forthcoming book is left for the reader to decide. Even if I make progress in addressing only one, that would be significant, although my work is more ambitious than that. However that may be, we cannot simply posit “education” as a solution to these crises. We as a culture need to learn better before we can better teach anyone.

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Crisis #1: The Poverty of Justification in (Animal) Ethics: Intuitionism

Monday, January 26, 2009

I am sorry I was not able to keep up my blog in the months since my last entry. I was unavoidably detained by a time-sensitive project of (for me) overwhelming magnitude. Therefore, my last blogging was in the fall, and I now write in the bitter cold of the Canadian winter.

Last time I indicated that animal ethics is in crisis, which is no small claim. The first indicator of crisis status was my observation that most of the ethical theories are intuitionist. What does intuitionism mean? Intuitions are rock-bottom beliefs in ethics, and intuitionists claim that it is neither possible nor necessary to justify intuitions. Because they are rock-bottom or foundational, no reason can be given to justify intuitive beliefs. If another belief is introduced to justify an intuition, then the intuition itself is no longer basic to the system. (Note for specialists: “foundational” here does not necessarily mean that someone is committed to what is called a foundationalist epistemology, only that no more basic belief is given to justify the intuition.)

What are some examples of intuitions? First, let it be noted that thinkers can be either explicit or implicit intuitionists. An explicit intuitionist will discuss their intuitions quite openly. We can interpret someone to be a covert intuitionist, though, if they offer beliefs that are seemingly basic to their system, and no attempt is made to justify the belief, or even to indicate that a justification is needed. We can analyze the leading ethical theories, which have been extended to animal ethics, in terms of intuitions. These theories are: utilitarianism, the feminist ethics of care, ethical egoism, and virtue ethics, and right theories.

Utilitarianism is based on the intuitions that: (1) the good can be analyzed into good = pleasure and bad = pain (or else good = preference-satisfaction and bad = preference-frustration); (2) we ought to maximize the good and minimize the bad overall. (This rough-and-ready sketch does not account for the intuitions of rule utilitarianism and indirect utilitarianism, though.) In “The Rights of Animal Persons” I document how utilitarian “animal liberationists” can and do defend medical vivisection, even though that is an affront to animal rights. The feminist ethics of care is based on the intuitions that ethics is based on sympathy, empathy, and/or compassion. However, not only is this ideal intuited, but the way caring is applied is intuited as well. Traditional animal welfarists who still use animals for food, clothing, entertainment, etc. consider themselves compassionate, as do utilitarians who think they “maximize” compassion, whereas those who would abolish all animal exploitation think none could be more compassionate than strong rights advocates. Different intuitive notions of “caring” or compassion therefore compete. Ethical egoism holds that everyone should agree to rules such as not killing, stealing, breaking promises, etc. since it is in everyone’s self-interest to forge such an agreement. It is based on the intuition that people only ought to pursue their own self-interest in the end. Virtue ethics is organized around promoting virtues such as courage, honesty, etc., and avoiding vices such as cruelty, laziness, etc. This last view is based on the intuition that these are the most important or fundamental aspects of ethics. However, every ethical theory also has its own idea as to what is virtuous or vicious: an ethical egoist sees altruism as weak, whereas a utilitarianism sees altruism as noble, for example. So diverse intuitions come to bear against virtue ethics too.

It might be thought odd to claim that the leading rights theories are intuitionist, since only some of them claim to be intuitionist. However, I will illustrate how these other theories are in fact based covertly on intuitions even when they do not claim to be. (Best caring, my own view, is an animal rights theory, but the intention at least is that it not be based on intuitions.) The leading rights views are those based on intuitions, compassion, tradition, Immanuel Kant’s theory, John Rawls’ theory, and Alan Gewirth’s theory. Intutionist rights theories include Tom Regan’s account, elaborated in The Case for Animal Rights (1983), which holds that animals are subjects of a life who have “inherent value,” which means in part that they are not to be treated as a mere means to the ends of others (in contrast to utilitarianism). Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” is also based on intuitions that individuals have a dignity which (as Rawls says) even the good of society as a whole cannot override. These are self-evidently intuitionist views, but the others evidently are too.

Compassion-based rights (Joan Dunayer bases rights on compassion and justice) are ambiguous, since we have seen, in considering the ethics of care, that people have very different ideas about what caring entails.

Tradition (S. F. Sapontzis and Bernard Rollin rely on this for their version of animal rights) is also amorphous, since traditions exist for virtually every kind of ethical view. So rights based in tradition are intuitively selected among other traditions that do not necessarily involve rights.

Kant posits the ethical principle that forms of action are acceptable if they can be universalized for all moral agents. For example, Kant indicates that we cannot consistently universalize lying, since that would mean that others would lie to us, which we would not find acceptable. Yet we can universalize any ethical principle in theory, so we must find ourselves intuitively favoring some principles over others once again. Julian Franklin extends Kant’s theory to animal rights.

John Rawls asks us to imagine a thought experiment in which we are spirits not yet born, and to frame principles of justice based on the assumption that we do not know if we will be born more or less intelligent, “white” or “black,” rich or poor, etc. He calls this state “the original position.” Therefore, our principles of justice will presumably rule out racism, sexism, classism, and so forth. However, we can frame almost any rules of justice in the original position, so these must be intuitively favored. Also, the original position is rigged so that we will favor strong consideration of individuals. Rawls’ view is based on individualist intuitions rather than utilitarian ones, then. Note that Mark Rowlands and Mark Bernstein use Rawls’ theory of rights to articulate animal rights.

What about the last rights framework, Alan Gewirth’s? He states that we all need freedom and well-being to do anything, so we should claim rights to freedom and well-being. However, this only seems intuitively right to Gewirth, we can surmise, since we can need freedom and well-being without claiming any such rights. Gewirth suggests that we should extend rights to others as well because of the principle of generic consistency. That is, we should treat the same kinds of things in the same ways. However, such a formal principle is compatible with any ethical theory whatsoever, and we are left once again with intuiting which view seems right to us.

Now that we have seen that the ethical scene is apparently intuitionist altogether, what is wrong with relying on intuitions?

First, they free thinkers from the fundamental obligation of justifying one’s views. They are therefore arbitrary, prejudicial, and not fully accountable.

Second, the diversity of intuitions makes ethics totally indeterminate. One cannot truly defend a theory using intuitionism, since it does not fend off any number of other intuited ethical views.

Third, intuitionists cannot resolve conflicts between intuitions without again relying on intuitions, but each will resolve these conflicts differently and along the same lines as what is initially asserted.

There are other problems with intuitionism, but these are certainly a ground-rocking start. Ironically, intuitionism is meant to be used to defend ethical theories. Yet resorting to intuitionism seems to justify skepticism in ethics, or the view that no single view of morality is correct, and people simply offer different assumptions concerning what we ought to do, believe, etc. This is indeed a crisis. The purpose of ethical theory is to justify a view of ethics as correct, and we cannot do this with intuitionism. Animal ethicists are keen to convince others to accept their views, e.g., that we should be vegetarian or vegan in some cases. But we cannot effectively convince others if it is just a case of pitting one set of intuitions against others.

Can we escape the inuition-ridden crisis of justification in ethics? I try to do so with best caring, and how I do so is sketched in “The Rights of Animal Persons,” although I need a forthcoming book to account for this theory in richer detail.

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Crisis #2: The Crisis of Inconclusive (Animal) Rights Theories

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

The crisis in rights theories not leading to strong rights, an extraordinary outcome, is somewhat detailed in “The Rights of Animal Persons.” However, since I am doing a series on crises in animal ethics (not all are discussed in the essay just mentioned), expanding on the list posted in September, I will briefly discuss this difficulty. The major approaches to animal rights hitherto duplicate human rights theory in the arena of animal ethics. They are: (1) intuitionism; (2) compassion; (3) tradition; (4) Kant’s theory; (5) Rawls’ theory; and (6) Gewirth’s theory. I actually discuss all of these theories in the last post, so I will not bore the reader with a repetition. Minimally, these rights theories do not entail strong rights, but are compatible with utilitarian vivisection for medical purposes, for example, because: (1) one can have utilitarian intuitions; (2) utilitarianism can claim to be “compassionate”; (3) there are utilitarian traditions; (4) Kant claims we should go by universalizable principles, but we can universalize utilitarianism; (5) we can set utilitarian principles of justice from “the original position” (see last post for details); (6) utilitarianism is compatible with needing freedom and well-being, and the principle of generic consistency, or treating like things alike. I also can show that sado-masochism is compatible with all of these frameworks too. It might seem odd to say that in the case of compassion, but if ethics is based on the compassion that people happen to have—well, sado-masochists might not have much. If compassion is advocated as an ideal because it promotes good, sadism can produce a good. In any event, these rights frameworks are grossly indeterminate. They do not result in what their advocates claim, which is a pity, because even granted the assumptions they wish others to share, their conclusions do not follow. And it is asking a lot to have others simply agree to one’s intuitive assumptions. Last time I showed that all of the frameworks are either intuitionist or crypto-intuitionist as well. Surely it is a crisis in rights theory if they do not even vindicate rights!

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Update Regarding Great Apes Activism

Thursday, March 19, 2009

At Brock University in a fourth-year seminar course on animals and the law, we extensively discuss great apes advocacy. On June 10, 2008 I made a blog entry defending such advocacy against Francione's attack on the Great Ape Project, which he used to support but no longer does. Rethinking these issues has occasioned me to revise the earlier entry in that I more clearly outline that the pragmatist approach has four major advantages over Francione's negativist proposal, and shares the advantage that his enjoys of utterly criticizing speciesist arguments that beings should have rights because they have human-like cognitive characteristics.

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Blog Reformat

Friday, March 20, 2009

Sometimes when people read a blog, they want to start with the latest entry. That is the traditional format, and is suitable for more or less regular readers. However, sometimes readers are new to the blog. Especially when items are entered in a series, it makes more sense for such individuals perhaps to read from earliest to latest. Therefore, at my blogsite, I now offer a choice of reading the entries from latest down to earliest, as before, but also from earliest through to the most recent. This should serve to make my blog more user-friendly.

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Crisis #3: the Conundrum over Animal Equality

Monday, May 4, 2009

We are in a state of crisis regarding notions of animal equality. Animal liberation implies some kind of animal equality. For Peter Singer, a utilitarian, in his book Animal Liberation it means equal consideration of equivalent interests, such as not suffering. However, for him, different animal lives are of differential value depending on whether they involve self-awareness, planning, advanced communication, complex social relationships, and other characteristics. For Tom Regan, an animal rights theorist whose views are mainly articulated in The Case for Animal Rights, animals who are routinely exploited often may be considered not merely living, but “subjects of a life,” and they each have “equal inherent value.” Yet in dilemmas, if we have to choose between saving a human and a dog, say, in a burning building in which you can only pull one form the fire, Regan would say to save the dog because nonhuman animals supposedly have fewer “opportunities for satisfaction.”

Joan Dunayer, in her book, Speciesism, is more of an absolute egalitarian. She states that it would be perfectly moral to flip a coin in the case of the dog versus the human. She calls Singer and Regan “new speciesists” because they do not take equality of sentient beings all the way down the line, so to speak. Not only this, but she calls for equal rights for insects, as well. Paola Cavalieri, in The Animal Question, also calls for equality of all conscious beings, undermining any appeals to real or supposed cognitive sophistication.

I believe that these debates over equality raise a crisis. David Selby writes:

Do all non-human animals have rights, and if so, do they all possess them to the same extent?….If sentience is the key determinant in the possession of rights, are the rights of species to be graded according to the degree of sentience? Where do the tsetse fly, the malarial mosquito, the locust, the tapeworm and the myriad organisms that invade our bloodstream and make us ill stand in the animal rights landscape?(Selby, Earthkind (1995), pp. 8-9)

And Stephen Wise writes:

Let those who would ridicule the argument that legal rights should not be restricted to human beings link the rights of chimpanzees and mosquitoes. If the link can be forged, it is likely that no nonhuman animal will ever obtain legal rights. (Wise, "Thunder without Rain," Animal Law 3 (1997): 50)

Is this really a crisis? Why not just settle for Dunayer’s and Cavalieri’s simpler view of equality across the board?

I think the crisis is this: most people would view it as highly objectionable to toss a coin between saving a human or a maggot, other things being equal. And they have the sense, however intuitive, that there are sound reasons for such a choice, if only they could be clearly articulated. They do not think they are speciesist. So either we go by the radical egalitarian view of Dunayer and Cavalieri, which seems to lead to this objectionable consequence and to reduce animal liberation to absurdity in most people’s minds, or else we have inequality in certain cases, and then it becomes a question as to whether this inequality should spread across the board, so that animals would enjoy no equal rights whatsoever. That might be an invitation to animal exploitation. Regan does not state what separates a dilemma from a normal situation in The Case for Animal Rights. He just asserts that there is a difference. Moreover, “opportunities for satisfaction” could lead to our saving the rich over the poor. Francione expresses that our intuition tells us that we should save a human over a dog if we know nothing about the individuals except their species, but intuition tells us exactly nothing as to why we should choose this way. Other animal rights philosophers such as Julian Franklin, Mark Rowlands, Bernard Rollin, and others simply do not tell us how to choose in such dilemmas.

In sum, is animal liberation DOOMED? On the one hand, undermining animal equality in any way might doom animal liberation, which seems to be based on some form of egalitarianism. On the other hand, having absolute equality seems to lead to absurdities, and absurd implications of animal liberation might also threaten animal liberation as a whole with possible untenability. A majority of society would not accept such an implication even if some extremists are content to flip a coin between a baby and a flea. The thought that someone might rescue a tiny insect trapped in a droplet of water gives me joy, but someone who says they’d flip a coin between saving a human or such an insect frankly makes me feel a bit sickened.

I believe that we can find principled grounds for distinguishing such cases, and also logical reasons for preferring humans to blow-flies in dilemmas, while still consistently maintaining a broad-based equality. Indeed, my own theory includes a strict duty to refrain from harming, say, insects if that is reasonably avoidable. However, such a theory must withstand objections from Dunayer and Cavalieri, e.g., that humans are not really intellectually superior, that cognitive capacities are morally irrelevant and so forth. I believe that such a theory is possible and my forthcoming book (and a research paper, if I have time to write it; there are so many papers and books that I feel the need to write!) will seek to enunciate this view. Thus it may be possible to transcend the crisis of either human-caterpillar absolute equality on the one hand, and creeping inegalitarianism across the board resulting in routine harming of nonhuman animals, including insects, on the other hand.

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Crisis #4: Unprotective Anti-Vivisection Theories

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Strong animal rights theories are intended to protect animals, at least in theory, against vivisection. This is a goal that I support. I have already commented (see entry for Jan. 27/09) on how the various rights theories contain frameworks that do not logically entail strong rights. The logic of these views could also, honestly speaking, lead to utilitarianism. That alone makes past rights frameworks unprotective of animals, since utilitarian logic is the #1 way of rationalizing vivisection. The utilitarians admit that animals are harmed in, say, medical vivisection, but assert that this harm is outweighed by the harm that is eliminated by developing cures for humans (and perhaps other animals, but we know what the usual priorities are) using medical vivisection research results, and therapies and treatments that are allegedly based on such practices. This is trying to help patients using “models” that are harmful for the nonhuman victims.

Another point already made, another crisis if you will, is the intuitionist crisis in animal ethics (see entry for January 26/09). Since ALL of the main rights theories thus far are based on “intuitions,” as I have shown, this also creates problems for being firm about anti-vivisection. For the moment you admit intuitions, you must admit the possibility of utilitarian intuitions too, for example. This criticism is related to but different from the previous one, and it applies to all of the rights theories, only some of which are openly intuitionist. Most of them are crypto-intuitionist, or rely on rock-bottom opinions or assumptions that are not rationally justified—although not openly realizing or confessing this fact.

However, the failure to rule out vivisection becomes even deeper when we look at rather logically embarrassing individual efforts of theorists to address the vivisection issue in particular. I will focus on medical vivisection since, although I utterly oppose the practice, it stands the best chance of being justifiable, because it addresses a human need (albeit other animals’ needs are at stake too), unlike vivisection for curiosity or to test new lines of makeup. We can get rid of meat-eating without much sacrifice, it seems to me, and eliminating that harm to animals does not lead to any other harms that cannot be compensated (animal agriculture jobs can be replaced with plant agriculture or other jobs; people can find nutritious and tasty meals from within the plant kingdom). Medical vivisection, unlike meat-eating, is often interpreted to pose a dilemma between either harm to animals if vivisection is done or harm to humans if the research is not done. It is purportedly a conflict between life and health needs and/or vital interests of humans and other animals.

Tom Regan is often called the intellectual leader of the animal rights movement. He favors a ban on all vivisection. (Regan 1983, 393) This conclusion is based on Regan’s argument that animals, alongside humans, have equal inherent value. From the fact that we have equal inherent value, Regan derives “the respect principle.” And from the respect principle, in turn, he derives “the harm principle.” The latter would less confusingly be labeled “the nonharming principle” since that is Regan’s intent. In any cases, these intuitively based principles are taken to rule out the harm of vivisection.

One problem with Regan’s claiming he has formulated a case against medical vivisection though is that in The Case for Animal Rights, he presents various principles for overriding rights. First, he favors overriding the minimum number of rights of the innocent when other innocents will be harmed in a comparable way if one does not override the rights. (Ibid., 305) Stated more simply, the foregoing means: I can sacrifice some innocents to save others if comparable harms are at stake in making the sacrifice, so long as the minimum number of rights are overridden. Furthermore, he tells us that in prevention of harm cases, Martha’s right can override Nora’s right if Martha faces greater harm. (Ibid., 309)

What implications do Regan’s principles for overriding of rights have for medical vivisection? Animal experimenters will claim that sick humans are innocent and have a right to life. Sacrificing a finite number of animals can allegedly result in cures for endless humans. This means a greater number of rights of humans will supposedly be respected than there will be animals’ rights that are violated. Since Regan favors overriding the lesser number of rights, this may imply advocacy of vivisection.

Also, the extent of harm done to animals in experiments is generally comparable to the egregious human disease effects that the experiments are meant to replicate. However, it can be additionally argued that greater harm is done to the human if the experiments are not done, using the criteria that Regan himself invokes to resolve lifeboat cases. If a lifeboat is sinking that contains four humans and a dog, and only four of the creatures can be successfully floated, then Regan says we should toss the dog overboard. That is because, Regan assures us, killing each individual (normal) human in the boat would foreclose more “opportunities for satisfaction” than killing the dog. (Ibid., 324)

So one can argue that there is a lesser harm in experimenting on animals both quantitatively, because of the number of lives saved (using an optimistic picture of medical vivisection, recited above, that I do not myself subscribe to), and also because the amount of harm suffered by humans is supposedly qualitatively greater than harm suffered by animals who are subjected to similar physical or psychological conditions. Unfortunately, the lesser harm figures into Regan’s principles for overriding rights in a way that might make medical vivisection “necessary” to defend using his principles.

Regan claims that such rights-overriding reasoning is exceptional, not routine like animal experiments. (Ibid., 325) However, the most logical and straightforward way to deploy principles is simply to apply them in all cases in which they are applicable. The last statement must also be true of principles for overriding rights. Regan cannot arbitrarily pick and choose how to apply his principles depending on his favorite conclusions that he wishes to reach. Moreover, medical vivisection can indeed be argued to be “exceptional” among animal usages because it supposedly confers benefits that are allegedly difficult to replace unlike meat-eating, fur-wearing, using animal ingredients, animals being enslaved for entertainment, and any number of other uses.

Regan claims that experimenting on animals reduces animals’ value to their utility to others and thus treats them as renewable resources. (Ibid., 397) However, it could be argued that animals are not used as a “mere” means (to adapt Kant’s phrasing here) if the animals are deemed to have inherent value, only their right to life is overridden in favor of others’ rights to life using Regan’s own principles. Such a view grants animals strong rights, in most cases, and does not treat them as mere resources. Certainly we cannot merely stipulate that animal rights means abolishing vivisection. This needs to follow if at all, as a logical implication of a well-reasoned ethical theory, presumably some form of animal rights view.

Regan offers other unconvincing anti-vivisection ideas. He writes, in the Preface of the 2004 second edition of The Case for Animal Rights, p. xxx-xxxi, that it violates animals’ rights to be in the laboratory in the first place. However, vivisectors might not wrongly override animals’ rights if they accord with Regan’s own principles for overriding rights. In general, it is perilous to pit rights against principles for overriding rights, since the latter will tend to trump.

Regan also rejects utilitarian-style aggregation and its minimizing of overall harm, but we can treat medical vivisection as a conflict of rights to life without relying at all on utilitarianism. Also, even Regan uses aggregation (though not admittedly) in saving fifty miners instead of one. (Regan 1983, 301) You see, all that aggregation means is “adding together,” and overriding the minimum number of rights adds potential rights violations together and is therefore a form of aggregation. He claims that aggregate consequences do not matter but respect for the equality of individuals does. (Ibid., 307) However, “equality” in this context partly amounts to counting each individual once, not more or less, when seeking to preserve the most number of rights. He still aggregates consequences in terms of rights-violations/fulfillments in saving the fifty miners instead of the one.

In another book, Empty Cages, Regan claims that medical researchers appeal to benefits from medical vivisection is question-begging because such arguments assume those benefits are morally legitimate. (Regan 2004, 174) However, Regan also begs the question by merely assuming that these benefits are morally illegitimate (especially given his intuitionist assumptions on which his theory rests, and the way his own principles justify harming someone to secure the benefit of a lesser harm for someone else).

Regan also points out (Ibid., 174-176) that animal researchers (1) do not take steps to minimize harm to animals; (2) overestimate benefits of such research; and (3) underestimate harm to humans (because drugs tested safe and effective on animals can harm humans, or those substances tested unsafe or ineffective on animals may help humans). Fair enough. Yet these last three points, however true they may be, do not require abolishing medical vivisection, some of which may both minimize harm to animals and promise benefits but not harms for humans.

So Regan expends much intellectual vigor opposing medical vivisection, but he is even more energetically rebuffed by the logical implications of his own reasoning which seem to favour the practice.

Does Gary Francione do any better in protecting animals from vivisection, as he claims his theory does? He challenges audiences around the world during his talks: Would you use a severely retarded human for cancer research if it was thought to yield valuable data? He reports that no one has ever raised a hand in favor. (Francione 2000, 91) Not surprisingly for a lawyer, Francione notes that the 1947 Nuremberg Code, drafted after the horrors of the Nazi doctors who vivisected Jews and others, forbids research on unconsenting research subjects, and also, the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki by the World Medical Association prohibits using humans without full information and consent. (Ibid., 92) However, Francione is here committing the fallacy of appeal to popular opinion. I say this because some thinkers do openly advocate using mentally disabled humans as well as animals for medical vivisection, such as utilitarian R. G. Frey. (Frey 1987, 89) Francione’s reasoning has no bearing on Frey, although that is precisely the position that needs to be refuted.

We have already seen how Francione’s principle of equal consideration does not rule out utilitarianism, and so begs the question against that theory when he insists on a neo-Kantian framework that no one should be treated as property. David Langlois has clarified to me that not being considered property means more than the idea that no one should be treated as owned. Francione thinks that not being property also means not being treated as a resource, slave, etc. although this idea, very similar to Regan’s notion of inherent value, again is merely intuitive and thoroughly begs the question against alternative philosophies such as utilitarianism or ethical egoism (a view I will not elaborate here), for example. By Francione’s own admission, the principle of equal consideration just means treating like cases alike unless there is a “good reason” not to. (Francione 2000, 82) However, both of the just-mentioned moral philosophies treat like cases alike, unless there is a “good reason” not to according to each theorist’s analysis of “good reasons.” In turn, each philosophy claims to have a “good reason” to treat animals differently from normal humans in the case of medical vivisection. Francione simply begs the question against such theories’ versions of “good reasons” at his own logical peril.

Also, Francione admits that we can prefer to rescue humans over other animals in cases of emergency. (Ibid., xxxvi) If this is allowed in dilemmas, why not also more generally, thus pushing animals into the vivisection lab? Why should not animals be treated as property, suffering forcible harm, rather than humans suffering involuntarily and helplessly from diseases? After all, emergencies can result in rights not being respected, as in the old school case Francione often gives of only being able to pull one being from a burning building. Why not disregard the rights of animals while instead affirming the rights of humans? He does not refute the idea that medical vivisection itself constitutes a moral dilemma.

He further asserts that his view rests “comfortably” on two assertions: (1) that we can prefer humans in cases of necessity; and (2) it is wrong to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals. (Ibid., xxxvi) However, vivisectionists will say that life or death matters are indeed cases of necessity, and so vivisection does not involve inflicting any “unnecessary suffering” on animals, since they favor humans in a contest between human needs and animal needs. Francione has nothing to say in response to this criticism, only his earlier impotent reliance on the fallacy of popular opinion.

Evelyn Pluhar, like Regan or Francione, does not present a convincing refutation of utilitarian defences of animal experimentation; her attempts to refute utilitarianism try to point out how it leads to the killing of innocents, although this strategy rather begs the question, (Pluhar 1995, ch. 4) simply assuming (however plausibly to rights advocates) that we should not tolerate such outcomes.

Steve Sapontzis seeks to integrate animal rights and utilitarianism, (Sapontzis 1987, xii) and so he does not object to utilitarianism per se, although he opposes animal experiments because he holds that animals can never be consenting. (Ibid., 209-216) However, consider (in the way a utilitarian might) the comforts of having one’s consent respected and also the suffering of being forced. Can the values of these utilities be outweighed by the supposedly huge and perpetual benefits of medical vivisection? A lot of vivisectionists would say “yes.” Sapontzis then does not provide secure grounds against vivisection either.

Mark Rowlands tries to refute medical vivisection’s supposed acceptability by his adaptation of John Rawls’ theory of justice. I’ve described this theory earlier in my blog, but it entails that people who negotiate principles of justice in the original or impartial position would not vote in favor of social rules that would permit themselves to be vivisected. That would go against their self-interest. (Rowlands 2002, 151) After all, who, in an impartial position, would vote in favor of a principle where they end up being vivisected—given that they do not know what life circumstances they will end up in behind the so-called “veil of ignorance” (a condition attached to the impartial position). This is actually one of the more plausible ways of criticizing medical vivisection among the various animal rights theories.

However, Rawls’ view is too full of holes. Rawls’ “original position” takes it for granted that one must never (or hardly ever) act contrary to one’s own self-interest. However, Peter Singer and other utilitarians take it for granted that their own very different “original position” equally considers all equivalent interests, and is open to others’ interests overriding one’s own self-interest. Which one is right? Merely taking any one theory for granted does not answer this question. In other words, Rawls and Rowlands profoundly beg the question against utilitarian arguments for vivisection. Rowlands, in his animal rights version, in effect merely stipulates that we should not vivisect in that he contrives an original position that happens to carry his sought-after implication.

Julian Franklin (2005) purely takes it for granted that his framework is anti-vivisectionist, but he does not offer a way to refute the contention that vivisection resolves a dilemma between animal rights and human rights. Joan Dunayer (2004) and Bernard Rollin (1992) also do not offer such a much-needed way out. Even if we agree with their rejection of utilitarianism, they (like Regan and others) do not show how vivisection is to be ruled out in terms of their favored approach of rights.

What about Peter Singer? A lot of people mistakenly think that he totally opposes vivisection. Others say he advocates the practice. The truth is unclear, because he declares things consistent with both positions and is actually badly inconsistent overall, as I will now demonstrate. In his essay, “The Value of Animal Life,” Singer states that we can defend medical vivisection:

The knowledge gained from some experiments on animals does save lives and reduce suffering. Hence, the benefits of animal experimentation exceed the benefits of eating animals and the former stands a better chance of being justifiable than the latter; but this applies only when an experiment on an animal fulfils strict conditions relating to the significance of the knowledge to be gained, the unavailability of alternative techniques not involving animals, and the care taken to avoid pain. Under these conditions the death of an animal in an experiment can be defended. (Singer 1980, 254)

He adds that we can defend such research also on humans who have lesser mental capacities, like animals. (Ibid.)

In Animal Liberation, Singer’s signal contribution to animal ethics, he clearly implies that we do not need to advocate a wholesale abolition of animal experimentation:

All we need to say is that experiments serving no direct and urgent purpose should stop immediately, and in the remaining fields of research, we should, whenever possible, seek to replace experiments that involve animals with alternative methods that do not. (Singer 1990, 40)

This last statement says we need only call for reducing, not eliminating animal research, and that it may not even be “possible” to replace some experiments. Similarly, Singer was once challenged as to whether a particular animal experiment conducted by a Professor Azzis may be justified. (Singer 2006) Singer said he needed to evaluate the particulars of the experiment, with which he was unfamiliar. Finally, in another important Singer book, Practical Ethics, he makes his utilitarian pro-vivisection logic finally clear for all to see:

In the past, argument about animal experimentation has often…been put in absolutist terms: would the opponent of experimentation be prepared to let thousands die from a terrible disease that could be cured by experimenting on one animal?...I think the question should be answered affirmatively—in other words, if one, or even a dozen animals had to suffer experiments in order to save thousands, I would think it right and in accordance with equal consideration of interests that they should do so. This, at any rate, is the answer a utilitarian must give. Those who believe in absolute rights might hold that it is always wrong to sacrifice one being, whether human or animal, for the benefit of another. (Singer 1993, 67)

In the above quotation Singer shows his sympathy for utilitarian logic. He adds (p. 68) that if we eliminate speciesist bias and also use humans who are mentally equivalent to animals, then “…the number of experiments performed on animals would be greatly reduced.” Again, we see the theme of reducing rather than eliminating animal (and, it is implied, human) experiments which is also documented from Animal Liberation above.

Thus Singer talks out of one side of his mouth like a supporter of some few animal experiments in which the costs are supposedly outweighed by the benefits.

At other times, Singer talks the opposite. In another part of Animal Liberation, Singer writes:

…the ethical question of the justifiability of animal experimentation cannot be settled by pointing to its benefits for us, no matter how persuasive the evidence in favor of such benefits may be. The ethical principle of equal consideration of interests will rule out some means of obtaining knowledge. We always accept many restrictions on scientific enterprise. We do not believe that scientists have a general right to perform painful or lethal experiments on human beings without their consent, although there are many cases in which such experiments would advance knowledge far more rapidly than any other method. Now, we need to broaden the scope of this existing restriction on scientific research. (Singer 1990, 92)

This sounds like an abolitionist argument against animal experiments. However, perhaps we need to think like a lawyer here, looking for “escape clauses,” given Singer’s advocacy of vivisection elsewhere. Sure enough. He states in the quote that “some means” of obtaining knowledge are to be ruled out (not necessarily all means). Scientists lack a “general right” (although that leaves rooms for exceptional rights). Also, he advocated that society “broaden the scope” of a restriction, but this does not require that we do so to the degree of 100%. In any event, Singer’s consent argument is highly similar to Sapontzis’ argument, noted above (which was actually expressed long after Singer’s version), which also invokes animals’ systematic lack of consent. Like Sapontzis’ view, Singer’s is quite vulnerable to the utilities associated with consent being outweighed by the benefits of vivisection, a view that we have seen Singer elsewhere seems to hold such as in passages quoted above.

We need to appreciate just how contradictory this is. In the last quote reprinted, Singer is saying that the benefits to humans do not vindicate animal research because it violates the need for consent, a principle which we need to extend to animals. However, in the pro-vivisection passages, he does not even consider consent, and instead cites the benefits of the research as justifying the practice. These are totally incompatible claims. On Singer’s Frequently Asked Questions section of his website, he suggests that although individual animal experiments might be justified, he does not favor the institutional practice of vivisection since few experiments would be of benefit, and resources would be better spent otherwise. (Singer 2009) However, Azzis’ experiment which he hesitates over in the above citation (and which Singer also mentions in that very same FAQ passage, warning that people surprised by this reaction have not read him carefully in the past as not ruling out all vivisection), IS an instance of institutionalized animal experimentation. So once again we have a contradiction. Are institutional animal experiments unjustified like Singer says? If they are not justified, as he plainly states, then why hesitate over Dr. Azzis’ institutional vivisection practices?

So what to believe about Singer? His plea for abolishing (or somewhat restricting?) vivisection on the basis of animals not consenting is an isolated although important statement. He does not raise the issue of consent elsewhere regarding animal experiments. In any event his consent-based "anti-vivisection" statement is not absolute, as I have analyzed, and his FAQ's condemnation of institutional vivisection is tarnished with hesitations over Azzis' experiments conducted in his particular institution. Whatever Singer’s opinion may happen to be, the fact is that his framework, utilitarianism, cannot rule out vivisection and is the #1 framework used to defend the practice in the way he himself usually does (judging by the number of relevant passages that I can find, at any rate).

That said, animal rights theories are the #1 means used to rule out vivisection ethically, although the ethics of care theory also sometimes carries that anti-vivisectionist conclusion (they also face this dilemma: is it more “caring” to offset harm to humans or to animals? No ethics of care theorist such as Carol Adams or Josephine Donovan—see Donovan and Adams 1996—has adequately, if at all, addressed this problem). But we have seen that animal rights views such as Regan’s either unwittingly conduce towards justifying medical vivisection, or else fail to stave off a seeming “animal rights” justification of vivisection: judging between a supposed dilemma between animal rights and human rights.

Anyone who cares about vivisection—or even just logic—should be quite concerned by these findings from our brief survey of anti-vivisection ethics. Is there a way out of this theoretical miasma, that left by itself, altogether fails the poor animals targeted for this hideously hellish practice? I say: yes. I have already published on these issues to some extent (Sztybel 2006a, 2006b) and will address this crisis of anti-vivisection theory much more thoroughly in my forthcoming book on animal rights ethics.

References

Donovan, Josephine, and Carol J. Adams (eds.). 1996. Beyond Animal Rights: a Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. [See also Adams’ essay on vivisection featured in her anthology of her own essays entitled Neither Man Nor Beast.]

Dunayer, Joan. Speciesism. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

Francione, Gary L. 2000. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Franklin, Julian. Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Frey, R. G. 1987. “Animal Parts, Human Wholes.” Biomedical Ethics Reviews—1987, eds. James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press.

Pluhar, Evelyn B. 1995. Beyond Prejudice: the Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Durham: Duke University Press.

Regan, Tom. 2004. Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Rollin, Bernard. 1992. Animal Rights and Human Morality: Revised Edition. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. First edition published in 1981.

Rowlands, Mark. 2002. Animals Like Us. London: Verso.

Singer, Peter. 2009. Princeton University website. http://www.princeton.edu/~psinger. Retrieved July 6, 2009.

Singer, Peter. 2006. The Sunday Times, December 3.

Singer, Peter. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, Peter. 1990. Animal Liberation. Second Edition. New York: Avon Books.

Singer, Peter. 1980. “Animals and the Value of Life.” In Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan. New York: Random House.

Sztybel, David. 2006a. “A Living Will Clause for Supporters of Animal Experimentation.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (May 2006): 173-189.

Sztybel, David. 2006b. “The Rights of Animal Persons.” Journal for Critical Animal Studies 4 (1): 1-37.

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New: "Animal Rights Made Simple"

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

This notice is an interlude in my ongoing series on the crises in animal ethics. Today I am posting for the first time on this website a two-page essay, "Animal Rights Made Simple," in PDF format. I will offer a word of explanation. Clarity is my first rule of style, otherwise communication becomes self-defeating, and the message is lost. At the same time, academic writing with clarity as a guiding principle is not always accessible to everyone, especially if the material is developed with rigour. Rigorous perspectives consider all objections, contrary theories, and elaborate one's own view thoroughly. Not everyone has the staying-power for such work, for different reasons. However, I believe that a case for animal rights can be made convincingly in relatively simple terms. I am still a theorist, and what I am doing here is simplifying a system of ideas. This is not an exercise in rhetoric, where animal suffering is detailed and an attempt is made to inflame people to action on the basis of sheer outrage. That said, animal oppression is grossly outrageous! Given, however, my logical approach, even animal rights made simple is still only the case for those who are able to think logically. Having done my share of high school teaching, I mourn that most students are not trained in this way. It could be otherwise, though. The basic ideas in my best caring theory are VERY clear and simple, and add up to equally clear animal rights conclusions. Although to some extent I deal in abstractions, it would be a mistake to think of, say, ruling out bad things when possible as a "mere abstraction." On the contrary, it is a sweeping generalization that makes reference to any number of concrete instances in which animals are subject to, for example, suffering in often intense and various ways. It ranges from the suffocation of the fish out of water to the docking of a pig's tail, with literally endless examples to add even in terms of detailing general KINDS of suffering... If someone fails to see the concrete because the abstract is used, that is simply a failure of understanding of what is referred to, and perhaps a failure of imagination to see beyond the mere idea to the realities encompassed by the idea. So this brochure I see as perhaps being useful on college and university campuses, internet discussion forums, or as a tool to have at information tablings or street education efforts, since occasionally very thoughtful people appear who wish to think critically about animal protection issues. It is not something that will reach everyone. However, that is not an "elitist" assumption. If people in our society were better educated, everything in "Animal Rights Made Simple" would be dirt-simple to most everyone. It is rather because society is elitist that logical appeals only reach relatively few people. Instead, arguments are often thrown out the window and atrocity images and quick statistics are used instead, recognizing that media "sound bites" and "flashing images" have a very limited attention span on the receiving end. It would be elitist to give up on the importance of logic and to cynically assume that any brochure cannot reflect a more-or-less complete argument (for the purposes of a brochure, anyway). I hope that people will find "Animal Rights Made Simple" to be of use, then, in their outreach to thinking people who are also compassionate.

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Modification to Crisis # 5: Taking Criticisms Seriously

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

I have already outlined the series of crises I am currently commenting on in my blog. The pacing of their unfolding is slow because of my many commitments, but I remind my readers that some of the finest things require time: wine (not that I drink), well-laid plans, and maturity to take a few examples. Crisis #5 was about a failure in critical theory. The aspect of critical theory mentioned in the original entry for September 21, 2008, Item 5., is about how current animal ethics theories fail to launch effective objections against other theories. These objections tend to beg the question, jump to conclusions, etc. I will soon use the writing of Tom Regan as an example in this respect. However, there is another dimension to critical theory that 5. neglected. Many animal rights theorists fail to reckon with criticisms of their own views. I will edit that entry from last September accordingly to include this other aspect.

My example for this part will be the animal rights theory of Professor Gary L. Francione, which I promised earlier in the blog I would discuss anyway. It makes sense since I have already engaged with a whole other aspect of his theory, his stance on acceptable animal legislation (not that he seems to advocate a legislative approach at this time, as noted earlier).

I will feature a special preview (in draft) from my own forthcoming animal rights ethics book. Note that I do not yet include material from Francione's latest book, a collection of essays entitled Animals as Persons, but since it features no alteration in his basic theory, there is no hurry on that score. I have found so many flaws in Francione's writing, detailed in this blog and in my journal article, "Animal Rights Law," that I am not eager to thoroughly read and perhaps respond in writing to his new book. The track record suggests that it would just be another laborious exercise in having to face logically flawed, tediously repetitive, and spottily organized material. Other projects seem more appealing at present.

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Crisis # 5a: Taking Criticisms of One's Own View Seriously: Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Wednesday, August 26, 2009

Accountability in animal ethics means being able to justify one's stance with good reasons. However, one can hardly do so if one's account falls due to logical criticisms that strictly adhere to the essence of what is being argued. Such criticisms cannot be shaken off because again they indelibly apply to the core of what is being asserted. As announced in the last blog entry, I am using the animal rights theory of Gary L. Francione as an example of a view that succumbs to such criticisms. These critiques are by no means dependent on accepting my own theory, but show how the view in question fails on its own terms, impartially considered. I have seen a lot in recent years of people, even academic theorists, being unconcerned with logical problems in their own views, and I think ego may have a lot to do with that. However, what happens in the wake of my criticisms is largely up to other people to decide. In the spirit of open discussion and fair debate, I offer the following critique of Francione's animal rights ethic. I agree with the latter in many respects, but find faults in its reasoning, a very important difficulty for any philosophy. To read this excerpt from my forthcoming book, in PDF format (page and footnote numbers differ from the book), please click HERE.

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Interlude: Thoughtful Debate as “In-Fighting”?"

Thursday, September 9, 2009

I am going to take some time out while on the topic of critical discourse to address an old concern among animal rightists. Some activists think that conflicting claims among animal rights theorists amount to “fighting” with each other rather than with those who hurt animals. One example that is commonly used is the animal “welfare” versus fundamentalist debate. Characterizing exchanges between thinkers in this manner is a false, destructive, and distorting view. Ironically, it is trying to fight off valuable thinkers who are helping to clarify what animal rights is and what it means, as well as its justification. The importance of academic writing and debate for animal rights includes:

• Developing more convincing arguments to influence opponents of animal rights and win them over. People who go ahead with mere opinions may feel powerful, affirmed, etc., but it is only with one’s own people, or unproductively “preaching to the choir,” and resting smug with one’s own insufficiently examined ideas. Mere opinions do not convince others. Only good arguments do that—or at least that is what should happen. And we have important people to win over, including ordinary citizens, lawmakers, and policymakers. Educators need to focus not only on getting ideas out there, but on trying to learn what are the best ideas in the first place.
• If we as the animal rights movement do not prepare by weeding out bad AR arguments ourselves, the enemies of animal rights will do it for us. And we would not want to actually be caught, as public activists, using bad arguments and thus giving anti-animal-rightists any more credit to their side than they are due.
• Keeping intellectual humility and avoiding arrogance is only possible if one sincerely believes and practices that one needs to justify what one is asking others to adopt, be it animal rights, veganism, suffering-reduction laws, or whatever.
• Helping to decide important strategy questions such as whether to advocate “welfarist” legislation. These are of enormous significance to animals even if some are willing to bury their heads in the sand and dismiss it as mere “fighting.” Sure, activists vitally need to cooperate on common ground, but they need to settle some issues too.
• Some frame this as an issue of loyalty to the animals, or being treacherous with respect to each other. Yet it is truest to the animals to forge the most convincing possible arguments on their behalf. It is most faithful to furthering animals’ interests to decide what is in their best interests in terms of strategies. It is truest to each other to reflect the truth for everyone, and to seek that everyone exercise their own best judgment. It is not self-centred to debate, if one does this without ego. It is rather getting away from everyone being self-centredly complacent about whatever they happen to believe, and not having the humility to seek the truth beyond oneself no matter what. The truth is without ego.
• We need to choose our battles wisely, but some foolishly avoid all intellectual conflict and thus frown on trying to ascend to greater wisdom. And then fools’ opinions are counted right alongside deeply reflective counsel. Or rather, it is only bare opinions that survive. Theory is cast overboard as an imagined “threat” to activist unity, a kind of paranoid anti-intellectualism.
• Seeking stronger unity in the long-term. If we try to paper over intellectual conflicts now, they still persist at a deeper level, only we fail to acknowledge them. This results in stifling conformism, and deep-seated alienation or even resentment. However, if one side convinces others due to winning arguments—which are more than possible—then more true unity emerges. And it is stronger than ever because it is bigger and better than ever. Solid justifications for views allow everyone to have a firmer sense of identity, purpose, and means of resolving conflicts without them becoming mere vague impasses that impede full-powered progress. Feelings of positive association and genuine “friendliness” would also increase, since people would genuinely have more in common, rather than forcing or pretending to have unity. That is, there need be no fighting off dissension and pretending there is unity. People who try to force artificial unity as opposed to developing authentic solidarity sometimes deal with differences “underground” by gossiping about opponents secretly, or subtle back-stabbing rather than respectful dialogue.
• Trying to find truth. That is the purpose of academic inquiry, even when the conclusion of some scholars such as postmodernists is that truly there is no truth. It is superficial and confusing matters to characterize debate as “fighting” just because claims are conflicting. Sometimes what should be debates are carried on as fights, with insults, giving way to impulsive anger, revenge, stubbornly defending prejudices and dismissing the views of others, lack of forgiveness or flexibility, etc. Even just ignoring views is fighting them off in a sense. At its best debate does not involve fighting but learning. Views are not discarded because of “battle” but because they are lacking in evidence, and so are not worthy of support. The winning views have not “slain their enemies” but have merely revealed reality and dispelled illusions. People who mistake their own opinions for facts have given up long ago on the quest for truth, but it matters. Opinions that are not properly justified pose as truth but without the substantiation that is necessary to certify truth.
• Greater empathy for “opponents.” We need to overcome viewing other animal rightists as enemies (unless of course they make themselves into genuine enemies!), but rather simply ones with different views. Through thoughtful debate, we acquire more empathy for others by more fully understanding alternative positions and the reasons behind them. Here we try to avoid the pitfall of thinking one knows others more than one actually does, and one actually takes the risk of really listening. Many think they are respecting others by promoting a thin and superifical “unity,” but meanwhile, their understanding of other views is limited to little more than crude stereotypes rather than true depth of understanding.
• Mediation. Academic writing, if it offers convincing arguments and thus fulfills its purpose, can mediate conflict by actually settling disputes, at least among people with open minds. I have witnessed this rewarding phenomenon many times by seeing reports from people who have, in all good faith, changed their minds. People who have trouble articulating the right position (and I aver that such positions exist) are grateful to others who can do a better job of it because it is, for one thing, a professional preoccupation. Moreover, this mediation would be rational and fair, by considering justifications, criticisms, objections, and so on. So it is not mere “arbitration” or playing eenee-meanie-miney-mo with regard to matters of importance. There is no single “Dean of Animal Rights Ethics,” so we need to listen to everybody all around in a full-fledged dialogue, whenever that is possible.
• Democracy. This form of decision-making at its best is rational, not just a rabble throwing up hands without duly thinking through whatever decision is at hand. It is best, I believe, to seek consensus as much as possible not through sheer domineering, but rather informed debate.

Overall, then, academic dispute should be viewed as something that can be overwhelmingly positive, and the perception that it is just idle “fighting” is ironically just a way of fighting off expending effort to be accountable for one’s views by taking justification seriously. Reasons for fighting off serious thinking include:

• not wishing to have one’s prejudices challenged
• laziness or not wanting to go to the bother of thinking very much
• lack of developing studious habits, and not being comfortable with staying put and learning
• fear of conflict, perhaps because of unfortunate experiences growing up in which conflicting views typically lead to vicious “battles”
• self-servingly avoiding conflict just because being at odds makes one personally uncomfortable; opposition is not always easy but that does not mean it should always be avoided, for all that
• short-sightedness about the importance for developing winning arguments
• mistaking bad examples of debate with debate in general, thus negatively stereotyping
• tar-and-feathering of academic debaters as “elitists,” even though they are, at their best, just trying to find the truth and what is best for animals. It is rather elitist to dismiss informed debate from the movement, assuming that it is only appropriate for certain university folk rather than the right of all activists
• being influenced by certain academics who provide a distorted model of scholarly conduct by exhibiting no scruples about indulging in insulting as a substitute for dialogue, conveniently ignoring criticisms deemed fatal by a wide swath of others, and pandering to many peoples’ temptations by providing oversimplified conceptions
• wanting to focus on “practical” aspects of activism (this is actually quite a legitimate position for an activist to take, but it does not justify expressing negativity towards those who do wish to debate intelligently or trying to fight off such people, ironically enough); we must not ignore that debate itself is a form of intellectual activism, and a practice all in itself on behalf of animals.

We can look at this issue in terms of crude, but still valuable, personality theory: True Colors. According to this widely disseminated and trademarked view, there are four basic personality types:

1. Green (thinkers and intellectuals);
2. Gold (methodical, by-the-book, rule-based people who run institutions with fiscally responsible, standard procedures);
3. Blue (emotionally sensitive, caring about relationships, friendly, loving, keeping the peace, etc.);
4. Orange (fun-loving, thrill-seeking, creative, sporting, helping to cultivate interest, entertainment and amusement).

People who are “Blue” might be disturbed seeing conflicts among the “Greens.” Why can’t we all just get along? Cooperation feels so much better than the conflict! Or Golds want to institute their goals and see debate as an “unproductive” impediment to simply implementing whatever happens to be on their minds, which they then take for granted and go forward with. Or Oranges find that intellectual debating is just not enough fun. Really, though, this is a case of certain personality types giving into potential weaknesses and thus, ironically, trying to fight off the Greens.

The Blues have a valuable peace-keeping role, but they should be focused on avoiding needless conflict, and ensuring solidarity on points on which we all (should) agree. Golds should implement policies that are rationally determined to be best for animals, and Oranges obviously need to hunker down and respect the value of work, including intellectual tasks, although ways of making debates interesting are to be encouraged. A fully integrated person will make some room for all of the “True Colors,” and also leave enough breathing room for others with different predominant colours (if that is the case) such as the Greens. We need our true colours to shine through with a full-spectrum approach. So yes, let us challenge the speciesists, but with better and better strategies, and arguments for overcoming oppression, that are—let’s face it—formulated chiefly by the Greens. This is not just a matter of: Go, Greens, go! Let all go forth, with animal rightists seeking and finding the most satisfying and effective forms of unity that are conceivable! “For the animals” means, in part, being for good and for truth, and also against “garbage” reasoning about animals that can and should be avoided!

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