(refutation of disagreement with 2. G.)
Refutation of claiming that we can count beings by degrees--the degree to which they realize the greatest conceivable good:
- This view does not have a proper name, but may be referred to as "the good instantiation view."
- We cannot act for an impersonal standard, including a concept of the greatest number of goods a being may have. See response to 2. E. above.
- If one seeks to justify such a standard because the most goods in such a standard is "best," best meaning "the most good," it remains that it is only the most good one can conceive in an impersonal standard. It does not result in the most good for persons, or what is most worthwhile for all, since it results in favouring a few persons, and discounting others, so that some enjoy good but not all. Therefore it is not best in the way that counts: best for persons.
- We must account for everyone's good by judging how good that person's good is for them: in every case, everyone's good if fully or totally good for them. If we judge a person's good by a conceptual model of the greatest possible good a being can have, we use an irrelevant standard in accounting for that person's good. It does not account for that person's good, but rather for what would be of value to a being who happened to have a list of many goods manifesting in his or her life.
- Therefore the best sense of who counts is simply whoever is a person with a good, without an impersonal standard that causes contempt for the good of some, or indeed for everyone, because no one after all is perfect.
RETURN TO DISAGREEMENTS WITH PREMISE 2.
RETURN TO MAIN ARGUMENT