(refutation of disagreement with 6. N.)
Refutation of claiming that animals are not harmed in any morally significant way because they are incapable of morality:
- Pain is pain, regardless of the species or moral character of the sufferer. A sense of pain as an intrinsically bad thing is unavoidable if we consider the impact of the pain on the victim herself. We do not harm babies, or humans who are cognitively disadvantaged, so it is unthinkable to fail to consider other animals who also lack moral capacities. There is a distinction in general between a moral agent, who has the ability to make moral judgements of right and wrong (and who may be erroneous or wicked), and a moral patient, or one who can be benefited or harmed. A nonmoral person still has things that are worthwhile or not for him or her as a person, and it cannot simply be set aside by someone who thinks himself "morally superior" in doing so.