

# Extending Peace to Animals?

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## Introduction

People for centuries have been used to the idea of being kind to animals, or the “animal welfare” view as it is traditionally so-called. It means that animals should be treated humanely, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. There is great cause for concern in how well animals are treated, as I make clear at the end of this paper in outlining how animals are treated in different industries such as the fur trade, farming, and experimentation. Indeed, animal welfare needs to be clarified mainly by identifying particular areas of cruelty rather than explaining what kindness to animals means.

However, although kindness to animals is a common idea, most people are totally unfamiliar with the much more historically recent and likely more complicated concept of “animal rights,” beyond the superficial idea that it criticizes our uses of animals. Thus, as an educational effort and as an attempt to develop students’ logical and critical thinking, the following document contemplates extending peace to animals considering the animal rights perspective as well as the animal welfare viewpoint. In presenting a balanced perspective on different views, people most need to learn about philosophy when it comes to animal rights, and most need to learn about the surprising details of how animals are commonly treated when it comes to animals welfare. Of course, no single perspective is being advocated, and everyone must decide for themselves. However, decisions should be informed—hence this document. Much more has been written about these ethical questions in the scholarly literature, so interested students are encouraged to learn more, and perhaps to study courses in philosophy such as “environmental ethics” which help students further to explore these issues, or by following up on readings listed in the Bibliography.

The most common view of animal welfare does not consider extending peace to animals in any extensive or systematic way. The idea of peace and animals might conjure up images of “Old MacDonald’s Farm” where cows graze peacefully, and chickens blissfully peck at the gravel for grubs. However, the reality for a majority of nonhuman animals is not so peaceful, as I will illustrate below. Animal welfarists are not fully at peace so long as animals are treated unkindly. Animals typically live miserable lives on so-called “factory farms,” fur farms, or tiny cages as part of the circus, or in laboratories. Animal rights takes a different approach to peace and animals than animal welfare. Animal rightists maintain that we treat animals violently as a norm, and furthermore that it is “speciesist” to do so. Most people do not see themselves as violent towards animals, or as supporting violence that others such as slaughterers do. Indeed, it is a fact that most

people are not in the least bit malicious or mean in their regard of animals. However, if there were a mentally disabled human being, and we killed that being for food, skin, ingredients, or forced that human to perform for our amusement using electric prods and the like, we would call that “violent.” Yet mentally disabled humans may have equivalent mental capacities as animals. So harms to them may be as significant as harms to animals and vice versa. Both can be made happy or miserable. Animal rightists thus claim that animals are harmfully discriminated against and treated violently in many common cases.

We abhor racism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, ageism, and religious discrimination. Here is a relevant question then: are we “speciesist” in upholding the rights of mentally disabled humans but not animals? Here is a typical definition of speciesism:

**Speciesism:** Arbitrarily and harmfully discriminating on the basis of species—likened to racism or sexism.

Most philosophers respond by agreeing that speciesism is wrong, but that they themselves are not speciesist. Rather, animals are treated as they are because they are less rational, capable of using language or being ethical, self-aware, sociable, etc. The problem is this description equally applies to many mentally disabled humans too.

Let us think about harmful discrimination. First of course there is the ideal of:

## No Harmful Discrimination

We cherish this ideal for human beings.

Let us now distinguish four levels of harmful discrimination in how humans and animals are treated, where each level reflects the degree of harm involved:

**Level 1: Minor discrimination.** A targeted individual will be provided with all the necessities of life but be regarded with contempt, perhaps insults, or negative attitudes. (Many people may well experience this as “major,” but still the following category is much worse...)

**Level 2: Major discrimination.** More than just verbal, results in inferior treatment (poor quality of food, shelter, clothing, or other provisions)

**Level 3: Very major discrimination.** One treated this way may be eaten, have their skins used, have body parts used as ingredients in soaps or other products, be hunted down, be forced to perform to amuse others, or be forcibly subject to experiments (some of which may be medical to find cures or treatments). *However* at this level one requirement is that the being used in these ways must be treated “kindly,” “humanely,” or with no “unnecessary suffering.”

**Level 4: Extreme discrimination.** At this level, animals may be treated the same ways as on Level 3, but with *no* regard for well-being, humaneness, or kindness. Animals who are raised in “factory farms” under crowded, stuffy, diseased, and generally miserable conditions are treated at this level. Those of my relatives who perished in the Holocaust were treated at this level. Runaway slaves who were whipped to death after trying to escape also fell to Level 4 treatment.

Now admittedly there is some arbitrariness in naming these categories, but it must be admitted that there are different degrees of harmful treatment, and while perhaps many *more* gradations could be added, there could not be *fewer* without losing the sense of these different degrees.

The simple point I make is that if animals are really treated according to their “rationality” (or other such capacities), why is it that humans who lack rationality (or whatever) to the *same* degree as animals are treated with *no* harmful discrimination (ideally, since the practices of our culture towards those with mental disabilities are quite far from perfect), but animals are treated, objectively, at Levels 3 or 4 harmful discrimination? This disparity cannot be due to animals’ lack of rationality, etc., since after all humans with the same lack of rationality, etc. are treated much better—in other words, at bottom, we inevitably find only species to be the difference at work, which animal rightists would say is a result of speciesism.

#### “Special Reasons”?

Some have tried to give “special reasons” why, in effect, we treat animals at Levels 3 or 4 and why we have the ideal of treating mentally disabled humans at the level of “No Harmful Discrimination.”

(1) *Mentally disabled humans are normally rational.* True, but they are still not, so it is not sincerely using the criterion in question. By this criterion, any student should pass a driving course in which pupils “normally” succeed.

(2) *It is a tragedy when mentally disabled humans lack rationality but not for animals.* Anyone sensitive to tragedy would presumably be sensitive to violence, which is always thought tragic when it happens to humans. We would consider killing a mentally disabled human to eat him or her violent—so it should be thought, without prejudice, in the case of other animals, according to animal rights advocates.

(3) *Mentally disabled humans look like normal humans.* This is as superficial as discrimination on the basis of skin colour, or against those disfigured by accidents.

(4) *Many people care about mentally disabled humans.* Many care about animals too, and besides however people happen to care is not the basis of ethics, or slavery would have been right when people mostly “cared for” it.

(5) *It is “natural” to prefer one’s own species just as it is to prefer one’s own family.* One does not deny rights to those who are not of one’s family, let alone treat them violently.

(6) *If we discriminate against mentally disabled humans then normal humans are next.* Not only are humans amazingly adept at discrimination (as Apartheid historically reveals), but this selfishly lacks concern for these humans with more limited mental abilities and is only directly concerned with “normal” humans. In short, there seems no “special reason” that stands up to critical scrutiny for why all human beings should be treated without harmful discrimination and animals should standardly be treated at levels 3 or 4.

We could therefore logically conclude that speciesism is at work in common thinking about animals, and that is exactly what animal rightists claim.

### **Animal Rights and the Paradox of Speciesist “Animal Welfare”**

I call the animal rights position, as an oversimplification, the view that animals including all humans be subject to no harmful discrimination. The common view in our society which most people actually subscribe to is called “animal welfarism.” Animal welfarists again generally believe that animals can be used but must be treated “kindly.” However, let us look at what “animal welfarism” amounts to in terms of the levels of harmful discrimination. “Animal welfare” is actually Level 3, or Very Major Harmful Discrimination in the analysis just given. However really most animals are treated at Level 4, simply because 95% of animals who die at human hands are raised for “meat,” and more than 90% of these live on factory farms and are brutally raised and transported to slaughter, inevitably a harrowing experience for animals. Is the debate, therefore, between “animal welfare” and “animal rights” (as it is often depicted) or rather major harmful discrimination versus animal rights? Something more to think about. Is the predominant consideration in how most people treat animals (or have animals treated by others such as slaughterers) “animal welfare” or human benefit? We would not say that black slaveholders were “black welfarists,” or tireless crusaders for the good of black people, but rather that above all they were engaged in very harmful discrimination called racism.

How can a culture which subscribes to “animal welfare” end up this way, treating most animals at Level 4, which is contrary to animal welfare? The answer lies in the idea quietly hidden in Level 3 “animal welfare” or “kindness.” The tacit idea is that human interests always take priority over animal interests, so that for a taste of flesh an animal can be confined, made to suffer and killed. And there is more money to be made in confining animals in minimal spaces (less rent), in feeding them awful food (which is cheaper), keeping them in filth rather than paying for the cleaning, letting them suffer stifling air and extremes of hot or cold rather than pay for regulation of the atmosphere in factory farms, transports, or stockyards, and transporting and killing them forcefully and hurriedly because workers are paid by the hour? See Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, for an extensive description of factory farming conditions which he draws from agricultural journals. Thus Level 3 slips into Level 4 because Level 3 “animal welfare” is more truly

about human expediency than animals truly enjoying well-being, although it is certainly true that sometimes animals are given better treatment than others.

### **Non-violence and Animals**

The only major justification for violence in the case of humans is defence, either of oneself or of someone else. The trouble is, animal rightists claim that we standardly treat animals violently when we use them, although that is not in “defence” against the animals. The animal rights view is that we have not come up with any alternative reason for treating animals violently. Rather, it is claimed that there is an absence of justification. If we reply that animals are harmed because they are different in some way such as species, that does not give us a licence to harm them. And if we say they are different in some way other than species, such as less rational, moral, etc. we see that some humans also are different in these ways, and again being different does not mean that one can be harmed. In the past people harmed people of colour because they were “different.” (Black people were or are not different from themselves of course but rather from oppressive white people.) We do not accept harming other humans because they are different, so should we accept harming nonhuman animals because they are different?

### **Best Caring Ethics and Animals**

In the second workshop of this series we saw that best caring is potentially an attractive alternative to the “big 5” theories of peace: older rights theories, feminist ethics of care, utilitarianism, ethical egoism and skepticism in ethics (see “Visions of Peace: Ethics” for an outline of this talk, and use the interactive philosophy web on this website for a more detailed understanding). Best caring however does not necessarily stop short at the species barrier between humans and other creatures. The benefits of such an approach still hold, but it may be unjust or prejudicial to withhold one’s best caring from animals other than humans but to extend one’s best caring to humans at the same time. Is animal rights correct then? Every person must decide for themselves, and there are no easy answers. A shift to animal rights in society would be expensive and difficult, and would involve awkward questions as well, such as how we should treat insects. However animal rights should not be ignored or dismissed for these reasons. All claims to rights should be considered impartially, fairly and reasonably, as should the much more common ideas about animal welfare. Few find kindness to animals to be objectionable, but animal rights has been disagreed with for a number of reasons. The following are common objections to animal rights and replies that an animal rights person might make, as part of learning about this relatively recent ethic for our treatment of nonhuman animals.

### **Animal Rights : Common Objections and Replies**

*Objection 1: Animal rights advocates should not dictate their beliefs to others.*

*Reply to 1:* This is true. However, animal rightists seek democratic reforms, not dictatorship, and advocate making informed and thoughtful *choices*. On the other hand,

animals are “dictated to” par excellence. They are generally forced (with violence if necessary) to sacrifice their lives, well-being, and freedom for human interests such as a taste of meat.

*Objection 2: Animals have no souls.*

*Reply to 2:* How can we prove that humans have souls? But if souls are bearers of experience that survive death without the body, then animals seem to have experiences too so perhaps they also have souls or psyches? It seems ethnocentric to judge that animals have no souls since many religions such as Hinduism, Jainism, and North American Native spiritual traditions hold that other animals have spirits as well. Cardinal Bellarmine makes us think by noting that even if animals do lack an immortal soul, then we should be all the more kind to them because they only have this brief sojourn—whereas we would have an eternity.

*Objection 3: It is against my religion to support animal rights.*

*Reply to 3:* Note that the case for animal rights (at least the “best caring ethics” version) is based on supporting what is best, being non-violent, justly consistent, honest in our examination of the facts, and compassionate. No major religion in the world would oppose any of these five ideals and on the contrary would support them. So animal rights may not be contrary to, let alone does it “threaten,” the spirit of any major religious tradition. If scripture is appealed to, we cannot merely go on the basis of that because the Bible for example says that eating in the mountains (which used to be considered holy ground) is punishable by death (Ezekiel 18:5-9). This means we require scripture-independent standards to judge actual holy writs, and aiming for what is best and these other ideals may offer a decent basis for sorting out such matters. People often refer to the idea that God gave humans “dominion” over animals (based in Genesis 9) but that is not a licence to be cruel, and “dominion” is the same term used for a government to have rule over a people (who of course should have rights).

*Objection 4: What about plants?*

*Reply to 4:* If plants do not feel anything or are unaware, then they are mere things like stones and nothing matters to them, but things *do* matter to animals who can suffer or feel joy. If someone believes that somehow sentient spirits are associated with plants then it should be pointed out that we would in that case necessarily have to choose between human life and plant life—and most would choose in favour of humans. We do not however have to choose to eat animals because we can be healthy, and arguably even much healthier, without eating them. John Robbins, *Diet for a New America* (Walpole: Stillpoint, 1987) argues with reference to numerous scientific double-blind studies cited from peer-reviewed medical journals that vegetarianism is healthier in terms of heart disease, cancer, diabetes and other diseases. Many other such citations exist. As well, vegetarians eat ten times fewer plants than meat-eaters since meat comes from animals who are fed grain throughout their lives. More than 80% of standard crops are devoted to animal feed. So veganism is the kindest diet for plants, if that is even a relevant consideration.

*Objection 5: Animals have no language.*

*Reply to 5:* We do not need words to find suffering to be emotionally significant, and surely we can be aware of suffering without any words such as “suffering” (or words in any other language) or any shouting of “ow!” Babies are aware of feelings before they have words, and we very often search for words to best describe what we experience. No one needs language to perceive things and find them to be joyous or hard to bear.

*Objection 6: Animals are property.*

*Reply to 6:* The same used to be true of human slaves. Yet was that best or ideal?

*Objection 7: Animals cannot behave ethically towards us, so we owe them nothing.*

*Reply to 7:* Humans sometimes lack moral capacity too but we accord them rights. That is because there is a distinction between being a moral agent, who makes ethical choices, and being a moral recipient, who is benefited and harmed but may not be able to choose to do what is morally right.

*Objection 8: Humans should have priority.*

*Reply to 8:* I may rescue my own child from a fire rather than a neighbour’s kid. But that does not mean I can treat my neighbour’s offspring violently. We do not say that mentally disabled humans are “not a priority” and therefore may be denied rights, so it would be prejudicial to say the same of nonhuman animals. Moreover, what is important needs to be reckoned from the standpoint of individuals. For example, it is important for one individual to have a crutch but perhaps not for another individual. Similarly, it is important to animals that they not be treated with avoidable suffering by humans so that must be part of what is important (or what is “of priority”) in general. What is important in general is not a free-floating abstraction but must make reference to those individuals to whom alone things are important: sentient beings (beings who can feel pleasure or pain). By contrast, mere things do not “find” anything to be important—or even unimportant.

*Objection 9: Animals cannot suffer.*

*Reply to 9:* Animals have neural anatomy that is completely analogous to our own, as well as pain-avoiding behaviours such as running, hiding, vocalizing, wincing, and more. It makes evolutionary sense that they would feel pleasure at eating, mating, etc. and pain from things that could harm them. If it is held to be “anthropomorphic” that they have minds, this merely assumes that all minds must be human in nature. Indeed, many people are anthropomorphic, or imposing human forms onto the nonhuman world, in asserting that animals have no freedom, preferences, things of importance, reasoning, communication and other things just because these things are not identical in nature to the *human* forms of these things. This finding in favour of animals’ mental lives is of course just as important to animal welfare as it is to animal rights.

We can see then that animal rights is not a view that is easily dismissed. However, regardless of whether one views the more common view of “animal welfare” or animal rights” as the most reasonable, one should be aware of how animals are commonly treated in various industries, and most people have little idea of just how harsh that treatment is (as I implied when I gave a brief account of “factory farming” above). The following section then is intended to help remedy that information gap.

## **Animal Welfare Concerns: Facts about How Animals are Most Commonly Treated**

### **Fur**

- The leg-hold trap is used 80% of time: animals languish in agony, sometimes even biting their legs off to get free
- the Coniber trap was designed as a “humane” alternative trap but it grips the whole animal’s body, often their soft underbellies, pressing to the bone and causing severe pain
- Animals are legally allowed to remain for days at a time in these traps
- 2/3 animals caught in traps are called “trash” because they are not target species: song birds, puppies, housecats, etc.
- fur-ranched animals are kept in small, wire-bottomed cages, go insane with confinement, showing “stereotypical behaviours” such as racing in circles or back and forth; they often have painful genetic deformities from being inbred just for the quality of their fur; caged mink sometimes devour offspring although they never would in the wild; ranch animals are often crudely (and cheaply) killed by electroshock, suffocation, gas, poison, decompression

### **Factory Farming**

- 95% of the animals routinely killed by humans are in intensive farms
- 8 billion animals killed for food every year in the U.S. alone, about 500 million in Canada
- “[F]actory farming means that animals are raised in the smallest possible spaces and the cheapest facilities, and that they receive the least expensive food in a manner that requires the minimum of human labour.” (Francione, *Introduction to Animal Rights*, p. 10)
- conditions rife with manure, disease, ammonia fumes, close confinement, demonstrably frustrated instincts

#### *broiler chickens*

- they are given no room to stretch their wings, dust bathe, nest, enjoy outside air or sunshine, although they instinctively enjoy these things when given the chance
- 60-80,000 birds are often tended by one person, with no care except the removal of dead birds



- beak mutilation by a guillotine-like device or a hot knife is very common practice to offset chickens from cannibalizing each other, which they do not normally do but this happens in concentrated confinement

#### *hens*

- crammed into tiny cages
- kill all male chicks because they do not lay
- hens' feet are damaged by wire cages, skin and feathers rubbed raw
- passive bird in the natural pecking order is often kept from food and water and starves/dehydrates to death
- 5 birds are typically caged in the size of a folded newspaper such as *Globe and Mail*
- mortality rates commonly 10-20%, but still profitable because so many concentrated animals

#### *dairy cows*

- intensively confined, often subjected to automated milking, subjected to stressful hormones, frequently have mastitis or infection of the udders
- concrete floors or slatted floors are common in their stalls so the manure falls below rather than being cleaned frequently
- slaughtered after five years mainly for ground "hamburger" meat
- veal calves are male dairy cows...

#### *"veal"*

- auctioned and confined often with umbilical cord still attached, early weaned after two or four days, mother bellows for days in mourning
- kept 13 to 16 days before slaughtered
- stall 19-22 ins. wide
- slatted floor above concrete, slippery with excrement (often diarrhea) causing frequent falls
- kept tethered to keep muscles soft; they get tougher when exercise is permitted
- naturally playful, not allowed to walk, let alone socialize
- iron-deficient diet for pale flesh, kept anemic which produces paleness

#### *cattle killed for food*

- confined to crowded feedlots, not allowed to roam freely as often; sometimes confined intensively to protect from "property damage" by the elements
- killed after 6 to 8 months of fattening, but have a natural lifespan of 20 to 25 years
- often dipped in pesticides
- exposed to icy or blistering elements
- dehorning, castration, ear piercing, branding are all done without anesthetics almost universally

### *pigs*

- tiny pens, concrete floors, 7 square feet each; they can stand up and lie down but not turn around again to keep muscles from toughening
- automatic feeding, slatted floors allow manure to drop
- straw bedding rare, no exercise, painful skeletal deformities common
- ammonia fumes commonly cause porcine pneumonia in over 80% by the time of slaughter
- many are “frozen” or immobile, extremely agitated by stress, or they rock back and forth
- offered “water” often own distilled wastes
- sows restrained in “iron maiden” cages so they do not crush their young which they never do normally but are known to do under the unnatural conditions of factory farming
- sows are impregnated by being subjected to the so-called “rape rack”

### *transport and slaughter*

- 72 hours without food or water, exposed to elements in trucks, commonly lose 9% body weight
- chains, hooks, board, kicks, electroshocks used to prod on animals
- all animals go screaming, bellowing, fighting, and crying pitifully to the slaughterer
- often not stunned in advance
- average meat eater consumes 12 cows, 29 hogs, 2 sheep, 37 turkeys, 984 chickens, 910 lbs. fish in a lifetime (Toronto Vegetarian Association estimate)

### **Vivisection (meaning harmful laboratory experiments)**

- 4 types of research: basic research (done for curiosity, pure theory); teaching (demonstrations for students); commercial testing of products; biomedical research
- types of harmful experiments: surgery without anesthetics, drowning, cramping, crowding, freezing, burning, crushing, car-crashing, starving, inducing aggression or passivity, compression, radiation, being impacted by weapons, and more
- other animals force-fed, rubbed raw to the skin, eye-dripped, or gassed with products supposedly being tested for safety; eat oven cleaner, pesticides, etc.; Draize test (dripping poisons into eyes of immobilized rabbit trapped in a specially designed box exposing only the head), LD-50 test means lethal-dose-50%, finished when half the animals die; common symptoms of LD-50: ruptured stomach, intestines, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, wheezing, bleeding from eyes, nose, mouth, convulsions, paralysis, possibly coma
- 95% of drugs found “safe and effective” on nonhuman animal tests are rejected during human trials (F. I. McMahon, *Medical World News* 168, vol. 6 1968)

- 40,000 species of plants were tested for antitumour activity on animals over 25 years by the United States National Cancer Institute, of ones tested “safe and effective” on animals, they are either ineffective on humans or too toxic, with the result that there was not one usable agent for humans after clinical trials were completed (Dr. Robert Sharpe, *The Cruel Deception*, p. 78; cites N. R. Farnsworth and J. M. Pezzuto, paper presented at University of Panama workshop sponsored by the International Foundation for Science, 1982. Reproduced in *Lord Dowding Fund Bulletin*, 26-34, no. 21, 1984.)
- “To what extent do particular findings in mice, dogs, or other nonhumans apply to humans? No one can know without comparing the nonhuman-animal data to the corresponding human data. But if the human data are available, the nonhuman data are superfluous. In lieu of human data, nonhuman-animal data are dangerously unreliable. Eighty percent of drugs fail human trials *after* passing nonhuman-animal tests. In humans the drugs prove ineffective or harmful.” (Joan Dunayer, *Animal Equality* (Derwood, MD: Ryce Publishing, 2001), p. 105; cites “Molecules and Markets: A Survey of Pharmaceuticals,” *Economist* 7 Feb. 1987, 14-page insert between pp. 50 and 51) [Here we have a different but also high figure of frequency of drugs tested as safe and effective on animals but that fail human clinical trials]
- the more medically relevant an animal is, the more similar it is to us, but the more similar it is to us, should we not be more inclined to grant these animals rights?
- biomedical research constitutes only a minority of all vivisection, most goes unpublished, very much gets repeated sometimes with only minor variations or complete repetition to retest the results
- there are no laws protecting research animals in Canada, only weak guidelines that are voluntary to implement, under the supervision of the Canadian Council on Animal Care; votes are taken on cases that violate the protocols, and the parties that vote are totally dominated by animal exploitation interests (pharmaceutical representatives, military representatives, etc.—only one representative speaks on behalf of animal welfare)

Animals are also used in hunting, fishing, rodeos, aquaria, circuses, zoos, in races, and films, among other usages, each with common cruelties, but I shall not detail these practices in this document but rather invite people to research these issues further. Probably the best summary of further animal welfare concerns in these industries is provided in Francione’s *Introduction to Animal Rights* (2000).

## Conclusion

How we choose to respond to these facts about animal welfare is a choice each person must make for themselves. However, both the traditional idea of kindness towards animals and the more recent idea of animal rights will find many problems in the way animals are typically treated, as will be plain from considering the facts of animal treatment outlined in the last section, and the outline of animal rights concerns above.

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### ***Recommended Audiovisual Resources***

*Peaceable Kingdom*. 2004. 77 minutes. Tribe of Heart

This film is about animal agriculture and does contain some disturbing scenes. However it also contains inspiring and uplifting footage depicting animals living in sanctuaries, and activists who act on behalf of animals in a very positive and life-affirming way.

*The Witness*. 2000. 43 minutes. Tribe of Heart.

This is the story of an unlikely animal activist, Eddie Lama, who was a hard-bitten, "macho" construction worker who cared little for animals and now innovated a form of activism through which he shows what happens to fur-bearing animals on the traplines on a screen carried inside his van—a mobile cinema for passers-by. The shocked and compassionate reactions of incredulous and sometimes crying pedestrians is memorable.

### ***Recommended Websites***

THE ANIMALS' VOICE  
<http://WWW.ANIMALSVOICE.COM>

THE CENTRE ON ANIMAL LIBERATION AFFAIRS  
<http://WWW.CALA-ONLINE.ORG>

THE FARM SANCTUARY  
<http://FARMSANCTUARY.ORG>

THE MEDICAL RESEARCH MODERNIZATION COMMITTEE  
<http://MRMCMED.ORG>

PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS  
<http://PETA-ONLINE.ORG>

PHYSICIANS' COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE MEDICINE  
<http://WWW.PCRM.ORG>

THE VEGETARIAN RESOURCE GROUP  
<http://VRG.ORG>